# Compiling C Programs into a Strongly Typed Assembly Language

Takahiro Kosakai Toshiyuki Maeda Akinori Yonezawa (Univ. of Tokyo)



#### **Brief Overview**

- We propose a method to guarantee the memory safety of C programs:
   Compile C programs into a typed assembly language
- Our contribution:
  - Designed a typed assembly language
     CTAL<sub>0</sub>
  - 2. Implemented an experimental compiler from C to CTAL<sub>∩</sub>



#### **Outline**

- Background
- Our Language: CTAL<sub>0</sub>
- Implementation of Compiler
- Related Work
- Conclusion & Future Work



#### **Outline**

- Background
- Our Language: CTAL<sub>0</sub>
- Implementation of Compiler
- Related Work
- Conclusion & Future Work



#### Background (1/2)

- C is a classic programming language developed 35 years ago
- Even today, C is popular and a lot of security-critical software is written in C
  - □ Almost all of operating systems
  - Web servers
  - □ etc...



## Background (2/2)

- However, C programs often have memory-related bugs that can easily lead to security vulnerabilities
  - Buffer overflow, dangling pointer, double free, ...
- About 40% of recent Linux kernel vulnerabilities are caused by memory-related bugs [1]

[1] SecurityFocus vulnerability database, January - June 2007.



## Why so many memory bugs?

- Because C is **not** a **memory safe** language
  - □ E.g., No protection against out-of-bounds array access
    - array[i++] = 123;
    - May cause buffer overflow
- Ensuring memory safety is a crucial step for ensuring security of software



## **Existing Work**

- There are several schemes to certify memory safety of C programs
- Two of such schemes are CCured [1] and Fail-Safe C [2]
  - Make C programs memory safe by program transformations
    - Inserting runtime bounds-checks, etc.
- [1] G.C.Necula et al., CCured: Type-safe retrofitting of legacy software, TOPLAS '05.
- [2] Y.Oiwa et al., Fail-safe ANSI-C compiler: An approach to making C programs secure, ISSS '02.




#### **Problem with Existing Schemes**

They are source-to-source translators

Procedure for ensuring memory safety

- 1. Get source code of software
- 2. Apply the schemes to get certified source code
- 3. Compile it with conventional compiler (e.g., GCC)






#### **Problem with Existing Schemes**

They are source-to-source translators

Procedure for ensuring memory safety

- 1. Get source code of software
- 2. Apply the schemes to get certified source code
- 3. Compile it with conventional compiler (e.g., GCC)






#### **Problem with Existing Schemes**

They are source-to-

Compiler may produce unsafe assembly code. We must trust it.




Source code is not often available.



#### Our Approach

Lower down the certification phase to assembly-code level





#### How to certify assembly code?

- We selected Typed Assembly Language (TAL) [1] as our starting point
- TAL is an assembly language equipped with a strong static type system
  - Well-typed assembly programs are memory safe
  - Certification of memory safety can be done by simple type-checking

[1] G.Morrisett et al., From system F to typed assembly language, POPL '98.



## How to certify assembly code?

- TAL is not suitable for compiling from C
  - □ Its target is type-safe languages like ML
  - Operations that are not type-safe are not considered
- We propose an extension of TAL, called
   CTAL<sub>0</sub>, which is aimed at C
  - □ It can handle lower-level issues such as non-type-safe casts and NULL pointers



#### **Outline**

- Background
- Our Language: CTAL<sub>0</sub>
- Implementation of Compiler
- Related Work
- Conclusion & Future Work



#### A flavor of CTAL<sub>0</sub>

Simple program named "inc" that loops infinitely, incrementing the value of register r1

```
Type annotation & \{ inc \rightarrow \forall (x). code[r1: Int(x)] \} Pseudo-instruction inc:

add r1, 1
apply inc, (x \rightarrow x + 1)
jmp inc

Ordinary assembly code
```

## 70

#### A flavor of CTAL<sub>0</sub>

```
Annotation of heap type
     Meaning: "At address inc, there is
     a value of type \forall (x). code[r1: Int(x)]"
inc \rightarrow \forall (x). code[r1: Int(x)] 
 code[r1: Int(x)] denotes instruction sequences
 that are executable if r1 has type Int(x)
 Int(x) denotes integers whose value is
 exactly equal to x
```



## Type-Checking in $CTAL_0$ (1/5)

Type-checking proceeds by manipulating:

 $\Gamma$ : Type of each register

 $\Psi$ : Type of each value in the heap

ψ : Valid logical formula over variables

```
{ inc \rightarrow \forall (x). code[r1: Int(x)] } inc: add r1, 1 apply inc, (x \rightarrow x + 1) jmp inc
```



## Type-Checking in $CTAL_0$ (2/5)

■ First,  $\Gamma$ ,  $\Psi$ ,  $\phi$  are initialized according to the heap type annotation

```
\Gamma = [\mathbf{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x)]
\Psi = \{ \ \mathsf{inc} \to \forall (x). \ \mathsf{code}[\mathbf{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x)] \}
\phi = \mathsf{True}
```

```
\{ inc \rightarrow \forall (x). code[r1: Int(x)] \}
```

#### inc:

```
add r1, 1 apply inc, (x \rightarrow x + 1) jmp inc
```



## Type-Checking in $CTAL_0$ (3/5)

When checking add, Γ(r1) is updated so that it reflects the effect of add

```
\Gamma = [\mathbf{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x + 1)]
\Psi = \{ \mathsf{inc} \to \forall (x). \; \mathsf{code}[\mathbf{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x)] \}
\phi = \mathsf{True}
\{ \mathsf{inc} \to \forall (x). \; \mathsf{code}[\mathbf{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x)] \}
\mathsf{inc}:
\mathsf{add} \; \mathsf{r1}, \; \mathsf{1}
\mathsf{apply} \; \mathsf{inc}, \; (x \to x + 1)
\mathsf{jmp} \; \mathsf{inc}
```



#### Type-Checking in $CTAL_0$ (4/5)

Next apply pseudo-instruction instantiates the polymorphic type of inc in Ψ

```
\Gamma = [\texttt{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x + 1)]
\Psi = \{ \texttt{inc} \rightarrow \mathsf{code}[\texttt{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x + 1)] \}
\phi = \mathsf{True}
```

```
{ inc \rightarrow \forall (x). code[r1: Int(x)] } inc:

add r1, 1

apply inc, (x \rightarrow x + 1)

jmp inc
```



## Type-Checking in CTAL<sub>0</sub> (5/5)

Type-checking jmp is to check the current state matches the type of jump destination

```
\Gamma = [\mathbf{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x+1)] \longleftrightarrow \mathsf{match} \to \mathsf{OK}
\Psi = \{ \mathsf{inc} \to \mathsf{code}[\mathbf{r1}: \mathsf{Int}(x+1)] \}
\phi = \mathsf{True}
```

```
{ inc \rightarrow \forall (x). code[r1: Int(x)] } inc: add r1, 1 apply inc, (x \rightarrow x + 1) jmp inc
```

This program successfully passes the type-checking



#### **Extensions to TAL**

- Key extensions in CTAL<sub>0</sub> that make it suitable for compiling from C
  - □ Two characteristic types
    - Untyped array types: Array(i)
    - Guarded types:  $\phi$  ?  $\tau_1$  :  $\tau_2$
  - □ Support of byte addressing



## **Untyped Array Types (1/2)**

- Motivation
  - □ How to deal with non-type-safe casts?

```
int arr[3];
((char *)arr)[2] = 'A';
```

- □ arr is an array of int, but it is also used as an array of char
- □ Thus arr cannot have type "Array(int)" in a strongly typed language



## **Untyped Array Types (2/2)**

- Denotes "untyped" memory blocks
  - □ CTAL<sub>0</sub> type system imposes no restrictions on their contents
  - Original TAL arrays are typed (all elements must have uniform type)
- Can deal with non-type-safe casts

```
int arr[3];
((char *)arr)[2] = 'A';
```

arr can be an untyped array



#### **Guarded Types (1/2)**

- Motivation
  - ☐ How to deal with NULL pointers?

$$\{\,\mathtt{p} o \mathtt{int}\,\}$$

- □ This heap type means: "A value of type int exists at address p"
- We want to allow p to be NULL



#### **Guarded Types** (2/2)

- Guarded type  $\phi$  ?  $\tau_1$  :  $\tau_2$  is ...
  - $\square$  equal to type  $\tau_1$ , if logical formula  $\phi$  is true
  - $\square$  equal to type  $\tau_2$ , if logical formula  $\phi$  is false
- Can represent "maybe-NULL" pointers

$$\{\mathbf{p} \rightarrow (\mathbf{p} ) \neq \mathbf{p} \}$$
  $) ? int : \langle \rangle \}$ 

- □ This heap type means: "If p is non-zero, then an int value is at address p"
  - i.e., p is either NULL or a pointer to int



## **Byte Addressing**

- All bytes in memory blocks are accessible
  - Original TAL only considers word-size access
  - This extension itself is straight-forward, but slightly complicates formalization and proof of language safety



#### **Formal Properties**

- Well-typed CTAL<sub>0</sub> programs are ...
  - Memory safe
    - Will never perform wrong memory accesses
  - □ Control-flow safe
    - Will execute only valid instructions




#### **Outline**

- Background
- Our Language: CTAL<sub>0</sub>
- Implementation of Compiler
- Related Work
- Conclusion & Future Work



## **Compiling Strategy**

- It is impossible to directly compile unsafe C programs into safe CTAL<sub>0</sub>
- Our compiler takes 2 steps
  - First, establish safety by source-level program transformation
  - □ Then, compile it to CTAL<sub>0</sub>, preserving the established safety





## **Program Transformation**

- Basically, insert bounds-checks before every memory dereference operation
  - Program will abort before doing wrong memory accesses
- To obtain correct bounds information for each pointer, we add some **meta-data** 
  - □ Using several techniques of Fail-Safe C [1]

<sup>[1]</sup> Y.Oiwa et al., Fail-safe ANSI-C compiler: An approach to making C programs secure, ISSS '02



## Transformation: Step 1 / 3

Extend each integer and pointer to

2 words

"Fat integer"

Casts between integers and pointers are freely possible

Integer: Value

Pointer:

Value



: Meta-data

Memory Block



## Transformation: Step 2 / 3

Attach to every memory block its length

Bounds checks are now possible

Integer: Value 0

Pointer: Value


Memory Block

: Meta-data



## Transformation: Step 3 / 3


Since integers are doubled in size,
 memory blocks should also be doubled





## Transformation: Step 3 / 3


Since integers are doubled in size,
 memory blocks should also be doubled





## **Typing**

■ This structure can be typed in CTAL<sub>0</sub>





#### **Supported Features**

- Casts between integers and pointers
  - Using fat integers
- Arrays, structures, unions
  - By treating them as untyped arrays
- Function pointers
- Dynamic memory allocation (malloc)



## **Preliminary Experiment**

- We have successfully compiled ...
  - Simple insertion sort program
  - glibc's quick sort function
    - Heavily uses function pointers
  - ☐ Huffman-code compressor
  - xvgif (GIF image decoding library)
    - Successfully detected and prevented a known buffer overflow bug
  - □ etc.



#### **Outline**

- Background
- Our Language: CTAL<sub>0</sub>
- Implementation of Compiler
- Related Work
- Conclusion & Future Work



#### **Related Work**

- CCured [1], Fail-Safe C [2]
  - Ensure memory safety of C programs
  - □ Good runtime performance
  - Source-to-source translators; there is no safety guarantee on assembly code

- [1] G.C.Necula et al., CCured: Type-safe retrofitting of legacy software, TOPLAS '05.
- [2] Y.Oiwa et al., Fail-safe ANSI-C compiler: An approach to making C programs secure, ISSS '02.



#### **Related Work**

- Typed Assembly Language [1]
  - □ Basis of our language CTAL<sub>0</sub>
  - Mainly aimed at compiling from ML-like type-safe functional languages
- TALx86 [2]
  - □ TAL for Intel IA-32 architecture
  - Mainly aimed at compiling from Popcorn (an imperative, safe language)
- [1] G.Morrisett et al., From system F to typed assembly language, POPL '98.
- [2] G.Morrisett et al., TALx86: A realistic typed assembly language, WCSSS '99



#### **Outline**

- Background
- Our Language: CTAL<sub>0</sub>
- Implementation of Compiler
- Related Work
- Conclusion & Future Work



#### Conclusion

- We have proposed a new typed assembly language CTAL<sub>0</sub>, based on TAL
  - Guarantees memory safety at assembly-code level
- We have implemented an experimental compiler from C to CTAL<sub>0</sub>
  - Supports free intermixing of integers and pointers, arrays, structures, unions, and function pointers



#### **Future Work**

- Improve compiler implementation
  - Optimization and static analysis to remove redundant dynamic checks
  - □ Binary compatibility with existing libraries
- Enrich CTAL<sub>0</sub>'s type system
  - Support explicit memory deallocation
  - Support linking of object files



## Fin.