

Motivation



- Answers many questions
 - How does the Internet really operate?
 - Is it working efficiently?
 - How will trends affect its operation?
 - How should future protocols be designed?
- Aren't simulation and analysis enough?
 - We really don't know what to simulate or analyze
 - Need to understand how Internet is being used!
 - Too difficult to analyze or simulate parts we do understand

Internet Measurement



- Process of collecting data that measure certain phenomena about the network
 - Should be a science
 - · Today: closer to an art form
- · Key goal: Reproducibility
- "Bread and butter" of networking research
 - · Deceptively complex
 - Probably one of the most difficult things to do correctly

Measurement Methodologies



- Active tests probe the network and see how it responds
 - Must be careful to ensure that your probes only measure desired information (and without bias)
 - Labovitz routing behavior add and withdraw routes and see how BGP behaves
 - Paxson packet dynamics perform transfers and record behavior
 - Bolot delay & loss record behavior of UDP probes
- · Passive tests measure existing behavior
 - · Must be careful not to perturb network
 - Labovitz BGP anomalies record all BGP exchanges
 - Paxson routing behavior perform traceroute between hosts
 - · Leland self-similarity record Ethernet traffic

Types of Data



Active

- traceroute
- ping
- UDP probes
- TCP probes
- · Application-level "probes"
 - · Web downloads
 - DNS queries

Passive

- Packet traces
 - Complete
 - · Headers only
- Specific protocols
- Flow records
- Specific data
 - Syslogs ...
 - · HTTP server traces
 - DHCP logs
 - · Wireless association logs
 - DNSBL lookups
 - ...
- Routing data
 - BGP updates / tables, ISIS, etc.

Overview



- Active measurement
- Passive measurement
- Strategies
- Some interesting observations

Active Measurement



- Common tools:
 - ping
 - traceroute
 - scriptroute
 - Pathchar/pathneck/... BW probing tools

Sample Question: Topology




- What is the topology of the network?
 - At the IP router layer
 - Without "inside" knowledge or official network maps
 - Without SNMP or other privileged access
- Why do we care?
 - Often need topologies for simulation and evaluation
 - Intrinsic interest in how the Internet behaves
 - "But we built it! We should understand it"
 - Emergent behavior; organic growth

How Traceroute Works



• Send packets with increasing TTL values




- Nodes along IP layer path decrement TTL
- When TTL=0, nodes return "time exceeded" message

Problems with Traceroute



- Can't unambiguously identify one-way outages
 - Failure to reach host : failure of reverse path?
- ICMP messages may be filtered or rate-limited
- IP address of "time exceeded" packet may be the outgoing interface of the return packet



Famous Traceroute Pitfall



- Question: What ASes does traffic traverse?
- Strawman approach
 - Run traceroute to destination
 - · Collect IP addresses
 - Use "whois" to map IP addresses to AS numbers
- Thought Questions
 - What IP address is used to send "time exceeded" messages from routers?
 - How are interfaces numbered?
 - How accurate is whois data?

More Caveats: Topology Measuremen




- Routers have multiple interfaces
- Measured topology is a function of vantage points
- Example: Node degree
 - Must "alias" all interfaces to a single node
 - Is topology a function of vantage point?
 - Each vantage point forms a tree

Less Famous Traceroute Pitfall



- Host sends out a sequence of packets
 - Each has a different destination port
 - Load balancers send probes along different paths
 - · Equal cost multi-path
 - Per flow load balancing
- Why not just use same port numbers?



Designing for Measurement



- What mechanisms should routers incorporate to make traceroutes more useful?
 - Source IP address to "loopback" interface
 - AS number in time-exceeded message
 - ??
- More general question: How should the network support measurement (and management)?

_ 14

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Two Main Approaches




- Packet-level Monitoring
 - Keep packet-level statistics
 - Examine (and potentially, log) variety of packetlevel statistics. Essentially, anything in the packet.
 - Timing
- Flow-level Monitoring
 - Monitor packet-by-packet (though sometimes sampled)
 - · Keep aggregate statistics on a flow

Packet Capture: tcpdump/bpf



- Put interface in promiscuous mode
- Use bpf to extract packets of interest
- Packets may be dropped by filter
 - Failure of tcpdump to keep up with filter
 - Failure of filter to keep up with dump speeds
- Question: How to recover lost information from packet drops?



Traffic Flow Statistics



- Flow monitoring (e.g., Cisco Netflow)
 - Statistics about groups of related packets (e.g., same IP/TCP headers and close in time)
 - Recording header information, counts, and time
- More detail than SNMP, less overhead than packet capture
 - · Typically implemented directly on line card

What is a flow?



- Source IP address
- Destination IP address
- Source port
- Destination port
- Layer 3 protocol type
- TOS byte (DSCP)
- Input logical interface (ifIndex)

Flow Record Contents




Basic information about the flow...

- Source and Destination, IP address and port
- Packet and byte counts
- · Start and end times
- ToS, TCP flags


...plus, information related to routing

- Next-hop IP address
- · Source and destination AS
- Source and destination prefix



Problems with Packet Sampling Determining size of original flows is tricky For a flow originally of size n, the size of the sampled flow follows a binomial distribution Extrapolation can result in big errors Much research in reducing such errors (upcoming lectures) Flow records can be lost Small flows may be eradicated entirely

Packet Sampling Packet sampling before flow creation (Sampled Netflow) 1-out-of-m sampling of individual packets (e.g., m=100) Create of flow records over the sampled packets Reducing overhead Avoid per-packet overhead on (m-1)/m packets Avoid creating records for a large number of small flows Increasing overhead (in some cases) May split some long transfers into multiple flow records ... due to larger time gaps between successive packets time not sampled two flows



Strategy: Examine the Zeroth-Order



- Paxson calls this "looking at spikes and outliers"
- More general: Look at the data, not just aggregate statistics
 - Tempting/dangerous to blindly compute aggregates
 - Time series plots are telling (gaps, spikes, etc.)
 - Basics
 - Are the raw trace files empty?
 - Need not be 0-byte files (e.g., BGP update logs have state messages but no updates)
 - Metadata/context: Did weird things happen during collection (machine crash, disk full, etc.)

Strategy: Cross-Validation



- Paxson breaks cross validation into two aspects
 - Self-consistency checks (and sanity checks)
 - Independent observations
 - Looking at same phenomenon in multiple ways
- What are some other examples of each of these?

25

Longitudinal measurement hard



- Accurate distributed measurement is tricky!
- Lots of things change:
 - Host names, IPs, software
- Lots of things break
 - hosts (temporary, permanently)
 - clocks
 - links
 - · collection scripts
- Paxson's "master script" can help a bit

Anonymization



- Similar questions arise here as with accuracy
- Researchers always want full packet captures with payloads
 - ...but many questions can be answered without complete information
- Privacy / de-anonymization issues

PlanetLab for Network Measurement



- Nodes are largely at academic sites
 - Other alternatives: RON testbed (disadvantage: difficult to run long running measurements)
- Repeatability of network experiments is tricky
 - Proportional sharing
 - Minimum guarantees provided by limiting the number of outstanding shares
 - Work-conserving CPU scheduler means experiment could get more resources if there is less contention

Overview



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Traces Characteristics



- Some available at http://ita.ee.lbl.gov
 - E.g. tcpdump files and HTTP logs
 - Public ones tend to be old (2+ years)
 - Privacy concerns tend to reduce useful content
- Paxson's test data
 - Network Probe Daemon (NPD) performs transfers & traceroutes, records packet traces
 - Approximately 20-40 sites participated in various NPD based studies
 - The number of "paths" tested by NPD framework scaled with (number of hosts)²
 - 20-40 hosts = 400-1600 paths!

33

Observations - Routing Pathologies



- Observations from traceroute between NPDs
- Routing loops
 - Types forwarding loops, control information loop (count-to-infinity) and traceroute loop (can be either forwarding loop or route change)
 - Routing protocols should prevent loops from persisting
 - Fall into short-term (< 3hrs) and long-term (> 12 hrs) duration
 - Some loops spanned multiple BGP hops! → seem to be a result of static routes
- Erroneous routing Rare but saw a US-UK route that went through Isreal → can't really trust where packets may go!

Observations - Routing Pathologies



- Route change between traceroutes
 - · Associated outages have bimodal duration distribution
 - Perhaps due to the difference in addition/removal of link in routing protocols
- Temporary outages
 - Traceroute probes (1-2%) experienced > 30sec outages
 - Outage likelihood strongly correlated with time of day/
- Most pathologies seem to be getting worse over time

Observations - Routing Stability




- Prevalence how likely are you to encounter a given route
 - · In general, paths have a single primary route
 - For 50% of paths, single route was present 82% of the
- Persistence how long does a given route last
 - Hard to measure what if route changes and changes back between samples?
 - Look at 3 different time scales
 - Seconds/minutes → load-balancing flutter & tightly coupled
 - 10's of Minutes → infrequently observed
 - Hours → 2/3 of all routes, long lived routes typically lasted several days

ISP Topologies



- Rocketfuel [SIGCOMM02]
 - · Maps ISP topologies of specific ISPs
 - BGP → prefixes served
 - Traceroute servers → trace to prefixes for path
 - DNS → identify properties of routers
 - · Location, ownership, functionality



- · However...
 - · Some complaints of inaccuracy why?
 - · [IMC03] paper on path diversity

http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/networking/rocketfuel/

Network Topology





- Faloutsos³ [SIGCOMM99] on Internet topology
 - Observed many "power laws" in the Internet structure
 - · Router level connections, AS-level connections, neighborhood sizes
 - Power law observation refuted later, Lakhina [INFOCOM00]
- Inspired many degree-based topology generators
 - · Compared properties of generated graphs with those of measured graphs to validate generator
 - What is wrong with these topologies? Li et al [SIGCOMM04]
 - · Many graphs with similar distribution have different properties
 - · Random graph generation models don't have network-intrinsic meaning
 - · Should look at fundamental trade-offs to understand topology
 - · Technology constraints and economic trade-offs
 - Graphs arising out of such generation better explain topology and its properties, but are unlikely to be generted by random processes!

Inter-Domain Relationships

- Gao [TON01] → look at highest degree node
 - "Turning point" or plateau of valley-free path
- Subramanian [Infocom02] → merge views from multiple BGP tables. ranking each node
 - Peering edge (i, j): ranks are equal according to >50% vantage points
 - Customer-provider edge (i, j): rank(i) > rank (j) according to >50% vantage points

http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~sagarwal/research/BGP-hierarchy/





Policies: Intra- and Inter-Domain



- Mahajan et. al. [IMW02]
 - Approximate link weights on ISPs
 - · Actually, relative link weights
 - · NOT real weights
 - Use observed paths, solve constraints
 - · Only a snap-shot of the weights



- Spring et. al. [SIGCOMM03]
 - Again, use lots of traceroutes
 - · Quantify early exit between ISPs, Late exit, Load balancing

http://www.cs.washington.edu/research/networking/rocketfuel/

Routing Faults, Errors



- BGP misconfiguration Mahajan et. al. [SIGCOMM02]
 - · How prevalent? Upto 1% of BGP table size!
 - · Impact on connectivity?
 - Not much, but could increase router processing load
 - · Causes? Router reboot, old configuration, redistribution, hijacks due to typos
- Routing failures Feamster et. al [SIGMETRICS03]
 - · How often do they occur?
 - · Where do failures occurs? Everywhere, but most at edge networks and also within ASes
 - How long do they last?
 - 70% are < 5 minutes, 90% < 15 minutes
 - Do they correlate with BGP instability? Failures occur around instability → can use BGP to predict

http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/ron/

Observations – Re-ordering



- 12-36% of transfers had re-ordering
- 1-2% of packets were re-ordered
- Very much dependent on path
 - · Some sites had large amount of re-ordering
 - · Forward and reverse path may have different amounts
- Impact → ordering used to detect loss
 - TCP uses re-order of 3 packets as heuristic
 - Decrease in threshold would cause many "bad" rexmits
 - But would increase rexmit opportunities by 65-70%
 - · A combination of delay and lower threshold would be satisfactory though → maybe Vegas would work well!

Observations - Packet Oddities



- Replication
 - Internet does not provide "at most once" delivery
 - · Replication occurs rarely
 - Possible causes → link-layer rexmits, misconfigured bridges
- Corruption
 - Checksums on packets are typically weak
 - 16-bit in TCP/UDP → miss 1/64K errors
 - Approx. 1/5000 packets get corrupted
 - 1/3million packets are probably accepted with errors!

Observations - Bottleneck Bandwidth



- Typical technique, packet pair, has several weaknesses
 - Out-of-order delivery → pair likely used different paths
 - Clock resolution → 10msec clock and 512 byte packets limit estimate to 51.2 KBps
 - · Changes in BW
 - Multi-channel links → packets are not gueued behind each other
- Solution many new sophisticated BW measurement tools
 - Unclear how well they really work ☺

Observations – Loss Rates



- Ack losses vs. data losses.
 - TCP adapts data transmission to avoid loss
 - No similar effect for acks → Ack losses reflect Internet loss rates more accurately (however, not a major factor in measurements)
- 52% of transfers had no loss (quiescent periods)
- 2.7% loss rate in 12/94 and 5.2% in 11/95
 - Loss rate for "busy" periods = 5.6 & 8.7%
 - · Has since gone down dramatically...
- Losses tend to be very bursty
 - Unconditional loss prob = 2 3%
 - Conditional loss prob = 20 50%
 - Duration of "outages" vary across many orders of magnitude (pareto distributed)

Observations - TCP Behavior



- Recorded every packet sent to Web server for 1996 Olympics
 - Can re-create outgoing data based on TCP behavior > must use some heuristics to identify timeouts, etc.
- How is TCP used clients and how does TCP recover from losses
 - · Lots of small transfers done in parallel

Observations - TCP Behavior



Trace Statistic	Value	%Age
Total connections	1,650,103	100
With packet reordering	97,036	6
With rcvr window bottleneck	233,906	14
Total packets	7,821,638	100
During slow start	6,662,050	85
Slow start packets lost	354,566	6
During congestion avoidance	1,159,588	15
Congestion avoidance loss	82,181	7
Total retransmissions	857,142	100
Fast retransmissions	375,306	44
Slow start following timeout	59,811	7
Coarse timeouts	422,025	49
Avoidable with SACK	18,713	4

Flow Performance



- E2E performance Zhang et al. [SIGCOMM02]
 - Packet-level traces collected at various ISP links and ISP summary flow stats
 - Flow rate? → T-RAT
 Not as skewed as flow size;
 But highly correlated with size
 - Reason for limited flow rate?

Network congestion and receiver limitations http://www.research.att.com/projects/T-RAT/

- Classic Paxson97 paper
 - Traces of many TCP transfers
 - · Observed packet reordering and corruption
 - Measured packet loss rates and showed loss events occur in bursts
- Wide-area performance Akella et. al. [IMC03]

http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~aditya/bfind_release



 Tier 4
 35
 15

 Tier 3
 9%
 8%

 Tier 2
 12%
 13!

 Tier 1
 25%
 63!

Application Traffic Analysis



- P2P systems Saroiu et. al. [MMCN02]
 - Bandwidths distribution? Mostly DSL; better upstream bw → client-like
 - Availability? Median ~ 60min
 - · Peers often lie about bandwidth and avoid sharing

http://sprobe.cs.washington.edu/

- P2P traffic Saroiu et. al. [OSDI02]
 - · P2P traffic dominates in bw consumed
 - Kind of traffic carried: Kazaa → mostly video (bytes); web → text +images
 - File size distribution: P2P and HTTP (new)
 - P2P objects are 3X bigger
 - "Fetch-only-once" → popularity significantly different than Zipf

DNS Analysis




- Very interesting area, but little work 🕾
- Danzig [SIGCOMM92] → analysis of DNS traffic
 - How config errors contribute to inflation
- Follow-up I: Jung et. al. [IMW01]
 - · Failure-analysis and impact on latency
 - Cache hit rate (at MIT): 70%-80% → session-level = 0%!
 - Impact of TTLs: Low A-record TTLs are not bad for hit rates
 - Cache sharing: ~20 clients good enough for hit rate
- Follow-up II: Pang et. al. [IMC 04]
 - DNS infrastructure characteristics
 - Many authoritative and local name servers are both highly available
 - A few name servers get most of the load
 - Usage and availability correlated

Algorithms, Hacks



- · Counting and Sampling
 - Estan et. al. [SIGCOMM02] [IMC03]
 - Sample and hold: counting "heavy hitters"
 - Multi-resolution bit-maps: counting all flows
- Cool hacks are always hot
 - Wills et. al. [IMC03]
 - Popularity of web-sites by probing LDNS caches
 - Bellovin [IMW02]
 - Count NAT-ed hosts by looking at IPid sequences



Security, Worms



- Code-Red case study from CAIDA [IMW02]
 - Origins of infected host (country, region)? US, Korea...
 - Rate of infection? Up to 2000 hosts infected per minute!
 - How quickly were patches developed, employed?
 - Patches developed only after attack
 - Patches employed only after Code-Red v2 arrived!
- Intrusion detection Barford et. al. [SIGMETRICS03]
 - Look at >1600 firewalls logs for intrusions and extrapolate
 - Estimates about 25B intrusion attempts per day
 - Very few sources trigger a lot of attempts
 - Function in cliques
 - Intrusion attempts look normal from any single vantage point
 - Need global coordinated intrusion detection

http://wail.cs.wisc.edu/anomaly.html