
Lecture 24

Security - Technology

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Mutilated by Dave Eckhardt, F'04, S'06


Outline

- **Textbook coverage**
 - » Chapter 8
 - » Do not get bogged down in mathematics of DES, RSA
 - » Do understand how to use them to get jobs done
- **Security threats and techniques.**
- **Encryption**
 - » Private-key, public-key
- **Hashing**
- **IP security (IPsec)**

Security Threats

- **Impersonation.**
 - » Pretend to be another user with the intent of getting access to information or services
- **Secrecy.**
 - » Get access to the contents of packets
- **Message integrity.**
 - » Change a message unbeknownst to the sender or receiver
- **Repudiation**
 - » Denying having sent a message
- **Breaking into systems.**
 - » To steal or destroy contents
- **Denial of service.**
 - » Flooding the system so users with legitimate needs cannot get service

Active Versus Passive Threats



Three Levels of Defense

- **Using firewalls to limit access to the network.**
 - » Packets that cannot enter the network cannot cause harm
 - » Packets that do not leave the network cannot leak secrets
- **Securing the infrastructure at the network layer (IP).**
 - » Host to host or at a finer grain
 - » Can be viewed as management tool: can be done without knowledge of applications
- **Application level security.**
 - » Communicating peers execute protocols to secure their communication channel
 - » Essential for critical applications: end-to-end security
 - » Requires effort from both application developers and users

Encryption

Ciphertext = E(plaintext, K_E)

Plaintext = D(ciphertext, K_D)

Algorithm = E(), D()

- **Algorithm should generally be public**
 - » Otherwise when (!!) it is cracked you won't hear about it
 - » Easier to get known-good software implementations
 - » Encourages fast hardware implementations
- **Keys are generally kept private**
 - » Easier to change a key than an algorithm
- **Given the ciphertext, it must be “very difficult” to calculate the plaintext without K_D**
 - » Difficult = computationally very expensive
 - » Resistant to known attacks

Special Cases

Ciphertext = E(plaintext, K_E)

Plaintext = D(ciphertext, K_D)

Algorithm = E(), D()

- **Details**

- » E() and D() may be the same function
- » K_E and K_D may be the same key
- » This is called *symmetric* encryption

Perfect Encryption: One-Time Pad

- “Pad” = large **nonrepeating** set of **truly random** key letters

plaintext ONETIMEPAD

one-time pad TBF'RGF'ARFM.....

ciphertext IPKLPSFHGQ

- **Algorithm often simple**
 - » $K_E == K_D, E() == D() == XOR()$
- **Perfect if and only if**
 - » Key bits are truly random
 - » Key bits are never re-used

Simple Applications

- **Maintain secrecy of message**

A:	$m = \text{"secret msg"}$ $m' = E(m, K_E)$
A\RightarrowB:	m'
B:	$m = D(m', K_D)$

- **Prove identity by knowing a key**

- » two parties must have a shared secret

A:	$m = \text{"I am A"}$ $m' = E(m, K_E)$
A\RightarrowB:	m, m'
B:	verify $m = D(m', K_D)$

Public Key versus Private Key Cryptography

- **Private key (symmetric, e.g., DES)**
 - » Two parties share (keep private) a key k
 - » Encrypt plaintext using k
 - » Also decrypt ciphertext using k -- symmetric
- **Public key (asymmetric, e.g., RSA)**
 - » Keys come in *pairs*, K_{private} and K_{public}
 - » K_{private} is kept private by its owner
 - » K_{public} is published
 - » Sender encrypts with recipient's public key $C=E(M, K_{\text{public}})$
 - » Recipient uses private key to decrypt $M=D(C, K_{\text{private}})$
 - » Must be "impossible" to derive private key from public

Authentication Revisited

Private key

A: $m = \text{"I am A"}$
 $m' = \{m\}k_{\text{shared}}$
A \Rightarrow B: m, m'
B: verify $m' = \{m\}k_{\text{shared}}$

- Parties must share a secret before they can communicate.
- Need a separate channel to establish the shared key.

Public key

A: $m = \text{"I am A"}$
 $m' = \{m\}k_{\text{private}}$
A \Rightarrow B: m, m'
B: verify $m = \{m'\}k_{\text{public}}$

- Distribution of keys is easier: public directory of public keys
- Still need a way to reliably distribute public keys.


Data Encryption Standard

DES

- **Example of symmetric-key cryptography.**
- **Basically permutes the bits based on a 56-bit key.**
 - » **Substitution: reduce the relationship between plaintext and ciphertext**
 - » **Diffusion: move the bits around**
- **How secure is DES?**
 - » **It is becoming less secure as computers get faster**
 - » **DES has recently been “cracked” by teams of volunteers using both lots of idle workstations, and special-purpose hardware**
- **Security can be improved by running the algorithm several times, e.g. Triple-DES**
 - » **Odd fact: 2DES is less safe than DES!**

DES Algorithm

- **Use a 64-bit key to encrypt data in 64-bit blocks**
 - » Actually 56-bit key: every 8th bit is parity
- **16 “rounds”**
 - » The 56-bit key K is used to generate 16 48-bit keys $K_1 \dots K_{16}$, one for each round
- **In each round:**
 - » Substitution (S-boxes)
 - » Permutation (P-boxes)



RSA Algorithm

- **Example of a public key system.**
 - » Name based on the names of its founders
- **Key pair based on a pair of large prime numbers.**
 - » Different key sizes can be used
 - » Larger key sizes are harder to crack but also result in more expensive encryption and decryption
- **Encryption and decryption is based on exponentiation and remainder calculation.**
- **The security of RSA is based on the fact that there is no known algorithm for quickly factoring large numbers**

Public vs. Private Key Systems

- **Scale of key management.**
 - » If N users want to communicate securely, private key systems require $N \times (N-1) / 2$ keys while public key systems require only N key pairs
- **Computational cost.**
 - » Public key cryptography is much more expensive than private key cryptography
- **Compromise: use public key system to agree on temporary private keys**
- **Or: use an *authentication server* to reduce the key management complexity of private key systems.**
 - » Authentication server versus public key server

Cryptanalysis: Types of Attack

- **Goal: recover plaintext or key.**
- **Basic assumptions**
 - » Attacker has complete access to the communications (ciphertext)
 - » Cryptanalyst knows the cryptographic algorithms (and protocols)
- **Ciphertext-only**
 - » Given $C_1 = E_K(M_1)$, $C_2 = E_K(M_2)$, ..., $C_N = E_K(M_N)$
 - » Deduce M_1, M_2, \dots, M_N , or K
- **Known-plaintext**
 - » Given $M_1, C_1 = E_K(M_1)$, $M_2, C_2 = E_K(M_2)$, ..., $M_N, C_N = E_K(M_N)$
 - » Deduce K
- **Chosen-plaintext**
 - » Attacker chooses M_1, \dots, M_N and gets $C_1 = E_K(M_1)$, ..., $C_N = E_K(M_N)$
 - » Deduce K

Hash Functions

- Usually operates on an arbitrary length message to generate a fixed length message digest.
- Properties of a good hash function:
 1. Pre-image Resistant: given $f(x)$ “cannot” find x
 2. 2nd Pre-image Resistant: given x and $f(x)$, it is difficult to find $x' \neq x$ such that that $f(x) = f(x')$
 3. Collision Resistant: it is difficult to find any x', x such that that $x' \neq x$ and $f(x) = f(x')$
- If 1,2 are satisfied, the function is said to be “one way”
- Example uses:
 - » Message Authentication
 - » Password Storage
 - » Key Generation

Hash Function Usage

● Message Authentication

- » A: “I have published the new OpenBSD CD-ROM image on lots of FTP servers.”
- » B: “I have downloaded an image from ftp.asdfsdfa.org ... Is it the right one?”
- » A: “Oh, the MD5 hash of the image I published is d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e.”

● Password Storage

- » Storing passwords in a file makes the file very attractive to thieves...
- » Solution: store MD5(password) instead. When user types in password, compute MD5(typed), compare to MD5(password).

Thinking About Protocols

- **Goals**

- » Prove somebody has a certain identity, or certain authorization

- **Tools**

- » “Reasonable” assumptions about keys

- A knows A's private key
- Nobody else knows A's private key

- » Encryption really is secret

- If X can decrypt a message encrypted with A's private key, X must know A's private key (therefore X is A)

- » Secure hashing really works


- If I send you a hash of a message, I must know the message contents (or I stole the hash from somebody who did know the message contents)
- If a hash and a message match, the message contents were not changed in transit

Using an Authentication Server

- Avoid n^2 key problem: each principal shares a key with server.

» Server S helps in authenticating A to B



A ⇒ B :	“I am A”
B ⇒ A :	n
A :	$n' = \{n\}k_A$
A ⇒ B :	n'
B :	$n'' = \{A, n'\}k_B$
B ⇒ S :	n''
S :	recover A, n' extract $n = \{n''\}k_A$ $m = \{n\}k_B$
S ⇒ B :	m
B :	verify $m = \{n\}k_B$




Authentication

- **Use authentication to illustrate some of the pitfalls of using cryptography to address security threats.**
 - » Goal is for Alice to authenticate herself to Bob
- **Passwords.**
- **Encrypted passwords.**
- **Use of a nonce.**
- **A challenge-based approach.**

Plain or Encrypted Passwords




IP Spoofing



- **Fairly easy to generate packets with arbitrary IP source addresses.**
 - » Certainly when you have access to the operating system
- **Bob will send reply back to (the real) Alice.**
 - » But Trudy could intercept these replies

Preventing Replay Attack

- Include a *nonce*, a value that is used only once, in the message.
 - » Can be timestamp, random number, ...
 - » Prevents a simple replay of requests or responses



Digital Signatures

- **How can you prove somebody sent you a specific message?**
 - » Prove identify of sender and exact message contents
- **Digital signature: Bob sends Alice a plaintext message plus a cyphertext encrypted with his private key.**
 - » Alice can verify that they are the same (everybody can)
 - » Alice has proof that only Bob could have sent this message
 - since only Bob could have encrypted the message
 - » If either Bob or Alice modify the message, the other party can prove it
- **Catch: what happens if Bob advertises his private key?**

Message Digests

- **Public key cryptography can be used to sign documents, but it is computationally expensive.**
 - » Makes message nonforgeable, verifiable, nonrepudiable
- **Message digests save on computation costs by computing a small digest of the message, which can then be signed.**
 - » Uses a many-to-one hash function H , i.e., $m = H(M)$
 - » Given m , it is infeasible to find an N so $m=H(N)$
 - » It is infeasible to find an M and N so $H(M)=H(N)$
- **Example: MD5.**
 - » Computes a 128 bit digest
 - » Alternative: SHA-1, a US federal standard; creates a 160 bit digest

2004 Update

- **Summary of 2004 was fun**
 - » ...in terms of cryptography...
 - » ...where “fun” means “horror movie” ...
- **MD5 is probably blown**
 - » A Chinese group can come up with (m_1, m_2) pairs which hash to the same value...
 - » ...fast.
- **SHA-1 is “in trouble”**
 - » SHA-1's “little brother” SHA-0 is under pressure
 - » Same technique might end up working for SHA-1
- **So much for cryptographic hashing? Unknown!**

IP Security Goals

- **Provide a set of protocols that offer security at the network layer.**
 - » Ideally every datagram sent over the Internet would be protected by IPsec
 - » Analogy: almost all letters travel in an envelope
- **Security is supported from source host to destination host.**
 - » Can cover all end-to-end information in the packet
 - Layers 4 and up
 - Raises some issues with regard to classification
 - flow id's, firewall policy
 - » IPsec may not be sufficient for some applications
 - May want secure connection between two applications (instead of two hosts)
- **Defined for both IPv4 and IPv6.**

IP Security Components

- **IP “Authentication Header” protocol supports authentication and integrity.**
 - » Based on cryptographic authentication function that is computed using a secret authentication key
- **IP “Encapsulating Security Payload” protocol supports authentication, integrity, and confidentiality.**
 - » Encrypt entire IP datagram or upper-layer protocol data
 - » New clear-text IP header is used to carry packet through the network
- **Based on a “security association”.**
 - » Authentication/encryption state used to handle an incoming packet
 - » Selected by SPI (Security Parameter Index) field


Security Associations

- A security association manages IPsec state for one direction of a connection
- Calling host asks for a new SA; called host creates one and assigns SPI
- Calling host tags packets to that destination with the assigned SPI
- The Security Policy Database defines policies applicable to the node.
 - » Specifies policy (discard, bypass IPsec, apply IPsec) for inbound and outbound traffic
 - » Selectors identify flows: host-host or more fine grain
- The Security Association Database keeps track of the state of active connections.
 - » Protocols selected, keys, sequence numbers, ..

Authentication Header (AH) Protocol

- AH sits between IP header and the payload.
 - » Protocol 51
- Next header: protocol number of payload packet (e.g., TCP)
- Payload length: length of AH in words (-2).
- Security Parameter Index identifies the session.
- Sequence number field can be used against replay attacks.
- Authentication data: Integrity Check Value.
 - » Signed digest, e.g. DES, keyed MD5,

...



Transport versus Tunnel Mode AH

Transport mode: host-to-host

Origin host looks up SPI, adds AH header



Authenticated (-mutable)

Tunnel mode: router securely bridges two networks

Preserves host-to-host IP header


Adds router-to-router header, uses router SA, SPI




Authenticated (-mutable)

Encryption Support


- **ESP header follows IP header.**
 - » Protocol Id = 50
- **SPI and sequence number have same role as in AH.**
- **Padding is used to have make sure encrypted data is a multiple of 4 bytes, and is aligned on a 4 byte boundary.**
- **Authentication data: as in AH, but optional.**




Transport versus Tunnel Mode ESP



Example: Virtual Private Networks



V/HL	TOS	Length
ID		Flags/Offset
TTL	6	H. Checksum
128.2.156.154		
128.2.16.32		
TCP Payload		



V/HL	TOS	Length
ID		Flags/Offset
TTL	50	H. Checksum
12.132.2.54		
12.132.5.19		
Security Parameter Index		
Sequence Number Field		
[Hatched Area]		
Authentication Data		

Summary

- **Security threats and techniques**
- **Encryption**
 - » **Private-key, public-key**
 - Understand how to plug the parts together
 - Who gets which keys?
 - What do you encrypt and why?
- **Hashing**
- **IP security (IPsec)**