Subject: U.S.S. WAHOO - REPORT OF SECOND WAR PATROL. PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 8, 1942 TO DECEMBER 26, 1942. AREA: Dog (East). OPERATION ORDER: ComSubPac SECRET Dispatch 041947 of November 1942 and ComTaskFor 42 SECRET dispatch 150805 of November 1942. PROLOGUE: Arrived Pearl Harbor on October 17, 1942, from first war patrol. Commenced refit on October 18 with U.S.S. SPERRY repair forces. Shifted to Submarine BASE, Pearl on October 22, to complete refit, which was completed on November 2. Three day training period and readiness for sea on November 8. Installed 4 inch gun and two 20 mm. guns. 1. NARRATIVE: November 8 - 0900(VW) Underway for patrol in company with small escort vessel P-28. Made trim dive, received indoctrinational depth charge, made structural test firings of 4 inch gun, and fired 10 rounds of target ammunition for training. Sighted numerous planes and ships during the day. The escort returned to port at dark. November 9 - Sighted U.S.Navy patrol planes at 0700, 0710, and 1250, all times Xray. November 14 - Passed to command of ComSoPac at zero hours zed at Lat. 7-50N; Long. 176-15E. November 16- Having run submerged during part of 14th and all of 15th daylight periods in passing Mili, decided to run on the surface; MILI, JALUIT and MAKIN all being about 120 miles distant. At 1020(M) contacted airplane at 6 miles on radar and submerged. November 20- Arrived in patrol area Dog (East) as directed by ComTaskFor 150805 of November. Sea condition 6, wind force 6, visibility low, and rains frequent. Continued submerged patrol. November 22- Sighted BOUGAINVILLE Island to southwest at a distance of about 75 miles. Sea and wind moderating. November 23- 1711(K) O.O.D. sighted an object believed to be a periscope. It was in sight for but a few seconds, and no further evidence was noted which would indicate the presence of an enemy. BOUGAINVILLE and BUKA Islands were in sight at this time. November 30- At 2030(K) in Lat. 4d 55's; Long. 154-49E sighted the smoke of a ship bearing 150dT. distance estimated at 8000 yards. Changed course to head for the smoke. The night was quite dark; sky partially overcast and threatening thunderstorms. Brilliant flashes of lightning at irregular intervals illuminated the sea and horizon on all bearings. The smoke and the target were not visible except during these flashes. At 2040 a brilliant lightning flash revealed the source of the smoke: A high hull, low superstructure vessel of considerable size, giving the appearance of a lightly burdened freighter or transport; angle on the bow about 10d starboard, range about 6000 yards. Neither sound nor radar were able to pick up the target. A destroyer escort was on station on the port bow of the target. Dived. At 2043 sound operator reported echo ranging, long scale, at true bearing of 070d, 280d relative. Started swinging left. At 2046 the second sound operator reported echo ranging on true bearing of 169d, and shortly thereafter gave a propeller count of 120 RPM on that bearing. As this was apparently the target group sighted we commenced swinging right. Commenced sound tracking. Great difficult was had in picking up the target or its escort by periscope, due to the necessity of being trained on the proper bearing at the instant of a lightning flash. Sound bearings proved inadequate for this until at 2056 a flash revealed a destroyer bearing 216dT, angle on the bow 90d starboard, range estimated at 3000 yards. As gyro angles were about 50d right and range indeterminate, did not fire. Swung right for a straight shot on a large track, but could not swing fast enough to even get a reasonable shot. At 2100 all echo ranging stopped. This was essentially a sound approach. Attack was essentially a sound approach. Attack position was lost by the time the first periscope information was obtained. Radar was not used because it failed originally to pick up target, and tests off Pearl Harbor showed that even at short ranges the entire conning tower and bridge structure must be out of the water to obtain a contact. The approach was unsuccessful partly due to inaccurate, inadequate, and confused sound information and partly due to the failure to appreciate the true nature of the approach until too late, clinging to the hoe that lightning flashes would provide data for a more accurate approach. December 2- At 0028(K) while 18 miles east of cape HENPAN, sound picked up propellers bearing 245dT, which bearing changed progressively to 180dT in 4 minutes. Moon was shinning brightly and visibility was sufficiently good to see CAPE HENPAN, and nothing could be sighted. Propeller beat verified by several operators at 130 RPM. Sound must have been made by some submerged object very close aboard, probably a fish. December 7- Having patrolled the BUKA-KILINAILAU for seventeen (17) days with but one contact decided to move eastward and patrol the direct route between TRUK and the SHORTLANDS for a few days. At 2036(K) in Lat. 5-20 S; Long. 155- 55 E, picked up propellers on sound. Propellers started suddenly, worked up to about 120 RPM and faded slowly. There was a high background noise on that bearing for about 5 minutes, which faded gradually. It sounded as it we had flushed a stationary submarine, which dove on contact. December 8- At 0220(K) in Lat. 5-20 S; Long. 156-15 E, sound picked up echo ranging to northward. At 0230 radar reported contact at 062dT at a range of 18,000 yards, which contact was then lost. Came to normal approach course. At 0237 sound and radar contacted target and commenced tracking, radar data being intermittent. At 0245 sighted target bearing 082dT, range 14,000 by radar, angle on the bow about 80d starboard. Target was a large tanker, loaded, and headed in the general direction of the SHORTLANDS, zig-zagging. Echo ranging was heard continuously from the target's general direction. Target speed computed to be 13 knots. At 0305 range had closed to 6000 yards on a track and true bearing of 145d starboard when radar contacted the escort astern of tanker. At 0307 echo ranging stopped. The approach being over submerged to 40 feet and tracked by radar and sound. Kept radar contact on AO but lost it on escort at this depth. In analyzing this approach it is apparent that is was over at the time the target was sighted, a fact which was not realized for twenty minutes thereafter. The performance of the radar and sound were gratifying. This being the important target we had moved east to get, we now headed west to return to the passage between BUKA and KILINAILAU. December 10- (Attack No. 1) At 1457 while in Lat. 4d-56' S; Long. 154-58 E, sighted heavy smoke bearing 293d T at distance of about 16 miles. For the first in ten days sea conditions were ideal for attack, with roughened surface and many whitecaps. Shifted position to northward and got ahead of the formation. Sound conditions fair to poor. The source of the smoke turned out to be a convoy of three AK's, of tonnages approximating 8500, 6000, and 4000, escorted by one ASASHIO class DD. The ships were heavily loaded and headed for the SHORTLAND area. The formation was zig- zagging by simultaneous ships movements with the DD patrolling a front about two (2) miles wide at a mean distance of about 1000 yards ahead of the leading AK. Originally we decided to attack the DD first, but although he passed us at a range of about 300 yards his maneuvers were too radical for a good shot. Picked out the largest AK as a target, swung to a large track to open the range, and at 1627(K) fired a spread of four (4) torpedoes at a range of 700 yards on 120d starboard track, bow tubes. Three torpedoes hit, which was just as well because even then he took nearly two (2) hours to sink. The second target passed about 300 yards astern during this firing. Made a setup to fire the stern tubes at third AK, but DD got pretty close before we could fire. Started down. DD laid first depth charge pattern across our stern as we passed 120 feet. They were fairly close aboard. The main induction trunk flooded, the bridge speaker flooded, some lights were knocked out, a small circulation water line carried away in the pump room, and some odd nuts, bolts, paint, etc. flew around. He continued making passes and dropping depth charges. As we passed 250 feet and blew negative the gasket on the inboard vent carried away. The flood valve did not hold, and we went to 350 feet. By using negative vent stops and locking the flood valve closed by hand it remained dry the second time. Ran silent on reverse of convoy's course, maneuvering to avoid attacks. Depth charges dropped in varying numbers at following times: 1630, 1635, 1636, 1638, 1645, 1650, 1651, 1653, 1656, 1705, 1717, 1724, 1726, 1729, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1735, 1743, and 1745. Total charges dropped were about 40, some fairly close, but after 1700 they began to fall further astern. At 1726 came to periscope depth for observation. One AK was standing down the coast, one was just beyond the target picking up survivors, and the DD was patrolling the area dropping depth charges periodically. The target was on even keel, with both wells under water, about 2 feet of the bow and stern visible, and the high part of the bridge and stack visible. There were about ten (10) boats in the water. Observed target continue to settle until dark, and at 1815 heard the bulkheads go. The watertight integrity of this ship must have been remarkable. Issued ration of 1/2 once rum to the crew. Surfaced after moonset at 2030 and moved off to north. Target identified as being similar to SYOEI MARU, which is listed in ONI- 208-J as 5624 gross tons and in "RECOGNITION OF JAPANESE MERCHANTMEN" dated February 12, 1942 as 8748 gross tons. It was a pretty big ship. At 2215 received SUBS 42 NR 73A concerning probable ships movements in our area. Assumed this to be the convoy already contacted and continued moving to northeast. At 2340 received SUBS 42 NR 75A extending area. Started general movement in direction of new area. Decided to move in slowly to give the crew a chance to recover from effects of depth charging. December 12- At 0235 in Lat. 4-29N; Long. 156-12E, sound picked up a noise similar to echo ranging. Shortly thereafter a cargo ship was sighted and picked up by radar bearing 087dT, angle on the bow 90d port, range 10,000 yards. At 0245 angle on the bow became 150d port. Radar track for 30 minutes gave a mean course of about 020dT, speed 13. Ship was plainly visible during this time, and we trailed on the quarter. As a course of 020d was heading for no known Japanese base, we expected a course change. Did not close range because of excellent visibility. Trailing was doing no good and a decision had to be reached prior to daylight. At 0305 decided to get on his track to the SHORTLAND area in case he was at a rendezvous with an escort and would proceed in that direction at daylight. He apparently continued to northeast, as that is the last we saw of him. Ship was of medium size with a single stack amidships, coal burner, and gave an appearance of being loaded. It is believed that the noise heard was a fathometer, and that he was unescorted. This noise was heard continuously after once picked up. Sound conditions were not good, no propellers were ever heard. The radar contact was fair to good, and once contact was established it gave fairly good information up to a range of about 12,000 yards. The bridge T.B.T. was used as a check. December 14- At 0815(K) sighted hospital ship similar to MANILA MARU in Lat. 6-22N; Long. 156-13 E, heading for the SHORTLANDS on course 190d. Ship was properly marked, was on a steady course at steady speed, was unescorted, and there were no aircraft in the air. This conformed to International Law. When identification was completed at a range of about 8500 yards we broke off the approach and turned away. Sound conditions were bad. The ship passed us about 3500 yards abeam and her propellers were never heard. December 14- (Attack No. 2) At 1321(K), sighted a submarine on the surface in Lat. 6-30S; Long. 156-09E, on course 015d departing the SHORTLAND area. Range estimated at 3000 yards speed 12. We just had time to swing and shoot. Fired 6 minutes and 46 seconds after sighting. During the swing, submarine was positively identified as Japanese by the large flag and the designation I2 painted on the side of the conning tower. Firing range 800 yards, fired divergent spread of three torpedoes. First torpedo hit about 20 feet forward of conning tower 37 seconds after firing. Ship went down with personnel still on the bridge. Two and one half minutes after the torpedo explosion the submarine collapsed at deep depth with a noise considerably loader than the torpedo explosion. Apparently some of the W.T. doors had been shut. There was no counter- attack. At time of sighting the visibility was poor due to rain squalls, the sea in condition 3, and sound terrible. Even at 800 yards the targets propellers could not be heard. This attack was brought to a successful end largely through the splendid coordination of four officers, whose performance was outstanding. They were: Lieut. G.W. Grider - O.O.D. and Diving Officer Lieut. R.H. O'Kane - A.A.O. Lieut. R.W. Paine - T.D.C. Operator Lt.Cmdr. D.W. Morton - A.A.O. December 15- Decided to let the area of the submarine sinking cool off so went over and looked into KIETA Harbor. There were no ships visible inside the port. While in that vicinity sighted the masts of a steamer at 1535(K), ship hull down, headed in a generally northward direction. It had apparently come out of the SHORTLAND area. Range was too great to determine the presence of an escort. Nothing was heard on sound. Masts were in sight for about 20 minutes. During the inspection of KIETA several tall towers resembling radio, directionfinder, or radar towers were noted, on the 460 meter peak of BAKAWARI Island. December 17- At 0205(K) while patrolling in Lat. 5-45 S; Long 156-13 E, picked up echo ranging. The moon had set and the night was clear and dark, with the sea a flat calm. Closed the sound by surface running and at 0241 sighted a small ship believed to be a small destroyer or escort vessel. Range at sighting estimated to be 4000 yards. Sound conditions were spotty, with the propeller sounds fading in and out - mostly out. Radar could not pick up the ship. At time of sighting we were about 20d abaft his beam, and while watching he zigged away. there were no ships in company. As a stern chase on the surface on an echo ranging anti-submarine vessel which is zigzagging has small merit, we broke off the approach. December 19- Cleared area Dog (south) at 2000(K) ad directed by Subs 42 - Serial 78 Afirm [sic]. December 20- At 0030(K) while about 30 miles East of BUKA Island we picked up a plane by its motor noise. SD radar not manned at the time. Submerged for one hour. This was the first indication of aircraft activity we had encountered in the area. At 2000(K) cleared area Dog(east) for BRISBANE in accordance with Subs 42 serial 11 cast as modified by serial 78 afirm [sic]. December 21- Sighted lights believed to be aircraft flares to westward of BUKA Island at 0010 and 0022. At 0138(K) contacted airplane on radar at 2 miles and submerged for one hour. At 1650(K) sighted smoke bearing 048dT. Position Lat. 6-20S; Long. 154-00E. Closed on normal approach course until dark but never sighted any ships. At dark we were about ten miles into GROUPERS area. Broke off the approach and resumed assigned track. Ship apparently was enroute from RABAUL to the SHORTLANDS. Received Subs serial 86 afirm [sic] at 2015(K) requiring acknowledgement. Acknowledged at 0330(K) on 23rd. December 23- While running on surface in Lat. 12-06S; Long. 157-02E, picked up airplane on radar at 5 miles and then sighted it. Plane was flying high in a cloudy sky, proceeding in a southerly direction. He sighted us, turned and headed for as at a gliding angle. Fired emergency rocket and flare. He continued to close in and at a range of about two miles we submerged. Believed plane to be friendly, but we don't even let a friendly plane come close unless he gives a clue that he recognizes us. Stayed down for an hour and when we surfaced he was gone. December 26- Passed MORETON Island light for surface into BRISBANE at 0330 (Love). SUMMARY OF SUBMARINE ATTACKS Attack # 1 Attack # 2 1. Number of torpedoes fired 4 4 2. Firing interval: 12"-9"=12" 9"-1 3. Point of aim: M.O.T. M.O.T. 4. Track angles: 122dS, 125dS 78dP, 80dP, 82dP 127dS, 130dS 5. Depth setting: First two: 15' All: 10' Second two: 6' 6. Estimated draft: 23' 18' 7. Torpedo performance: Normal. Normal. 8. Estimated enemy speed: 11 kts. 12 kts. 9. Results of attack: 3 hits. 1 hit. Target sank. Target sank. 10. Evidence of sinking: Visual. Visual. 11. Spread employed: Divergent: Divergent: 0d, 6dR, 6dL, 6dL. 0d, 4dL, 4dR. 12. Estimated firing range: 700-800 yds. 850 yds. 13. Gyro Angles: 355d 359d 8d 352d 359d 357d 2d Detailed data required is listed in table above. There were eight (8) contacts and two (2) attacks. The two night contacts, on November 30th and December 12th, should have resulted in attacks, but we muffed the chances. Anyhow, we did learn something about night fighting, we hope. 2. WEATHER. Pearl Harbor to Solomans. Normal. Trade winds to MARSHALL then variable light winds. Sea smooth, conditions 0 to 2. Usual tropical rain squalls at frequent intervals. Off Solomans. November 19-30 Ran into heavy sea with strong winds from westward, which lasted until the 22nd. Wind and sea then moderated and became variable in force and direction with short periods of calm during the shifts. Temperature remained in the middle 80's, and the humidity was low. Visibility varied, being excellent during the forenoon and limited by haze and rain squalls during afternoon and evening. In general, it was good submarine weather. December 1-10 Sea became clam, varying from 0 to 1, with humidity increasing until it became uncomfortable. Winds were light and variable. Visibility spotty with sky usually overcast and local rain squalls prevalent. December 10-20 Variable. Sea would change from calm through condition 3 and back and back to calm. Land mostly obscured by haze. Moon extremely bright with corresponding excellent night visibility. Humidity reasonable. Rain squalls were frequent. Enroute to BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA. Calm Seam with moderate swell. The normal Southeast Trades were encountered, the visibility remaining excellent day and night. Infrequent rain squalls were encountered. 3. TIDAL INFORMATION The currents were never predictable, but a general trend was sometimes noted. Off BUKA, the currents were to the North or Northeast from CAPE HENPAN to the longitude of KILINAILAU. Between latitudes 5-00S and 5-30S and longitudes 155-30E and 157-00E the currents were generally between Northeast and Southeast. In the area North of BOUGAINVILLE STRAITS the currents were to South and Southeast, regardless of wind, sea, or tides. Drift varied from 0.4 to 1.0 knots. 4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS. BUKA, BOUGAINVILLE AND KILINAILAU Islands were in sight at various times and the peaks and tangents were useful in establishing an approximate position. KILINAILAU was visible for 8 or 10 miles and showed up well at night. The Southern Reef is well covered with trees. The landmarks on BUKA plotted fairly well, especially off CAPE HENPAN. A good fix was rarely obtained off BOUGAINVILLE. The peaks were usually obscured by haze and the tangents never seemed to be in the same place twice. The southeast coast of BOUGAINVILLE Strait provided excellent landmarks for establishing position. A general land haze in the area prevented the full use of these landmarks. With the excellent night visibility prevalent no difficulty was experienced with ordinary celo-navigation. The navigation officer fixed our position once or twice each night using ordinary sextant. 5. DESCRIPTION OF ALL ENEMY WARSHIPS, MERCHANT VESSELS, PATROL VESSELS, AND SAMPANS SIGHTED INCLUDING POSITION, COURSE AND SPEED, AND TIME OF SIGHTING. 1. (a) 2030(K) November 30. (b) One large AK with 1 or 2 DD escorts. (c) Lat 4-55 S; Long. 154-49 E. (d) Course 305d. (e) Speed 13 knots. (f) Empty cargo ship and escort from SHORTLANDS to RABAUL. 2. (a) 0220(K) December 8. (b) AO similar to KYOKUTO MARU, with escort. (c) Lat 5-20 S; Long. 156-15 E. (d) Course 160d - 220d. (e) Speed 18 knots. (f) Loaded tanker and escort from EMPIRE to SHORTLANDS. 3. (a) 1630(K) December 10. (b) Convoy of 3 AK's escorted by one ASASHIO class DD. (c) Lat 4-56 S; Long. 154-58 E. (d) Course 090d - 135d. (e) Speed 11 knots. (f) Ships enroute from RABAUL to SHORTLAND fully Loaded. Sunk one AK of about 8500 tons. Ship sunk was a one deck, split well, single stack freighter, with prominent knigpost forward and aft. Kingposts were of the goalpost type with mast in the center. Stack was also very prominent for height and lack of surrounding superstructure. Tentatively identified as similar to SYOEI MARU and believed to be about 8500 tons. 4. (a) 0235(K) December 12. (b) Medium sized cargo ship probably unescorted. (c) Lat 4-29 N; Long. 156-12 E. (d) Course 345d - 030d. (e) Speed 13 knots. (f) Picked up sound similar to echo ranging which is believed to have been made by fathometer. Ship apparently enroute EMPIRE from SHORTLANDS, but seemed to be loaded. 5. (a) 0815(K) December 14. (b) Hospital ship similar to MANILA MARU. (c) Lat 6-22 N; Long. 156-13 E. (d) Course 190d. (e) Speed 12 knots. (f) Ship conformed to Geneva Convention and in accordance with directives of ComTaskFor 7 we did not attack. 6. (a) 1321(K) December 14. (b) Japanese Submarine I-2 (c) Lat 6-30 S; Long. 150-09 E. (d) Course 015d. (e) Speed 11 knots. (f) Fired three torpedoes and sunk Target. He was proceeding singly on the surface leaving the SHORTLANDS. 7. (a) 1535(K) December 15. (b) Medium sized steamship. (c) Lat 6-00 N; Long. 156-05 E. (d) Course - northerly. (e) Speed - moderate. (f) Sighted masts and stack of ship hull down. 8. (a) 0205(K) December 17. (b) Small DD or escort vessel. (c) Lat 5-45 S; Long. 156-13 E. (d) Course - southerly. (e) Speed - moderate. (f) Proceeding singly in the direction of SHORTLANDS. 6. DESCRIPTION OF ALL AIRCRAFT SIGHTED, INCLUDING TYPE, POSITION, COURSE, ALTITUDE AND TIME OF SIGHTING. 1. (a) Time and date - November 8. (b) Type - Various. (c) Position - Off Pearl Harbor. (d) Course - Various. (e) Altitude - Various. (f) Remarks - Normal operating planes. 2. (a) November 9 at 0700, 0710 and 1250. (b) U.S. Navy PBY (c) 200 - 250 miles SW of Pearl Harbor. (d) SW in AM - NE in PM. (e) 1000 - 2000 feet. (f) Routine Patrols. 3. (a) November 16 at 1020(M). (b) (c) 150 miles SW of MILI ATOLL. (d) (e) (f) Radar contact at 6 miles. 4. (a) 0030(K) December 20. (b) (c) 30 miles East of BUKA. (d) (e) (f) Picked up by motor noise. 5. (a) 0138(K) December 21. (b) (c) 50 miles west of BUKA. (d) (e) (f) Radar contact. 6. (a) 1110(K) December 23. (b) Similar to British "Albermarle I" bombers. (c) Lat. 11-50S; Long. 157-02E. (d) Various. (e) 10,000 to 15,000 feet. (f) First picked up by radar at 4 miles. Moved out to five and a half miles, then came in. Fired one recognition signal without apparent effect. 7. SUMMARY OF S/M ATTACKS. Listed under paragraph 1 NARRATIVE. 8. ENEMY A/S MEASURES. (a) Escort for AK sighted on November 20th apparently used echo ranging from about 2045 to 2100, was silent then started echo ranging again about 2145. Echo ranging on 17 kcs, with pings at 8 second intervals. Passed about 3000 yards abeam without detection - zig- zagging. (b) Escort for AO sighted on December 8th was echo- ranging continuously until we reached a point 6000 yards on his quarter, at which time echo ranging ceased. Zig-zagging. (c) Convoy encountered on December 10th was zig- zagging by simultaneous ships movements in obedience to flag hoists on escorting DD. Escort patrolled area across the front of the formation at high speed. No echo ranging was heard. Depth charge attacks after sinking of the one AK lasted for one hour 15 minutes, and DD probably expended all its depth charges. After the first four or five attacks had been delivered in rapid succession around the firing point, DD periodically stopped and listened for contact. Apparently our position was undetected once we cleared firing point. (d) Cargo ship contacted on December 12 was zig- zagging, and was making a sound similar to echo ranging which is believed to have been a fathometer. No escort was detected. (e) The small DD or escort vessel encountered on December 17th was echo ranging and zig-zagging. As he has headed in the general direction of the SHORTLANDS it is presumed that he had released a convoy to the northward and was proceeding to port. 9. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS. No minecraft or mining operations were noted. 10. MAJOR DEFECTS EXPERIENCED. The gasket on the negative tank inboard vent carried away when the vent was opened under air pressure of 120 lb.in2. A retainer should be installed on gasket similar to that on the flood valve. 11. COMMUNICATION. Radio reception was very good and was compete. Bells were copied on 44.8 kcs. and on the 5 megacycle band. The other frequencies were not as good and were seldom used. Attempted to use the underwater loop for reception submerged on December 1. Keel depth 56 feet; depth of loop 19 feet; distance to transmitting station 1200 miles; frequency 44.6 kcs. Faint signals were heard, but were unable to copy through high noise level. Used the loop for copying on surface and when running at 40 feet; signals were generally readable down to a depth of 55 feet. Last serial received 72. A 86. C 14. D 1. (Dec. 22ND,. Last serial sent 250305 . 12. SOUND CONDITIONS AND DENSITY LAYERS. Sound conditions varied from very poor to excellent, with the conditions getting progressively worse near land. The two extreme conditions were encountered on December 8th and 14th. On the 8th propellers were heard at 15,000 yards, the location being 65 miles from land. On the 14th propellers could not be heard at 800 yards, the location being 5 miles off the channel of BOUGAINVILLE Straits. The water was laden with vegetable matter in suspension, the quantity increasing as the shore line was approached. This resulted in a large number of fish, which were seen and heard almost constantly. Fish noises caused the sound operators considerable trouble until they learned to recognize the variations. Besides the usual clicks, wheezes, and whistles previously encountered, we frequently picked up a noise similar to a reciprocating engine with a loose bearing making from 120 to 140 RPM. This turned out to be from whales. All observed temperature gradients were zero with a water temperature of 85d. Density layers seemed to be present at various times, but were never highly pronounced. A slight increase in speed or change in variable water was sufficient to change depth through all such layers encountered. 13. HEALTH AND HABITABILITY. The health of the crew was excellent throughout this patrol Only six persons received treatment for colds, none of which passed the "sniffling" stage. The only serious illness was one case of Cellulitis, left ankle, which was treated with hot MGSO4 dressings and a short course of Sulfathiazole. Habitability was excellent during the entire patrol due to good functioning of the Air Conditioning Plant. When the air conditioning units were shut down during the depth charge attack a marked discomfort was noted throughout the boat within a few minutes, although some sweating would doubtless have been noticeable in any case. The average submerged temperature was 85d F. 14. MILES STEAMED ENROUTE TO AND FROM STATION. Miles steamed to station, 2987. Time enroute, 264.5 hours. Average speed enroute, 11.3 knots. Miles steamed from station, 1515. Time enroute, 127 hours. Average speed enroute, 11.9 knots. 15. FUEL EXPENDED. Fuel used enroute to station 29,912 gallons. Fuel rate of consumption 10.0 gal. 1 mile. Fuel expended on station 9430 gallons. Fuel expended enroute Brisbane 26,428 gallons. Fuel rate of consumption 17.4 gal. 1 mile. 16. FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING. (a) Torpedoes - 17 (b) Fuel - 26,050 (c) Provisions - 30 days. (d) Fresh water - Unlimited. (e) Personnel - 15 days. 17. TERMINATION. Patrol was ended by the provisions of the operation order. No factor of endurance was reached. 18. REMARKS. Our weakness in night fighting was clearly brought out by this patrol Although we had sunk on ship on our previous patrol at night, we missed two on this patrol through lack of perspective and just plain confusion. The experience gained should make us mort adept at this type of attack on future patrols. From the contacts we made it is believed that much of the shipping into the SHORTLAND area is coming direct from the EMPIRE. The general track seemed to be between course 000d and 015d with a focal point at about Lat. 6-30dS; Long. 156-10E. TF42/A16-3 TASK FORCE FORTY-TWO Serial 01249 Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, December 28, 1942 S-E-C-R-E-T From: The Commander Task Force Forty-Two. To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Via : The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. Subject: U.S.S. WAHOO (SS238), Second War Patrol, Comments on. Enclosure: (A) Copy of Subject Patrol Report. 1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. 2. The Wahoo completed her second war patrol on /December 26, 1942, having spent 46 days at sea and 29 days in the assigned area. 3. Eight contacts were made, of which only two were developed into attacks, both of which resulted in sinkings. However, it is believed that at least three of the other contacts should have been developed into attacks; namely on 30 November on the freighter, on 8 December on the large tanker, and again on December 12, speed should have been used to close this apparently unescorted vessel. It is noted that the radar functioned exceptionally well and it appears that this information was not used to best advantage to develop these contacts. 4. Sound conditions varied from poor to good; generally, however, they were poor. 5. The WAHOO returned in excellent material condition. The current refit will be accomplished by the SPERRY (AS12). 6. The WAHOO is congratulated on sinking: 1 freighter of SYOEI MARU Class - 5644 tons. 1 submarine (I-2) - 1955 tons. JAMES FIFE, jr. DISTRIBUTION VCNO, Cinclant, Cincpac, Comsowespac, Comsublant, CSS 8 & 10, CSD 102, WAHOO File, Each SS TF42 (not to be taken to sea, BURN), Patrol Summary File, War Diary.