For most clustering problems, our true goal is to classify the points
correctly, and commonly studied objectives such as k-median, k-means,
and min-sum are really only a proxy. That is, there is some unknown
correct clustering (grouping proteins by their function or grouping
images by who is in them) and the implicit hope is that
approximately optimizing these objectives will in fact
produce a clustering that is close pointwise to the
correct answer.
In this paper, we show that if we make this implicit assumption
explicit---that is, if we assume that any c-approximation to the
given clustering objective F is epsilon-close to the
target---then we can produce clusterings that are O(epsilon)-close
to the target, even for values c for which obtaining a
c-approximation is NP-hard. In particular, for k-median and
k-means objectives, we show that we can achieve this guarantee for
any constant c > 1, and for min-sum objective we can do this for any
constant c > 2.
Our results also highlight a difference
between assuming that the optimal solution to, say, the
k-median objective is epsilon-close to the target, and assuming
that any approximately optimal solution is epsilon-close to
the target. In the former
case, the problem of finding a solution that is O(epsilon)-close to
the target remains computationally hard, and yet for the latter we
have an efficient algorithm.
Many natural games have both good and bad Nash equilibria. In
such cases, one could hope to improve poor behavior
by a "public service advertising
campaign" encouraging players to follow a good equilibrium, and
if every player follows the advice then we are done. However, it is a
bit much to assume that everyone will follow along. In this
paper we consider the question of to what extent can such an
advertising campaign cause behavior to switch from a bad equilibrium
to a good one even if only a fraction of people actually follow the
given advice, and do so only temporarily. Unlike in the ``value of
altruism'' model, we assume everyone will ultimately act in their own
interest.
We analyze this question for several important and widely studied
classes of games including network design with fair cost sharing,
scheduling with unrelated machines, and party affiliation games (which
include consensus and cut games). We show that for some of these
games (such as fair cost sharing), a random alpha fraction of the
population following the given advice is sufficient to get a guarantee
within an O(1/alpha) factor of the price of stability for any alpha >
0. However, for some games (such as party affiliation games), there
is a strict threshold (in this case, alpha < 1/2 yields almost no
benefit, yet alpha > 1/2 is enough to reach near-optimal behavior),
and for some games, such as scheduling, no value alpha < 1 is
sufficient.
Last updated: August 2010