ProSec Dimensions of Declassification in Theory and Practice

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partly based on joint work with A. Askarov and D. Sands

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A scenario: free service software

Users freely download and use the software providing a service:

- Grokster, Kazaa,
 Morpheus,... are file sharing services helping
 users exchange files
- Come with "hooks" for automatic updates
- Support advertisement to justify cost







Real story: malware

Users are tricked to download software bundled with:

- Homepage/search hijackers (MySearch)
- Unsolicited pop-up ads
- Rewriting URLs to override original ads with own
- "Hooks" for automatic updates are used to execute the advertiser's arbitrary code (MediaUpdate, DownLoadware)
- Information gathering—visited URLs and filled forms are forwarded to a third-party (Gator, IPInsight, Transponder)







General problem: malicious and/or buggy code is a threat

- Trends in software
 - mobile code, executable content
 - platform-independence
 - extensibility
- These trends are attackers' opportunities!
 - easy to distribute worms, viruses, exploits,...
 - write (an attack) once, run everywhere
 - systems are vulnerable to undesirable modifications
- Need to keep the trends without compromising information security

Need for language-based security

- Looking under the street light...
 Common attacker model:
 - eavesdropping on network
 - modifying network traffic
 - trusted communication endpoints
- ⇒ cryptographic protection of communication
- ...for a key that lies somewhere else!
 Real story [CERT]: Most attacks are
 - remote penetrations (buffer overruns, format strings, RPC vulnerabilities,...)
 - malware (viruses, worms, DDoS slaves,...)
- ⇒ need protection at application/language level

Information security: confidentiality

- Confidentiality: sensitive information must not be leaked by computation (non-example: spyware attacks)
- End-to-end confidentiality: there is no insecure information flow through the system
- Standard security mechanisms provide no end-to-end guarantees
 - Security policies too low-level (legacy of OS-based security mechanisms)
 - Programs treated as black boxes

Confidentiality: standard security mechanisms

Access control

- +prevents "unauthorized" release of information
- but what process should be authorized?

Firewalls

- +permit selected communication
- permitted communication might be harmful

Encryption

- +secures a communication channel
- even if properly used, endpoints of communication may leak data

Confidentiality: standard security mechanisms

Antivirus scanning

- +rejects a "black list" of known attacks
- but doesn't prevent new attacks

Digital signatures

- +help identify code producer
- no security policy or security proof guaranteed
 Sandboxing/OS-based monitoring
- +good for low-level events (such as read a file)
- programs treated as black boxes
- ⇒ Useful building blocks but no end-to-end security guarantee

Confidentiality: languagebased approach

- Counter application-level attacks at the level of a programming language—look inside the black box! Immediate benefits:
- Semantics-based security specification
 - End-to-end security policies
 - Powerful techniques for reasoning about semantics
- Security enforcement
 - Analysis enforcing end-to-end security
 - Track information flow via, e.g., security types
 - Type checking by the compiler removes run-time overhead

Dynamic security enforcement

Java's sandbox, OS-based monitoring, and Mandatory Access Control dynamically enforce security policies; But:

```
high(secret)
| h:=...;
| implicit flow from h to l
| if h then l:=true else skip
```

Problem: monitoring a single execution path is not enough!

Static certification

- Only run programs which can be statically verified as secure before running them
- Static certification for inclusion in a compiler [Denning & Denning'77]
- More precise implicit flow analysis
- Enforcement by static analysis (e.g., security-type systems)

Confidentiality: preventing information leaks

- Untrusted/buggy code should not leak sensitive information
- But some applications depend on intended information leaks
 - password checking
 - information purchase
 - spreadsheet computation
 - ...
- Some leaks must be allowed: need information release (or declassification)

info


Confidentiality vs. intended leaks

 Allowing leaks might compromise confidentiality

Noninterference is violated


 How do we know secrets are not laundered via release mechanisms?


 Need for security assurance for programs with release




info

State-of-the-art








What


 Noninterference [Goguen & Meseguer]: as high input varied, low-level outputs unchanged



- Selective (partial) flow
 - Noninterference within high sub-domains [Cohen'78, Joshi & Leino'00]
 - Equivalence-relations view [Sabelfeld & Sands'01]
 - Abstract noninterference [Giacobazzi & Mastroeni'04,'05]
 - Delimited release [Sabelfeld & Myers'04]
- Quantitative information flow [Denning'82, Clark et al.'02, Lowe'02]

Security lattice and noninterference –


Security lattice:



Noninterference: flow from l to l'allowed when l □ l'

Noninterference

 Noninterference [Goguen & Meseguer]: as high input varied, low-level outputs unchanged



Language-based noninterference for c:

$$\mathsf{M}_1 =_{\mathsf{L}} \mathsf{M}_2 \ \& \ \langle \mathsf{M}_1, \mathsf{c} \rangle \ \Downarrow \ \mathsf{M'}_1 \ \& \ \langle \mathsf{M}_2, \mathsf{c} \rangle \ \Downarrow \ \mathsf{M'}_2 \Rightarrow \mathsf{M'}_1 =_{\mathsf{L}} \mathsf{M'}_2$$

Low-memory equality: $M_1 =_L M_2$ iff $M_1|_L = M_2|_L$

Configuration with M₂ and c

Average salary

Intention: release average

```
avg:=declassify((h_1+...+h_n)/n,low);
```

- Flatly rejected by noninterference
- If accepting, how do we know declassify does not release more than intended?
- Essence of the problem: what is released?
- "Only declassified data and no further information"
- Expressions under declassify: "escape hatches"

Delimited release

[Sabelfeld & Myers, ISSS'03]

 Command c has expressions declassify(e_i,L); c is secure if: if M₁ and M₂ are indistinguishable through all e_i...

$$M_1 = M_2 \& \langle M_1, c \rangle \Downarrow M'_2 \& \langle M_2, c \rangle \Downarrow M'_2 \& \forall i .eval(M_1, e_i) = eval(M_2, e_i) \Rightarrow M'_1 = M'_2$$

- \Rightarrow security
- For programs with no declassification: Security ⇒ noninterference

...then the entire program may not distinguish M₁ and M₂

Average salary revisited

Accepted by delimited release:

```
avg:=declassify((h_1+...+h_n)/n,low);
```

```
temp:=h_1; h_1:=h_2; h_2:=temp;
avg:=declassify((h_1+...+h_n)/n,low);
```

Laundering attack rejected:

```
h_2:=h_1;...; h_n:=h_1;

avg:=declassify((h_1+...+h_n)/n,low); \sim avg:=h_1
```

Who

- Robust declassification in a language setting [Myers, Sabelfeld & Zdancewic'04/06]
- Command c[•] has robustness if

```
\forall \mathsf{M}_1, \mathsf{M}_2, \mathsf{a}, \mathsf{a}'. \ \langle \mathsf{M}_1, \mathsf{c}[\mathsf{a}] \rangle \approx_{\mathsf{L}} \langle \mathsf{M}_2, \mathsf{c}[\mathsf{a}] \rangle \Rightarrow
\forall \mathsf{M}_1, \mathsf{M}_2, \mathsf{a}, \mathsf{a}'. \ \langle \mathsf{M}_1, \mathsf{c}[\mathsf{a}'] \rangle \approx_{\mathsf{L}} \langle \mathsf{M}_2, \mathsf{c}[\mathsf{a}'] \rangle
```

 If a cannot distinguish bet. M₁ and M₂ through c then no other a' can distinguish bet. M₁ and M₂

Robust declassification: examples

 Flatly rejected by noninterference, but secure programs satisfy robustness:

```
[●]; x<sub>LH</sub>:=declassify(y<sub>HH</sub>,LH)
```


```
[●]; if x<sub>LH</sub> then
y<sub>LH</sub>:=declassify(z<sub>HH</sub>,LH)
```

• Insecure program:

```
[\bullet]; if x_{LL} then y_{LL}:=declassify(z_{HH},LH)
```

is rejected by robustness

Enforcing robustness



Where

- Intransitive (non)interference
 - —assurance for intransitive flow [Rushby'92, Pinsky'95, Roscoe & Goldsmith'99]
 - nondeterministic systems [Mantel'01]
 - concurrent systems [Mantel & Sands'04]
 - —to be declassified data must pass a downgrader [Ryan & Schneider'99, Mullins'00, Dam & Giambiagi'00, Bossi et al.'04, Echahed & Prost'05, Almeida Matos & Boudol'05]

When

- Time-complexity based attacker
 - password matching [Volpano & Smith'00] and one-way functions [Volpano'00]
 - poly-time process calculi [Lincoln et al.'98, Mitchell'01]
 - impact on encryption [Laud'01,'03]
- Probabilistic attacker [DiPierro et al.'02, Backes & Pfitzmann'03]
- Relative: specification-bound attacker [Dam & Giambiagi'00,'03]
- Non-interference "until" [Chong & Myers'04]

Principle I

Semantic consistency

The (in)security of a program is invariant under semantics-preserving transformations of declassification-free subprograms

- Aid in modular design
- "What" definitions generally semantically consistent
- Uncovers semantic anomalies

Principle II

Conservativity

Security for programs with no declassification is equivalent to noninterference

- Straightforward to enforce (by definition); nevertheless:
- Noninterference "until" rejects

if h>h then I:=0

Principle III

Monotonicity of release

Adding further declassifications to a secure program cannot render it insecure

- Or, equivalently, an insecure program cannot be made secure by *removing* declassification annotations
- "Where": intransitive noninterference (a la M&S) fails it; declassification actions are observable

if h then declassify(I=I) else I=I

Principle IV

Occlusion

The presence of a declassification operation cannot mask other covert declassifications

Checking the principles

What

Semantic consistency	Conservativity	Monotonicity of release	Non- occlusion
√	√	N/A	√
√	√	✓	✓
×	√	✓	√
✓	1	✓	×
√*	/	✓	√
√*	✓	✓	×
√*	✓	×	√
×	√	×	✓
×	×	✓	√
√*	/	×	×
	consistency	consistency Conservativity Conservativity Conservativity Conservativity	consistency Conservativity of release V N/A V V X V V V V V V X X X X X X

^{*} Semantic anomalies

Declassification in practice: A case study

[Askarov & Sabelfeld, ESORICS'05]

- Use of security-typed languages for implementation of crypto protocols
- Mental Poker protocol by [Roca et.al, 2003]
 - Environment of mutual distrust
 - Efficient
- Jif language [Myers et al., 1999-2005]
 - Java extension with security types
 - Decentralized Label Model
 - Support for declassification
- Largest code written in security-typed language up to publ date [~4500 LOC]



Security assurance/Declassification

Group	Pt.	What	Who	Where
I	1	Public key for signature	Anyone	Initialization
	2	Public security parameter	Player	Initialization
	3	Message signature	Player	Sending msg
II	4-7	Protocol initialization data	Player	Initialization
	8- 10	Encrypted permuted card	Player	Card drawing
III	11	Decryption flag	Player	Card drawing
	12-	Player's secret encryption	Player	Verification
IV	13	key	Player	Verification
	14	Player's secret permutation		

Group I – naturally public data Group II – required by crypto protocol Group III – success flag pattern Group IV – revealing keys for verification

Conclusion

Road map of information release in programs

 Step towards policy perimeter defense: to protect along each dimension

 Prudent principles of declassification (uncovering previously unnoticed anomalies)

 Need for declassification framework for relation and combination along the dimensions

End of talk

