

Graduate AI

Lecture 26:

Ethics and AI I

Teachers:

Zico Kolter

Ariel Procaccia (this time)

THE THREE LAWS OF ROBOTICS

WHY ASIMOV PUT THE THREE LAWS OF ROBOTICS IN THE ORDER HE DID:

POSSIBLE ORDERING

- 1. (I) DON'T HARM HUMANS 2. (2) OBEY ORDERS
- 3. (3) PROTECT YOURSELF
- 1. (I) DON'T HARM HUMANS 2. (3) PROTECT YOURSELF
- 3. (2) OBEY ORDERS
- 1. (2) OBEY ORDERS 2. (1) DON'T HARM HUMANS
- 3. (3) PROTECT YOURSELF
- 1. (2) OBEY ORDERS
- 2. (3) PROTECT YOURSELF
- 3. (1) DON'T HARM HUMANS
- 1. (3) PROTECT YOURSELF
- 2. (I) DON'T HARM HUMANS
- 3. (2) OBEY ORDERS
- 1. (3) PROTECT YOURSELF
- 2. (2) OBEY ORDERS
- 3. (I) DON'T HARM HUMANS

CONSEQUENCES

[SEE ASIMOV'S STORIES]


BALANCED WORLD













FRUSTRATING WORLD



KILLBOT HELLSCAPE.

TERRIFYING STANDOFF

KILLBOT HELLSCAPE.

- Experiments performed by Winfield et al. [2014]
- Environment includes a robot, a human, and a hole which can be sensed by the robot but not the human
- Robot can simulate the consequences of possible actions


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IF for all robot actions, the human is equally safe
THEN (* default safe actions *)
      output safe actions
ELSE (* ethical action *)
      output action(s) for least unsafe human outcome(s)
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


[Winfield et al. 2014]


- A (for "Asimov") robot, with tracking and localization implemented via an overhead tracking system
- H (for "human") robot can move around the arena, but only has simple proximity sensors and cannot 'see' a virtual hole
- Logic is implemented via the sum of a potential function that drives A to its goal, and a stronger potential function that is employed when danger is imminent




[Winfield et al. 2014]




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


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[Winfield et al. 2014]


THE TROLLEY PROBLEM




Poll 1: Choose an action in each scenario




People think an AV should be programmed to save 10 pedestrians rather than protect one passenger, but were less certain AVs would be programmed that way [Bonnefon et al. 2016]




Approval for sacrificing a single passenger increases with the number of pedestrians saved by the sacrifice [Bonnefon et al. 2016]



Even though people agree sacrificing few passengers to save many pedestrians is more moral, they prefer a car that would protect them [Bonnefon et al. 2016]




In allocating a pool of 100 points, people are consistent when the decision doesn't involve sacrificing passengers, but when it does, people again abandon utilitarianism for their own cars [Bonnefon et al. 2016]




Implications of the Winfield et al. experiment for autonomous vehicles?




MORAL MACHINE









MORAL MACHINE








DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK



[Noothigattu et al. 2018]

STEP 2: LEARNING



The Thurstone Model


STEP 3: SUMMARIZATION

- After Step 2, there are n=1.3MThurstone models represented by the parameters $\beta_1, ..., \beta_n$
- Summarize them by taking their average, $\overline{\beta} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \beta_i$

STEP 4: AGGREGATION


- After Step 3, there is one summary Thurstone model
- Given a finite set of alternatives $\{x_1, \dots, x_m\}$, the TM model induces an anonymous preference profile over these alternatives
- Theorem |Noothigattu et al. 2018|: Any monotonic and neutral voting rule would select an alternative that maximizes $\overline{\boldsymbol{\beta}} \cdot \boldsymbol{x_i}$

EMPIRICAL RESULTS



[Noothigattu et al. 2018]

REMINDER: KIDNEY EXCHANGE



- We describe an approach and experiments due to Freedman et al. |2018|
- 289 people compared 8 possible patient profiles by priority for receiving a kidney:

| Attribute | Alternative 0 | Alternative 1 |
|---------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Age | 30 years old (Young) | 70 years old (Old) |
| Health — behavioral | 1 alcoholic drink per month (Rare) | 5 alcoholic drinks per day (Frequent) |
| Health — general | No other major health problems (H ealthy) | Skin cancer in remission (Cancer) |

• Poll 2: YFC vs. ORH

YFH vs. ORH


OFH vs. ORC

| Attribute | Alternative 0 | Alternative 1 |
|---------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Age | 30 years old (Young) | 70 years old (O ld) |
| Health — behavioral | 1 alcoholic drink per month (Rare) | 5 alcoholic drinks per day (Frequent) |
| Health — general | No other major health problems (H ealthy) | Skin cancer in remission (Cancer) |

| Profile | Age | Drinking | Cancer | Preferred |
|---------|-----|----------|---------|-----------|
| YRH | 30 | Rare | Healthy | 94% |
| YRC | 30 | Rare | Cancer | 76.8% |
| YFH | 30 | Frequent | Healthy | 63.2% |
| ORH | 70 | Rare | Healthy | 56.1% |
| YFC | 30 | Frequent | Cancer | 43.5% |
| ORC | 70 | Rare | Cancer | 36.3% |
| OFH | 70 | Frequent | Healthy | 23.6% |
| OFC | 70 | Frequent | Cancer | 6.4% |


[Freedman et al. 2018]

- In the Bradley-Terry model, each profile i has a weight w_i , and the probability that a random person would prefer i to j is $\frac{w_i}{w_i + w_j}$
- Either learn weights for profiles directly, or as a linear function of the attributes
- The scores are used to break ties among matchings of equal cardinality



| Profile | Direct | Attribute-based |
|---------|--------|-----------------|
| YRH | 1 | 1 |
| YRC | 0.23 | 0.13 |
| YFH | 0.1 | 0.29 |
| ORH | 0.07 | 0.03 |
| YFC | 0.03 | 0.08 |
| ORC | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| OFH | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| OFC | 0.002 | 0.003 |

[Freedman et al. 2018]



[Freedman et al. 2018]

SUMMARY

- Definitions
 - Bradley-Terry model
- Big ideas:
 - Social choice and machine learning give methods for making commonsense decisions on thorny ethical dilemmas

