From ugw.utcs.utoronto.ca!cogsci.indiana.edu!dave Tue Mar 6 23:35:16 1990 Received: from ugw.utcs.utoronto.ca by nexus.yorku.ca with SMTP id 6215; Tue, 6 Received: from cogsci1.cogsci.indiana.edu ([129.79.238.5]) by ugw.utcs.utoronto. Received: by cogsci1.cogsci.indiana.edu (5.59/9.2jsm) id AA02969; Tue, 6 Mar 90 23:37:44 EST Date: Tue, 6 Mar 90 23:37:44 EST From: David Chalmers To: peter@nexus.yorku.ca Subject: Re: Qualia Bibliography Message-Id: <90Mar6.233601est.57428@ugw.utcs.utoronto.ca> Status: R To those who requested the qualia bibliography -- Hi. Enclosed is the bibliography on qualia, consciousness, and first-person issues in general in the philosophy of mind. It's certainly very incomplete; it basically consists of tracing references recursively, and the odd random journal search. Most listing are from the 1980's, there's an odd reference from the 70's and before if it was important, or if I happened to have the paper on hand. This is still only a fraction of the literature from the 80's, though. Any pointers to things I've missed would be appreciated. I'm still slowly compiling this, but I thought I'd send it off now to those who requested it rather than wait for a never-to-be-achieved perfection. Criteria for inclusion was essentially that the papers bear on the big first-person issues -- i.e. the "Mind-Body problem", consciousness, qualia and so on. Of course such issues form only a small minority of recent literature in the philosophy of mind, most of which is concerned with such third-person issues as propositional attitudes, mental content and folk psychology. Sometimes the third-person/first-person boundary is blurry, I've tried to be reasonably strict. I have another bibliography, about as big but by implication far less complete, which deals with third-person issues, if you're interested. I've grouped the papers under what I hope are reasonably well-defined headings, with salient names mentioned: including Subjectivity (Nagel); Knowledge Argument (Jackson); Functionalism and Qualia (Shoemaker/Block); Qualia, General; Programs and Consciousness (Searle); Machines and Consciousness, General; Subjective Experience; Consciousness; and a few others. There are some annotations, giving a one-line summary -- ignore these if you like, they may not be helpful for anyone but me, and have only been included occasionally, anyway. Any feedback is welcome. Dave Chalmers (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu) Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition Indiana University ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) Subjectivity (particularly Nagel); -------------------------------------- T. Nagel, "What is It Like To Be a Bat?", Philosophical Quarterly, 1974. [physicalism leaves out point-of-view facts] T. Nagel, _The View From Nowhere_, Oxford UP, 1986. [eliminating the subjective is impossible] L. Nemirow, Review of Nagel "Mortal Questions", Phil Rev, 1980. [understanding is not just facts; we can understand via sympathy] J. Foss, "On the Logic of What it is Like to Be a Conscious Subject", Austral J Phil, 1989. [?] [Super Neuroscientist will know our descriptions, hence everything; don't have to imagine to know what it's like] D. Pugmire, "Bat or Batman", Philosophy, 1989. [Subjectivity is not something we have *knowledge* of; (we lack comparisons)] H. Robinson, _Matter and Sense_, Cambridge UP, 1982. [??] N. Maxwell, _From Knowledge To Wisdom_, Basil Blackwell, 1985. [??] C. McGinn, _The Subjective View_, Clarendon Press, 1983. J. Margolis, _Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive Materialism_, Dordrecht-Holland, 1978. C. McMullen, "`Knowing What It's Like' and the Essential Indexical", Phil Stud, 1985. R. van Gulick, "Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental", Phil Topics, 1985. K. Akins, "What Is It Like To Be Boring and Myopic", Draft, 1989. [we can know what bat-experience is like; like nerd experience. but then...] R. Wollheim, _The Thread Of Life_, Cambridge UP, 1983. D. Lewis, "Knowing What It's Like" (postscript to "Mad Pain and Martian Pain"), in _Philosophical Papers Vol. 1_, CUP, 1983. W. Lycan ""Subjectivity"", in _Consciousness_, MIT Press, 1987. (2) The Knowledge Argument (Jackson). ------------------------------------- F. Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia", Journal of Philosophy, 1982. ["knowing" a completed neuroscience does not imply "knowing" about qualia] F. Jackson and R. Pargetter, "Causal Origin and Evidence", Theoria, 1985. F. Jackson and R. Pargetter, "The Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism About Colour", ... F. Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know", J Phil, 1986. [reply to Churchland 85; Mary *learns*, Churchland misstates the case] N. Stemmer, "Physicalism and the Argument from Knowledge", Aust. J. Phil, 1989 [physicalism explains all "evidential data", hence all facts] M. Watkins, "The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge Argument", Analysis, 1989. [Epiphenomenalism => qualia don't cause beliefs => we don't know about qualia] T. Horgan, "Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia", Phil Q, 1984. [qualia are physical, but Mary didn't know everything physical -intensionality] P.M. Churchland, "Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States", J Phil, 1985. [qualia is a normal reduction; intensional fallacy; maybe Mary can understand red; and more. good stuff on reductions, weak applications to qualia] P.M. Churchland, "Knowing Qualia: A Reply To Jackson", in _A Neurocomputational Perspective_, MIT Press, 1989. [more of the same] S. Shoemaker "Churchland on reduction, qualia, and introspection" Phil of Sci Assoc Vol 2, 1984. (1985?) (3) Functionalism and Qualia (including Absent Q, Inverted Spectra, etc). ------------------------------------------------------------------------- N. Block and J. Fodor "What Psychological States Are Not", Phil Reviews, 1972. [only touches qualia briefly, mentioning the possibility of Absent Qualia. sparked Shoemaker's reply.] S. Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia", Phil Studies, 1975. [absent qualia possible => qualia make no causal difference => no knowledge of qualia. therefore absent qualia are impossible.] N. Block, "Troubles With Functionalism", _Readings in Ph of Psych_, 1978. N. Block, "Are Absent Qualia Impossible?", Phil Review, 1980. [reply to Shoemaker 75. possibility of AQ is compatible with causal qualia. qualia make a causal difference that isn't specified on a given fnal account.] S. Shoemaker, "Absent Qualia are Impossible - A Reply to Block", in _Identity, Cause and Mind_, 1981. P.M and P.S. Churchland, "Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality", Phil Topics, 1981. L. Davis, "Functionalism and Absent Qualia", Phil Studies, 1982. W. Lycan, _Consciousness_, MIT Press, 1987. (esp. "Homunctionalism and Qualia") T. Horgan, "Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum", Phil and Phenom Research, 1984. [non-phenomenal mental events are functional, qualia are low-level physiological.] S. Shoemaker, "Some Varieties of Functionalism", Phil Topics, 1981. S. Shoemaker, "The Inverted Spectrum", J Phil, 1982. [all about the coherence and otherwise thereof] W. Lycan, "Inverted Spectrum", Ratio, 1973. J. Levin, "Functionalism and The Argument from Conceivability", Can J Phil, 1985. [argues that conceivability args are weak.] A. Marcel, "Phenomenal Experience and Functionalism", in _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_, 1988. R. van Gulick, "Qualia, Functional Equivalence and Computation", in (Otto & Tuedel) _Perspectives on Mind_, 1988. E. Conee, "The Possiblity of Absent Qualia", Phil Rev, 1985. (4) Qualia, General. -------------------- D. Mellor, "Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities", Arist Soc Supp, 1973. D. Dennett, "Quining Qualia", in _Consciousness and Contemporary Science_,1988. J. Levine, "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap", Pacific Phil Q, 1983. C. Hardin, "Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap", J Phil, 1985. H. Jacoby, "Eliminativism, Meaning, and Qualitative States", Phil Stud, 1985. M. Tye, "The Subjective Qualities of Experience", Mind, 1986. [absent/inverted qualia aren't really imaginable. knowledge argument fails, as making a discovery doesn't imply learning new facts] J. Levin, "Could Love Be Like A Heatwave?; Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience", Phil Studies, 1986. G. Harman, "The Quality of Experience", Philosophical Perspectives, to appear. [there are no real qualia problems. just Intentional confusions.] I. Fox, "On the Nature and Cognitive Function of Phenomenal Content, Part One", Phil Topics, 1989. [searching for a non-epi theory of qualia] D. Dennett, "On the Absence of Phenomenology", in (Gustafson) _Body, Mind, and Method_, 1979. P. Kitcher, "Phenomenal Qualities", Am Phil Q, 1979. (5) Are Programs Enough? (Searle) ----------------------------------------------- Searle, "Minds, Brains and Programs", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980. [following rules does not guarantee intentionality] Searle, _Minds, Brains and Science_, Harvard UP, 1984. [syntax is not sufficient for semantics] D. Hofstadter, "Reflections", in _The Mind's I_, Basic Books, 1981. [Searle is committing a level confusion.] R. Double, "Searle, Programs and Functionalism", Nature and Systems, 1983. C. Fields, "Double on Searle's Chinese Room", Nature and System, 1984. L. Carleton "Programs, Language Understanding, and Searle", Synthese, 1984. D. Cole, "Thought and Thought Experiments", Philosophical Studies, 1984. W. Rapaport, "Searle's Experiments with Thought", Philosophy of Science, 1984. [comments on Cole, general stuff on syntax/semantics] R. Sharvy, "Searle on Programs and Intentionality", Canadian J Phil, 1985. G. Rey, "What's Really Going On In Searle's `Chinese Room'", Ph Studies, 1986. S. Harnad, "Minds, Machines and Searle", 1989. [Non-symbolic function is necessary for mentality.] D. Jacquette, "Searle's Intentionality Thesis", Synthese, 1989. [Searle => intentional causation is not efficient causation] D. Jacquette, "Adventures in the Chinese Room", Phil and Phenom Research, 1989. M. Boden, "Escaping From The Chinese Room", in _AI in Philosophy_, 1988. [computers can have understanding/semantics, just because...(procedural)] D. Dennett, "Fast Thinking", in _The Intentional Stance_, MIT Press, 1987. [argues with Searle on many points. A little weak] P. Hanna, "Causal Powers and Cognition", Mind, 1985. [argues that Searle is confused, and underestimates computers. Terrible] A. Seidel, "Chinese Rooms A, B and C", Pac Phil Q, 1989. [person running prog, with interpretations, would understand. point-missing] (6) Machines and Conscious Mentality (other). --------------------------------------------- A. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", Mind, 1950. [on the Turing Test as a test for the intelligence of computers] P. Ziff, "The Feelings of Robots", Analysis, 1959. [of course computers can't think] H. Putnam, "Minds and Machines", in (Hook) _Dimensions of Mind_, 1960. [we are Turing Machines] H. Putnam, "The Mental Life of Some Machines", in (Castaneda) _Intentionality, Minds and Perception_, 1967. [more on Turing Machines] H. Putnam, "Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?", J Phil, 1964. [arguments and counter-arguments] D. Dennett, "Why You Can't Make a Computer That Feels Pain", in _Brainstorms_, 1978. D. Dennett, "Can Machines Think?", in _How We Know_ (Shafto), 1985. [defends the Turing Test] K. Gunderson, _Mentality and Machines_, Doubleday, 1971. T. Maudlin, "Computation and Consciousness", J Phil, 1989. [computational state is not sufficient...can be instantiated by a mostly inert object. (questions about counterfactuals...)] (7) Mind-Body Problem. ---------------------- J. Foss, "Is the Mind-Body Problem Empirical?", Canadian J Phil, 1987. [yes it is. empirical evidence bears on materialism, dualism, idealism, etc] C. McGinn, "Can We Solve The Mind-Body Problem?", Mind, 1989. [M-B Prob might be solvable but beyond our capacities] H. Feigl, "The Mind-Body Problem: Not a Pseudo-Problem", in Hook (ed.) _Dimensions of Mind_, NYUP, 1960. M. Levin, _Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem_, OU Press, 1979. (8) The Existence of Subjective Experience. ------------------------------------------- R. Kirk, "Sentience and Behaviour", Mind, 1974. D. Locke, "Zombies, Schizophrenics, and Purely Physical Objects", Mind, 1976 (9) Consciousness -- Eliminativist Perspectives ----------------------------------------------- K. Wilkes, "Is Consciousness Important?", Brit J for Phil of Sci, 1984. K. Wilkes, "Yishi, Duh, Um and Consciousness", in _Consciousness in Contemporary Science", 1988. P.S. Churchland, "Consciousness: The Transmutation of A Concept", Pacific Phil Q, 1983. G. Rey, "A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness", in (R. Davidson ed.) _Consciousness and Self-Regulation_, 1982. [could make a machine, duplicating usual parts of consc, very simply] (10) Consciousness and Awareness (third-person approaches) ---------------------------------------------------------- D. Dennett, "A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness", in _Brainstorms_, 1978. [very cute functional diagram of consciousness. completely 3-p, of course] D. Dennett, "How to Study Consciousness Empirically, or, Nothing Comes To Mind", Synthese, 1982. [Study consciousness by the things we say about it. Surely nothing more?] D. Dennett, "The Evolution of Consciousness", Draft, 1988. R. Nesbitt and T. Wilson, "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes", Psych Review, 1977. W. Richards, "Self-Consciousness and Agency", Synthese, 1984. [self-consciousness is consciousness of agency. Castaneda/Nozick/Nagel] (11) Consciousness, General --------------------------- J. Searle "Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality", Phil Topics, 1989. [1P has been ignored too much; even unconsc states are mental in virtue of their potential for consc.] T. Shallice, "Dual Functions of Consciousness", Psych Review, 1972. U. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process", Brit J Psych, 1956. J. Culbertson, "Consciousness: Natural and Artificial", Libra, 1989. R. Jackendoff, _Consciousness and the Computational Mind_, MIT Press, [separates computational mind from phenomenological mind, and studies the former, a 3-P approach. the residue is the "mind-mind" problem. holds that consc supervenes on intermediate level of representation] A. Elitzur, "Consciousness and the Incompleteness of the Physical Explanation Of Behavior", J of Mind and Behavior, 1989. [we talk about consc => consc has active role => physical laws are incomplete] D. Chalmers, "Consciousness and Cognition", Draft, 1990. [introduces Coherence Test on theories of mind. relationship between consciousness and claims of consciousness. ideas of pattern/information] R. van Gulick, "Consciousness, Intrinsic Intentionality, and Self-Understanding Machines", in _Consciousness in Contemporary Science_, 1988. R. van Gulick, "What Difference Does Consciousness Make?", Phil Topics, 1989. [wrestling with the problems, no answers.] G. Rey, "The Conceptual Role of Consciousness: Cartesian Intuitions", Draft, 1989. [relation between belief in consciousness and consciousness.] (12) Subjective Mental Content ------------------------------ J. Searle, "Intentionality and Its Place in Nature", Synthese, 1984. [(subjective) intentionality sure is real. it causes and is caused.] D. Chalmers, "Connectionism and Mental Content", Draft, 1989. [argues that connectionism can give a better account of phenomenological mental content]