

Using "expert" advice Say we want to predict the stock market. We solicit n "experts" for their advice. (Will the market go up or down?) We then want to use their advice somehow to make our prediction. E.g., Expt 1 Expt 2 Expt 3 neighbor's dog truth down uр uр uр uр down up up down down Basic question: Is there a strategy that allows us to do nearly as well as best of these in hindsight?

["expert" = someone with an opinion. Not necessarily someone who knows anything.]

Simpler question

- We have n "experts".
- One of these is perfect (never makes a mistake). We just don't know which one.
- Can we find a strategy that makes no more than lg(n) mistakes?

Answer: sure. Just take majority vote over all experts that have been correct so far.

>Each mistake cuts # available by factor of 2.

>Note: this means ok for n to be very large.


What if no expert is perfect?

Intuition: Making a mistake doesn't completely disqualify an expert. So, instead of crossing off, just lower its weight.

Weighted Majority Alg:

- Start with all experts having weight 1.
- Predict based on weighted majority vote.
- Penalize mistakes by cutting weight in half.

					prediction	correct	
weights	1	1	1	1			
predictions	Y	Y	Y	Ν	Y	Y	
weights	1	1	1	.5			
predictions	Y	Ν	Ν	Y	N	Y	
weights	1	.5	.5	.5			




- M = # mistakes we've made so far.
- m = # mistakes best expert has made so far.
- W = total weight (starts at n).
- After each mistake, W drops by at least 25%.
 So, after M mistakes, W is at most n(3/4)^M.
- Weight of best expert is (1/2)^m. So,


$$(1/2)^m \le n(3/4)^M$$

 $(4/3)^M \le n2^m$
 $M \le 2.4(m + \lg n)$

So, if m is small, then M is pretty small too.

Randomized Weighted Majority 2.4(m + lg n) not so good if the best expert makes a mistake 20% of the time. Can we do better? Yes. • Instead of taking majority vote, use weights as probabilities. (e.g., if 70% on up, 30% on down, then pick 70:30) Idea: smooth out the worst case. • Also, generalize $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1- ε . Solves to: $M \le \frac{-m \ln(1-\varepsilon) + \ln(n)}{\varepsilon} \approx (1+\varepsilon/2)m + \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \ln(n)$ $M \le \expcted$ $M \le 1.39m + 2\ln n + \varepsilon = 1/2$ $M \le 1.15m + 4\ln n + \varepsilon = 1/4$ $M \le 1.07m + 8\ln n + \varepsilon = 1/8$






What can we use this for?

In fact, alg/analysis extends to costs in [0,1], not just $\{0,1\}$.

- We assign weights w_i , inducing probabilities $p_i = w_i / \sum_j w_j$.
- Adversary chooses column. Gives cost vector $\vec{c}.$ We pay (expected cost) $\vec{p}\cdot\vec{c}.$
- Update: $w_i \leftarrow w_i(1 \epsilon c_i)$.



RWM

In fact, gives a proof of the minimax theorem...

Nice proof of minimax thm (sketch)

- Suppose for contradiction it was false.
- This means some game G has $V_C > V_R$:
 - If Column player commits first, there exists a row that gets the Row player at least $V_{\ensuremath{\mathcal{C}}\xspace}$
 - But if Row player has to commit first, the Column player can make him get only $V_{\rm R}.$
- Scale matrix so payoffs to row are in [-1,0]. Say $V_R = V_C \delta$.

 V_{R}

Proof sketch, contd

- Now, consider randomized weighted-majority alg, against Col who plays optimally against Row's distrib.
- In T steps,
 - Alg gets \geq [best row in hindsight] $-\epsilon T \log(n)/\epsilon$
 - $BRiH \ge TV_C$ [Best against opponent's empirical distribution]
 - $Alg \leq TV_R$ [Each time, opponent knows your randomized strategy]
 - Gap is δT . Contradicts assumption if use $\varepsilon = \delta/2$, once $T > \log(n)/\epsilon^2$.