

Pseudorandom generators from general one-way functions III

15-859I
Spring 2003

Review:

- Our goal is to construct a PRG from any OWF
- A False Entropy Generator is a function $f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ that has $f(U_n)$ computationally indistinguishable from some ptc ensemble $D_n: \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ where $H(D) > H(f(U))$.
- Using universal hash functions and product distributions, we can construct a PRG from a F.E.G. (4 pages from [HILL99])

Review: f' construction

- Let $f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ be a one-way function, and let $h: \{0,1\}^{p(n)} \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n+\lceil \log 2n \rceil}$ be a universal hash function. Define

$$f'(x,i,r) = (f(x), h_r(x) |_{1 \dots i + \lceil \log 2n \rceil}, i, r)$$

- Let $Y \leftarrow U_n$, then when $l < \tilde{D}_f(f(X))$, we will have $(f'(X,l,R), Y, X \cdot Y) \cong (F'(X,l,R), Y, U_1)$.
- To formalize, define two sets:
 - $T = \{(x,i) : x \in \{0,1\}^n, i \in \{0, \dots, \tilde{D}_f(f(x))\}\}$
 - $T^c = \{(x,i) : x \in \{0,1\}^n, i \in \{\tilde{D}_f(f(x))+1, \dots, n-1\}\}$

Review: FEG Construction

- Let $k(n) \geq 125n^3$, $l \in_U \{0, \dots, n-1\}$, and define

$$p_n = \Pr[l \leq \tilde{D}_f(f(x))]$$

$$m(n) = k(n)p_n - 2k(n)^{2/3}$$
- Let $X', Y' \leftarrow U_{nk(n)}, l' \in_U \{0, \dots, n-1\}^{k(n)}$, $R' \leftarrow U_{k(n)p(n)}, Z \leftarrow U_{m(n)}$.
- Let $h' : \{0,1\}^{p(n)} \times \{0,1\}^{k(n)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{m(n)}$ be a universal hash function, and $V \leftarrow U_{p(n)}$
- Define $g(p_n, X', Y', l', R', V) = (h'_V(X' \cdot Y'), f^{k(n)}(X', l', R'), V, Y')$

Review: Main Theorem

- False Entropy Theorem: g is a mildly nonuniform false entropy generator.
- Proof: Delayed...
- Main Theorem: If there exists a one-way function, then there exists a pseudorandom generator.
- Proof: Compose previous theorems: False Entropy Theorem, FEG \rightarrow (mildly nonuniform) PEG theorem, PEG \rightarrow PRG theorem, mildly nonuniform PRG \rightarrow PRG theorem.
- We're done! Oh wait, that pesky False entropy theorem...

Review: False Entropy Theorem

- Proof: Consider the distributions:

$$D = g(p_n, X', Y', l', R', V)$$

$$E = (Z, f^{k(n)}(X', l', R'), V, Y')$$

Lemma 1: $H(E) \geq H(D) + 10n^2$.

Lemma 2: $D \cong E$

Thus, g is a false entropy generator given p_n . We will show in the proof of lemma 2 that it is OK to use a value p with $p_n \leq p \leq p_n + 1/n$. Therefore we only need $\log n$ bits of advice. So g is a mildly nonuniform false entropy generator. QED

Lemma 2: $D \cong E$

Recall:

$$\begin{aligned} D &= h_V(X' \cdot Y'), f^{k(n)}(X', I', R'), V, Y' \\ E &= (Z, f^{k(n)}(X', I', R'), V, Y') \end{aligned}$$

Another way to describe D:

- For each j , choose $C_j=1$ with probability p_n
- When $C_j = 1$, choose $(X'_j, I'_j) \in T$, else $(X'_j, I'_j) \in T^C$

Define the distribution D' :

- Same as D , except when $C_j = 1$ replace j^{th} input to $h(X'_j \cdot Y'_j)$ by $B_j \leftarrow U_1$.

Lemma 2 intuition...

- Notice that by the Leftover Hash Lemma, $L_1(D', E) \leq 2^{-k(n)^{1/2}} = 2^{-5n}$, so $D' \cong E$.
- Intuitively, in D' we just replace $X'_j \cdot Y'_j$ by B_j when $(X'_j, I'_j) \in T$; and we have already shown that in this case $X'_j \cdot Y'_j \cong B_j$. So we would expect $D \cong D'$, giving $D \cong E$.
- The hybrid argument fails, however, because we can't efficiently sample from D'

Hybrid argument for $D \cong D'$

- Suppose we have A such that $\Pr[A(D)=1] - \Pr[A(D')=1] = \delta(n)$
- Define the hybrid distributions $F^{(j)}$ so that $F^{(0)}$ is distributed identically to D' up to position j and D afterwards, i.e., $F^{(j)}$ is chosen like D except that for $i \leq j$, when $C_i=1$ we replace $X'_i \cdot Y'_i$ by B_i . Thus $F^{(0)} = D'$, $F^{(k(n))} = D$
- If $J \in_U \{1, \dots, k(n)\}$, then we have that $E_J[\Pr[A(F^{(J-1)})=1] - \Pr[A(F^{(J)})=1]] = \delta(n)/k(n)$

How to fix our Hybrid argument?

- Notice that when $C_j = 0$, A has no advantage, yet when $C_j=1$ A has significant advantage.
- So A "knows" when an element $W \in T$, given $f(W, R)$.
- We will take advantage of this to build hybrid distributions which are "close" to $F^{(j)}$ allowing us to get by the problem.
- This is the last 4 technical pages of [HILL99]

New Hybrids...

- We will define two sets of hybrid distributions, $E^{(j)}, D^{(j)}$ for $j \in \{0, \dots, k(n)\}$.
- We will have $E^{(0)} = E$, $D^{(0)} = D$, and $E^{(k(n))} \approx D^{(k(n))}$.
- Define $\delta^{(j)} = \Pr[A(D^{(j)})=1] - \Pr[A(E^{(j)})=1]$.
- Then $\delta^{(0)} = \delta(n)$ and $\delta^{(k(n))} \approx 0$
- We will also have: $E_J[\delta^{(j-1)} - \delta^{(j)}] \geq \delta(n)/k(n)$
- This will allow us to (indirectly) invert f later.

Definition of $D^{(j)}, E^{(j)}$

- Define parameters:
 - $\rho = \delta(n)/16k(n)$
 - $\tau = 64n^2/\rho$
- Define: $D^{(0)} = D$; $E^{(0)} = E$; $B \leftarrow U_{k(n)}$.
- Suppose $D^{(j-1)}$ is defined. Then to sample from $D^{(j)}$:
 - Choose $c_j \in \{0, 1\}$ so that $\Pr[c_j=1] = p_n$
 - Sample $x_m \leftarrow U_n$, $i_m \in_U \{1 \dots n\}$, let $w_m = (x_m, i_m)$, $1 \leq m \leq \tau$.

D⁽ⁱ⁾ and E⁽ⁱ⁾ continued...

- Define $D^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_m)$ to be the same as $D^{(i-1)}$ except that (X'_j, l'_j) is fixed to w_m and the j^{th} input bit of h' is set to $x_m \cdot Y'_j$ if $c_j=0$ and B_j otherwise.
- Define $E^{(i-1)}(w_m)$ to be the same as $E^{(i-1)}$ except (X'_j, l'_j) is fixed to w_m .
- Define $\delta^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_m) = \Pr[A(D^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_m)) = 1] - \Pr[A(E^{(i-1)}(w_m)) = 1]$.

Sampling from D⁽ⁱ⁾ and E⁽ⁱ⁾...

- Use A and draw $O(n/\rho^2)$ samples from $D^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_m)$, $E^{(i-1)}(w_m)$ to get an estimate $\Delta^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_m)$ such that

$$\Pr[|\Delta^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_m) - \delta^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_m)| > \rho] \leq 2^{-n}$$
 (i.e., take average over $O(n/\rho^2)$ samples)
- Let $\mu \in \{1, \dots, \tau\}$ be such that $\Delta^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_\mu)$ is maximized.
- Define $D^{(i)} = D^{(i-1)}(c_j, w_\mu)$, $E^{(i)} = E^{(i-1)}(w_\mu)$

Using our hybrids

- Define $D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y)$ to be $D^{(i)}$ with $f(X'_{j+1}, Y'_{j+1}, R'_{j+1})$ replaced by $f(w, r)$, the $j+1$ input bit to h' replaced by b , and Y'_{j+1} replaced by y ; Same for $E^{(i)}(w, r, y)$.
- Define $M^A(f(w, r), b, y) =$
 - Choose $j \in_U \{0, \dots, k(n)-1\}$
 - Draw $d \leftarrow D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y)$, $e \leftarrow E^{(i)}(w, r, y)$, $b' \leftarrow U_1$.
 - If $A(d) = A(e)$, output b' ; else output $A(d)$.

Hybrid claim

- Hybrid Claim: if A distinguishes D and E with probability $\delta(n)$, M^A distinguishes $f(W, R), X \cdot Y, Y$ from $f(W, R), B, Y$ with probability at least $\delta(n)/16k(n)$
- (Hang in there... only 2pp left!)

Proof of Hybrid claim

- $\Pr[M(f(w, r), b, y) = 1] =$

$$\frac{1}{2} \Pr[A(D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y)) = A(E^{(i)}(w, r, y))] + \Pr[A(D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y)) = 1 \ \& \ A(E^{(i)}(w, r, y)) = 0]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \Pr[A(D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y)) = 1 \ \& \ A(E^{(i)}(w, r, y)) = 1] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[A(D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y)) = 0 \ \& \ A(E^{(i)}(w, r, y)) = 0] + \Pr[A(D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y)) = 1 \ \& \ A(E^{(i)}(w, r, y)) = 0]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}(E[A(D^{(i)}(w, r, b, y))] - E[A(E^{(i)}(w, r, y))])$$

$$\equiv \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}(d(j, w, r, b, y) - e(j, w, r, y))$$

Proof, con't...

- Notice that:
 - $E[d(j, w, R, x \cdot Y, Y) - e(j, w, R, Y)] = \delta^{(i)}(0, w)$
 - $E[d(j, w, R, B, Y) - e(j, w, R, Y)] = \delta^{(i)}(1, w)$
- Define $\varepsilon^{(i)} = E[\delta^{(i)}(0, W) - \delta^{(i)}(1, W)]$
- Then the advantage of M^A is:

$$E[M^A(f(W, R), X \cdot Y, Y)] - E[M^A(f(W, R), B, Y)] = E[\delta^{(i)}(0, W)/2] - E[\delta^{(i)}(1, W)/2] = E_j[\varepsilon^{(i)}]/2$$
- So we just need to show that

$$E_j[\varepsilon^{(i)}] \geq \delta(n)/8k(n)$$

Alternatively...

- Alternatively we can show that $E[\sum_j \epsilon^{\theta}] \geq 2\rho k(n)$
- We will prove this by showing that:
 - (a) $E[\delta^{(k(n))}] \leq 2^{-n+1}$
 - (b) $E[\delta^{\theta} - \delta^{\theta+1}] \leq \epsilon^{\theta} + 4\rho$
- This will give us:

$$\begin{aligned} 8\rho k(n) &= \delta(n)/2 \\ &< \delta(n) - E[\delta^{(k(n))}] \\ &= \sum_j E[\delta^{\theta} - \delta^{\theta+1}] \\ &\leq 4k(n)\rho + E[\sum_j \epsilon^{\theta}]. \end{aligned}$$

Proof of (a) $E[\delta^{(k(n))}] \leq 2^{-n+1}$

- Notice that $E^{(k(n))}$ and $D^{(k(n))}$ are identical except that the first $m(n)$ bits of $E^{(k(n))}$ are Z and the first $m(n)$ bits of $D^{(k(n))}$ are the output of h' .
- But $H_R(\text{input to } h' \mid \text{rest of } D^{(k(n))}) \geq \sum_j c_j$.
- A Chernoff bound gives us that with probability at least $1-2^{-n}$,

$$\sum_j c_j \geq k(n)p_n - k(n)^{2/3} = m(n) + k(n)^{2/3}$$
- When this is true, we get from the Leftover hash lemma that $L_1(D^{(k(n))}, E^{(k(n))}) \leq 2^{-k(n)^{2/2}} < 2^{-n}$.
- This gives us $E[\delta^{(k(n))}] \leq 2^{-n+1}$.

Proof of (b) $E[\delta^{\theta} - \delta^{\theta+1}] \leq \epsilon^{\theta} + 4\rho$

- Recall that $W \in_U T$. Define $W^C \in_U T^C$.
- Then since the $j+1$ input to h' in D^{θ} is always $X'_{j+1} \cdot Y'_{j+1}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \delta^{\theta} &= p_n E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W)] + (1-p_n) E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W^C)] \\ &= p_n E[\delta^{\theta}(1, W)] + p_n (E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W)] - E[\delta^{\theta}(1, W)]) + \\ &\quad (1-p_n) E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W^C)] \\ &< \epsilon^{\theta} + p_n E[\delta^{\theta}(1, W)] + (1-p_n) E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W^C)] \end{aligned}$$
- We will complete the proof by showing that $E[\delta^{\theta+1}] + 4\rho \geq p_n E[\delta^{\theta}(1, W)] + (1-p_n) E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W^C)]$.

To show:

$$E[\delta^{\theta+1}] + 4\rho \geq p_n E[\delta^{\theta}(1, W)] + (1-p_n) E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W^C)]$$

- A Chernoff Bound gives us that with probability at least $1-2^{-n}$, for stage j , at least n/ρ of the w_m are in T and at least n/ρ of the w_m are in T^C .
- Thus with probability at least $1-2^{-n}$, we have:

$$\max_m \{\delta^{\theta}(c, w_m)\} \geq \max\{E[\delta^{\theta}(c, W)], E[\delta^{\theta}(c, W^C)]\} - \rho$$
- Also recall that with probability at least $1-2^{-n}$, we have $|\Delta^{\theta}(c, w_m) - \delta^{\theta}(c, w_m)| < \rho$

To show:

$$E[\delta^{\theta+1}] + 4\rho \geq p_n E[\delta^{\theta}(1, W)] + (1-p_n) E[\delta^{\theta}(0, W^C)]$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{So } \delta^{\theta}(c, w_{\mu}) &\geq \Delta^{\theta}(c, w_{\mu}) - \rho \\ &= \max_m \{\Delta^{\theta}(c, w_m)\} - \rho \\ &\geq \max_m \{\delta^{\theta}(c, w_m)\} - 2\rho \\ &\geq \max\{E[\delta^{\theta}(c, W)], E[\delta^{\theta}(c, W^C)]\} - 3\rho \end{aligned}$$

With probability at least $1 - 3 \cdot 2^{-n}$. Thus:

$$\begin{aligned} E[\delta^{\theta+1}(c)] &= E[\delta^{\theta}(c, w_{\mu})] \\ &\geq \max\{E[\delta^{\theta}(c, W)], E[\delta^{\theta}(c, W^C)]\} - 4\rho \end{aligned}$$

Giving the required inequality.

So we are done

- This completes the proof that A distinguishes $f(w, r), x \cdot y, y$ from $f(w, r), b, y$.
- Thus completing the proof that a F.E. Generator can be constructed from any one-way function...
- HUGE issue: suppose we compose the various constructions to get a pseudorandom generator. Then to get inputs to f of size n , the inputs to the resulting generator will have size n^{34} . [HILL99]

Open problem

- Now we don't actually require all of the intermediate product distributions... [HILL99] claim that the same techniques can chip it down to inputs of size n^8 .
- Open problem: construct a pseudorandom generator from any one-way function f such that the security of f on inputs of size n is related to the security of g on inputs of size n^2 or n^3 .