Contents
Introduction
When evaluating the security of a system one needs to do
more than detection of vulnerabilities. Systems usually contain
multiple types of nodes along with complex connectivity matrices among
them. In order to properly identify the threats the system faces one
can construct a scenario graph. Scenario graphs represent the ways in
which an adversary can exploit
vulnerabilities to break into a system. Each path in an scenario graph
is a series of an attacker’s steps called actions, which lead to an
undesirable state. The edges in the graph are the actions, and the
nodes of the graph are the system’s states. An example of an
undesirable state is a state where the intruder has obtained
administrative access to a critical node in the network. Scenario
graphs used in the context of network security are called "attack
graphs".
Construction by hand of scenario graphs is tedious, error-prone, and
impractical
for graphs larger than a hundred nodes. Our model-checking based
toolkit automatically generates scenario graphs and enables different
analyses that system
administrators can perform on these graphs. These analyses can answer
questions such as "Given a set of
measures, what is a minimum subset needed to make this system safe?".
We strive to extend this toolkit to a more general analysis tool that
would be used in forensic analysis and intrusion detection.
People
Publications
- O.
Sheyner
“Scenario Graphs and Attack Graphs,”
Carnegie Mellon University, April 2004.
PhD Thesis.
- J.M.
Wing
“Scenario
Graphs Applied to Security,” Proceedings
of Workshop on Verification of Infinite State Systems with Applications
to Security, Timisoara, Romania, March 2005.
Summary paper.
- O.
Sheyner
and J.M.
Wing, “Tools
for
Generating and Analyzing Attack Graphs,” Proceedings of
Workshop on Formal Methods for
Components and Objects, 2004, pp. 344-371.
- S. Jha,
O.
Sheyner, and
J.M. Wing, “Two
Formal Analyses
of Attack Graphs,” Proceedings of the
15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop,
Nova Scotia, Canada, June 2002, pp. 49-63.
- O.
Sheyner,
J. Haines,
S. Jha, R. Lippmann,
and J.M. Wing, “Automated
Generation and
Analysis of Attack Graphs,” Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 2002.
Download
We supply two versions of the toolkit.
- The attack graph
toolkit, is
the toolkit developed by Oleg Sheyner for his PhD thesis. It is
specific for security applications.
- The scenario graph
toolkit, is the generalized version developed by Oren
Dobzinski.
Click
here for
installation instructions for
both tools.
Please contact
Oren with
any problem or question.