



# **NORMATIVE ECONOMICS AND SYSTEM PERFORMANCE**

**ARIEL PROCACCIA**

# DISCLAIMER

- “Wild and crazy ideas”
- = “ideas so vague that it would be wild/crazy to present them”
- All statements appearing in this presentation are vague. Any resemblance to real research, published or unpublished, is purely coincidental





# FAIR DIVISION

- Example: cake cutting
- Cake is the interval  $[0,1]$
- Players have heterogeneous, additive valuations;  $\forall i, V_i([0,1])=1$
- Proportional allocation:  $\forall i, V_i(A_i) \geq 1/n$
- Envy free allocation:  $\forall i,j, V_i(A_i) \geq V_i(A_j)$



# PRICE OF FAIRNESS



# NEVERTHELESS...




Figure 9: Number of large jobs completed for each allocation scheme in our comparison of DRF against slot-based fair sharing and CPU-only fair sharing.




Figure 10: Number of small jobs completed for each allocation scheme in our comparison of DRF against slot-based fair sharing and CPU-only fair sharing.




Figure 11: Average response time (in seconds) of large jobs for each allocation scheme in our comparison of DRF against slot-based fair sharing and CPU-only fair sharing.




Figure 12: Average response time (in seconds) of small jobs for each allocation scheme in our comparison of DRF against slot-based fair sharing and CPU-only fair sharing.

From: Ghodsi et al. Dominant resource fairness: Fair allocation of multiple resource types. NSDI 2011.




# SOCIAL CHOICE

- Set of voters and set of alternatives
- Each voter ranks the alternatives
- Voting rule maps rankings to winning alternative
- Axioms used to compare voting rules
- Axioms designed to guarantee “socially desirable” outcomes



# MONOTONICITY



Voter 1


★ a ★

d

b

c

A ballot for Voter 1 consisting of four red rectangular boxes stacked vertically. The top box contains a white star, the letter 'a', and another white star. The second box contains the letter 'd'. The third box contains the letter 'b'. The fourth box contains the letter 'c'.



Voter 2


★ b ★

★ a ★

d

c

A ballot for Voter 2 consisting of four red rectangular boxes stacked vertically. The top box contains a white star, the letter 'b', and another white star. The second box contains a white star, the letter 'a', and another white star. The third box contains the letter 'd'. The fourth box contains the letter 'c'.



Voter 3

c

★ d ★

★ a ★

b

A ballot for Voter 3 consisting of four red rectangular boxes stacked vertically. The top box contains the letter 'c'. The second box contains a white star, the letter 'd', and another white star. The third box contains a white star, the letter 'a', and another white star. The fourth box contains the letter 'b'.



# DISCUSSION

- Can we quantify the benefit of axiomatic properties to system performance?
- The AI perspective:
  - Do axioms like monotonicity or envy-freeness have any meaning in a multi-agent system?
  - Example metric: robustness to random failures
  - Super vague connection: monotonic boolean functions guarantee some level of noise sensitivity
- A good answer could be important

