

# Game strategies in network security

Kong-wei Lye<sup>1</sup>, Jeannette M. Wing<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering  
e-mail: kwlye@cmu.edu

<sup>2</sup>Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890, USA  
e-mail: wing@cs.cmu.edu

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**Abstract.** This paper presents a game-theoretic method for analyzing the security of computer networks. We view the interactions between an attacker and the administrator as a two-player stochastic game and construct a model for the game. Using a nonlinear program, we compute Nash equilibria or best-response strategies for the players (attacker and administrator). We then explain why the strategies are realistic and how administrators can use these results to enhance the security of their network.

**Keywords:** Stochastic games – Nonlinear programming – Network security

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## 1 Introduction

Government agencies, banks, retailers, schools, and a growing number of goods and service providers today all use the Internet as an integral way of conducting their daily business. Individuals, good or bad, can also easily connect to the Internet. Due to the ubiquity of the Internet, computer security has now become more important than ever to organizations such as governments, banks, businesses, and universities. Security specialists have long been interested in knowing what an intruder can do to a computer network and what can be done to prevent or counteract attacks. In this paper, we describe how game theory can be used to find strategies for both an attacker and the administrator. We consider the interactions between them as a general-sum stochastic game.

### 1.1 Example case study

To create an example for our case study, we interviewed one of our university network managers and put together the basis for several attack scenarios. We identified the

types of attack actions involved, estimated the likelihood of an attacker taking certain actions, determined the types of states the network can enter, and estimated the costs or rewards of attack and defense actions. In all, we had three interviews with the network manager, with each interview taking 1 to 2 h.

Based on our discussions with the network manager, we constructed an example network so as to illustrate our approach. Figure 1 depicts a local network connected to the Internet.

A router routes Internet traffic to and from the local network and a firewall prevents unwanted connections. The network has two zones or subnetworks, one containing the public Web server and the other containing the private file server and private workstation. This can be achieved by using a firewall with two or more interfaces. Such a configuration allows the firewall to check traffic between the two zones and provide some form of protection for the file server and workstation against malicious Internet traffic. The Web server runs an HTTP server and an FTP server for serving Web pages and data. It is accessible by the public through the Internet. The root user in the Web server can access the file server and workstation to retrieve updates for Web data. For remote administration, the root users on the file server and workstation can also access the Web server. For our illustration purposes, we assume that the firewall rules are lax and the operating systems are insufficiently *hardened*. It is thus possible for an attacker to succeed in several different attacks. This setup would be the *gameboard* for the attacker and the administrator.

### 1.2 Roadmap to rest of paper

In Sect. 2, we introduce the formal model for stochastic games and relate the elements of this model to those




Fig. 1. A network example

in our network example. In Sect. 3, we explain the concept of a Nash equilibrium for stochastic games and explain what it means to the attacker and administrator. Then, in Sect. 4, we describe three possible attack scenarios for our network example. In these scenarios, an attacker on the Internet attempts to deface the homepage on the public Web server on the network, launch an internal denial-of-service (DOS) attack, and capture some important data from a workstation on the network. We compute Nash equilibria (best responses) for the attacker and administrator using a nonlinear program and explain in detail one of the three solutions found for our example in Sect. 5. We discuss the strengths and limitations of our approach in Sect. 6 and compare our work with previous work in Sect. 7. Finally, we summarize our results and point to future directions in Sect. 8.

## 2 Networks as stochastic games

Game theory has been used in many other problems involving attackers and defenders. The network security problem is similar because a hacker on the Internet may wish to attack a network and the administrator of the network has to defend against the attack actions. Attack and defense actions cause the network to change in state, perhaps probabilistically. The attacker can gain rewards such as thrills for self-satisfaction or transfers of large sums of money into his bank account; meanwhile, the administrator can suffer damages such as system downtime or theft of secret data. The attacker's gains, however, may not be of the same magnitude as the administrator's cost. A general-sum stochastic game model is ideal for capturing the properties of these interactions.

In real life, there can be more than one attacker attacking a network and more than one administrator managing the network at the same time. Thus, it would appear that a multiplayer game model is more apt than a two-player game. However, the game makes no distinction as to which attacker (or administrator) takes which action. We can model a team of attackers at different locations as the same as an omnipresent attacker, and similarly for the defenders. It is thus sufficient to use a two-player game model for the analysis of this network security problem.

### 2.1 Stochastic game model

We first introduce the formal model of a *stochastic game*. We then apply this model to our network attack example and explain how to define or derive the state set, action sets, transition probabilities, and cost/reward functions.

Formally, a two-player stochastic game is a tuple  $(S, A^1, A^2, Q, R^1, R^2, \beta)$  where

- $S = \{\xi_1, \dots, \xi_N\}$  is the state set.
- $A^k = \{\alpha_1^k, \dots, \alpha_{M^k}^k\}$   $k = 1, 2$ ,  $M^k = |A^k|$ , is the action set of player  $k$ . The action set for player  $k$  at state  $s$  is a subset of  $A^k$ , i.e.,  $A_s^k \subseteq A^k$  and  $\bigcup_{i=1}^N A_{\xi_i}^k = A^k$ .
- $Q : S \times A^1 \times A^2 \times S \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is the state transition function.
- $R^k : S \times A^1 \times A^2 \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$ ,  $k = 1, 2$  is the reward function<sup>1</sup> of player  $k$ .
- $0 < \beta \leq 1$  is a *discount factor* for discounting future rewards, i.e., at the current state, a state transition has a reward worth its full value, but the reward for the transition from the next state is worth  $\beta$  times its value at the current state.

The game is played as follows. At a discrete time instant  $t$ , the game is in state  $s_t \in S$ . Player 1 chooses an action  $a_t^1$  from  $A^1$  and player 2 chooses an action  $a_t^2$  from  $A^2$ . Player 1 then receives a reward  $r_t^1 = R^1(s_t, a_t^1, a_t^2)$  and player 2 receives a reward  $r_t^2 = R^2(s_t, a_t^1, a_t^2)$ . The game then moves to a new state  $s_{t+1}$  with conditional probability  $\text{Prob}(s_{t+1}|s_t, a_t^1, a_t^2)$  equal to  $Q(s_t, a_t^1, a_t^2, s_{t+1})$ .

The discount factor,  $\beta$ , weighs the importance of future rewards to a game player. A high discount factor means the player is concerned about rewards far into the future and a low discount factor means he is only concerned about rewards in the immediate future. Looking from the viewpoint of an attacker, the discount factor determines how much damage he wants to create in the future. A high discount factor characterizes an attacker with a long-term objective who plans well and takes into consideration what damage he can do not only at present but far into the future, whereas a low discount factor means an attacker has a short-term objective and is only concerned about causing damage at the present time. For convenience, we use the same discount factor for both players.

There are finite-horizon and infinite-horizon games. Finite-horizon games end when a terminal state is reached whereas infinite-horizon games can continue forever, transitioning from state to state. A reasonable criterion for computing a strategy in an infinite-horizon game is to maximize the long-run discounted return ( $\beta < 1$ ), which is what we use in our example.

In our example, we let the attacker be player 1 and the administrator be player 2. To aid readability, we separate the graphical representation of the game into two

<sup>1</sup> We use the term “reward” in general here; in later sections, positive values are rewards and negative values are costs.

views: the attacker's view (Fig. 3) and the administrator's view (Fig. 4). We describe these figures in detail later in Sect. 4.

## 2.2 Network state

In general, the state of the network contains various kinds of features such as hardware types, software services, node connectivity, and user privileges. The more features of the state we model, the more accurately we represent the network, but also the more complex and difficult the analysis becomes.

We view the network as a graph (Fig. 2). A node in the graph is a physical entity such as a workstation or router. We model the external world as a single computer (node  $E$ ) and represent the Web server, file server, and workstation by nodes  $W$ ,  $F$ , and  $N$ , respectively. An edge in the graph represents a direct communication path (physical or virtual). For example, the external computer (node  $E$ ) has direct access to only the public Web server (node  $W$ ); this abstraction models the role of the firewall in the real network example. Since the root users in the Web server, file server, and workstation can access one another's machine, we have edges between node  $W$  and node  $F$ , between node  $W$  and node  $N$ , and between node  $F$  and node  $N$ .

Instantiating our game model, we let a superstate  $\langle n_W, n_F, n_N, t \rangle \in S$  be the state of the network.  $n_W$ ,  $n_F$ , and  $n_N$  are the *node states* for the Web server, file server, and workstation, respectively, and  $t$  is the *traffic state* for the whole network. Each node  $X$  (where  $X \in \{E, W, F, N\}$ ) has a node state  $n_X = \langle P, a, d \rangle$  to represent information about hardware and software configurations.  $P \subseteq \{f, h, n, p, s, v\}$  is a list of software applications running on the node and  $f, h, n$ , and  $p$  denote *ftpd*, *httpd*, *nfsd*, and some user process, respectively. For malicious code,  $s$  and  $v$  represent sniffer programs and viruses, respectively. The variable  $a \in \{u, c\}$  represents the state of the user accounts;  $u$  means no user account has been compromised and  $c$  means at least one user account has been compromised. We use the variable  $d \in \{c, i\}$  to represent the state of the data on the node;  $c$  means the data have been corrupted or stolen and  $i$  means the data are in good integrity. For example, if  $n_W = \langle (f, h, s), c, i \rangle$ ,




Fig. 2. Network state

then the Web server is running *ftpd* and *httpd*, a sniffer program has been implanted, and a user account has been compromised but no data have yet been corrupted or stolen.

The traffic state  $t = \langle \{l_{XY}\} \rangle$ , where  $X, Y \in \{E, W, F, N\}$ , captures the traffic information for the whole network.  $l_{XY} \in \{0, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}, 1\}$  and indicates the load carried on the link between nodes  $X$  and  $Y$ . A value of 1 indicates maximum capacity. For example, in a 10Base-T connection, the values 0,  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{2}{3}$ , and 1 represent 0 Mbps, 3.3 Mbps, 6.7 Mbps, and 10 Mbps, respectively. In our example, the traffic state is  $t = \langle l_{EW}, l_{WF}, l_{FN}, l_{NW} \rangle$ . We let  $t = \langle \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3} \rangle$  for normal traffic conditions.

The potential state space for our network example is very large, but we shall discuss how to handle this problem in Sect. 6. The full state space in our example has a size of  $|n_W| \times |n_F| \times |n_N| \times |t| = (63 \times 2 \times 2)^3 \times 4^4 \approx 4$  billion states, but there are only 18 states (15 shown in Fig. 3 and 3 others in Fig. 4) relevant to our application here. In these figures, each state is represented using a box with a symbolic state name and the values of the state variables. For convenience, we shall mostly refer to the states using their symbolic state names, as summarized in the appendix in Table 1.

## 2.3 Actions

An action pair (one from the attacker and one from the administrator) causes the system to move from one state to another in a probabilistic manner. A single action for the attacker can be any part of his attack strategy, such as flooding a server with *SYN* packets or downloading the password file. When a player does nothing, we denote this inaction as  $\phi$ . The action set for the attacker  $A^{Attacker}$  consists of all the actions he can take in all the states:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A^{Attacker} = \{ & Attack\_httpd, \\
 & Attack\_ftpd, \\
 & Continue\_attacking, \\
 & Deface\_website\_leave, \\
 & Install\_sniffer, \\
 & Run\_DOS\_virus, \\
 & Crack\_file\_server\_root\_password, \\
 & Crack\_workstation\_root\_password, \\
 & Capture\_data, \\
 & Shutdown\_network, \\
 & \phi \},
 \end{aligned}$$

where again  $\phi$  denotes inaction. His actions in each state is a subset of  $A^{Attacker}$ . For example, in the state **Normal\_operation** (see Fig. 3, topmost state), the attacker has an action set  $A_{Normal\_operation}^{Attacker} = \{ Attack\_httpd, Attack\_ftpd, \phi \}$ .

Actions for the administrator are mainly preventive or restorative measures. In our example, the administrator




Fig. 3. Attacker's view of the game

has an action set

$$A^{Administrator} = \{$$

*Remove\_compromised\_account\_restart\_httpd,*  
*Restore\_website\_remove\_compromised\_account,*  
*Remove\_virus\_and\_compromised\_account,*  
*Install\_sniffer\_detector,*  
*Remove\_sniffer\_detector,*  
*Remove\_compromised\_account\_restart\_ftpd,*

$$Remove\_compromised\_account\_sniffer,$$

$$\phi\}.$$

For example, in state **Ftpd\_attacked** (Fig. 4), the administrator has an action set  $A_{\text{Ftpd\_attacked}}^{Administrator} = \{Install\_sniffer\_detector, \phi, \phi\}$ .

A node with a compromised account may or may not be observable by the administrator. When it is not observable, we model the situation as the administrator having an empty action set in the state. We assume that the administrator does not know whether there is an at-




Fig. 4. Administrator's view of the game

tacker or not. Also, the attacker may have several objectives and strategies that the administrator does not know.

#### 2.4 State transition probabilities

In our example, we assign state transition probabilities based on the intuition and experience of our network manager. In practice, case studies, statistics, simulations, and knowledge engineering can provide the required probabilities.

In Figs. 3 and 4, we use arrows to represent state transitions. Each arrow is labeled with an action, a transition probability, and a cost/reward. In the formal game model, a state transition probability is a function of both players' actions. Such probabilities are used in the nonlinear program (Sect. 3) for computing a solution

to the game. However, in order to separate the game into two views, we show the transitions as simply due to a single player's actions (assuming the other player uses an arbitrary fixed strategy). For example, with the second dashed arrow from the top in Fig. 3, we show the probability  $\text{Prob}(\text{Ftpd\_hacked} \mid \text{Ftpd\_attacked}, \text{Continue\_attacking}) = 0.5$  as due to only the attacker's action *Continue\\_attacking*.

When the network is in state **Normal\_operation** and neither the attacker nor administrator takes any action, it will tend to stay in the same state. We model this situation as having a near-identity stochastic matrix, i.e., we let  $\text{Prob}(\text{Normal\_operation} \mid \text{Normal\_operation}, \phi, \phi) = 1 - \epsilon$  for some small  $\epsilon < 0.5$ . Then  $\text{Prob}(s \mid \text{Normal\_operation}, \phi, \phi) = \frac{\epsilon}{N-1}$  for all  $s \neq \text{Normal\_operation}$ , where  $N$  is the number of states. The remain-

ing probability is assigned to transition to a “catchall” state. There are also state transitions that are infeasible. For example, it may not be possible for the network to move from a normal operation state to a completely shutdown state without going through some intermediate states. Infeasible state transitions are assigned transition probabilities of 0.

### 2.5 Costs and rewards

There are costs (negative values) and rewards (positive values) associated with the actions of the administrator and attacker. The attacker’s actions have mostly rewards and such rewards are in terms of the amount of damage he does to the network. Some costs are difficult to quantify. For example, the loss of marketing strategy information to a competitor can cause large monetary losses. A defaced corporate Web site may cause the company to lose its reputation and its customers to lose confidence.

In our model, we restrict ourselves to the amount of recovery effort (time) required by the administrator. The reward for an attacker’s action is mostly defined in terms of the amount of effort the administrator has to make to bring the network from one state to another. For example, when a particular service crashes, it may take the administrator 10 min or 1 h to determine the cause and restart the service.<sup>2</sup> In Fig. 4, it costs the administrator 10 min to remove a compromised user account and to restart *httpd* (from state **Httpd\_hacked** to state **Normal\_operation**). For the attacker, this amount of time would be his reward. To reflect the severity of the loss of the important financial data in our network example, we assign a very high reward for the attacker’s action that leads to the state where he gains these data. For example, from state **Workstation\_hacked** to state **Workstation\_data\_stolen\_1** in Fig. 3, the reward is 999. There are also some transitions in which the cost to the administrator is not the same magnitude as the reward to the attacker. It is such transitions that make the game a general-sum game instead of a zero-sum game.

## 3 Nash Equilibrium

We now return to the formal model for stochastic games. Let  $\Omega^n = \{p \in \mathfrak{R}^n \mid \sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1, p_i \geq 0\}$  be the set of probability vectors of length  $n$ .  $\pi^k : S \rightarrow \Omega^{M^k}$  is a stationary strategy for player  $k$ .  $\pi^k(s)$  is the vector  $[\pi^k(s, \alpha_1) \dots \pi^k(s, \alpha_{M^k})]^T$ , where  $\pi^k(s, \alpha)$  is the probability that player  $k$  should use to take action  $\alpha$  in state  $s$ . A stationary strategy  $\pi^k$  is a strategy that is independent of time and history. A mixed or randomized stationary strategy is one where  $\pi^k(s, \alpha) \geq 0 \forall s \in S$  and  $\forall \alpha \in A^k$ , and a pure strategy is one where  $\pi^k(s, \alpha_i) = 1$  for some  $\alpha_i \in A^k$ .

The objective of each player is to maximize some expected return. Let  $s_t$  be the state at time  $t$  and  $r_t^k$  be the reward received by player  $k$  at time  $t$ . We define an expected return to be the column vector  $v_{\pi^1, \pi^2}^k = [v_{\pi^1, \pi^2}^k(\xi_1) \dots v_{\pi^1, \pi^2}^k(\xi_N)]^T$ , where

$$\begin{aligned} v_{\pi^1, \pi^2}^k(s) &= E_{\pi^1, \pi^2} \{r_t^k + \beta r_{t+1}^k + (\beta)^2 r_{t+2}^k + \dots \\ &\quad \dots + (\beta)^H r_{t+H}^k \mid s_t = s\} \\ &= E_{\pi^1, \pi^2} \left\{ \sum_{h=0}^H (\beta)^h r_{t+h}^k \mid s_t = s \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

The expectation operator  $E_{\pi^1, \pi^2} \{\cdot\}$  is used to mean that player  $k$  plays  $\pi^k$ , i.e., player  $k$  chooses an action using the probability distribution  $\pi^k(s_{t+h})$  at  $s_{t+h}$  and receives an immediate reward  $r_{t+h}^k = \pi^1(s_{t+h})^T R^k(s_{t+h}) \pi^2(s_{t+h})$  for  $h \geq 0$ .  $R^k(s) = [R^k(s, a^1, a^2)]_{a^1 \in A^1, a^2 \in A^2}$ , for  $k = 1, 2$ , is player  $k$ ’s reward matrix in state  $s$ . (We use  $[m(i, j)]_{i \in I, j \in J}$  to refer to an  $|I| \times |J|$  matrix with elements  $m(i, j)$ .)

For an infinite-horizon game, we let  $H = \infty$  and use a discount factor  $\beta < 1$  to discount future rewards.  $v^k(s)$  is then the expected total discounted rewards that player  $k$  will receive when starting at state  $s$ . For a finite-horizon game,  $0 < H < \infty$  and  $\beta \leq 1$ .  $v^k$  is also called the *value vector* of player  $k$ .

A *Nash equilibrium* in stationary strategies  $(\pi_*^1, \pi_*^2)$  is one that satisfies (componentwise)

$$\begin{aligned} v^1(\pi_*^1, \pi_*^2) &\geq v^1(\pi^1, \pi_*^2), \forall \pi^1 \in \Omega^{M^1} \text{ and} \\ v^2(\pi_*^1, \pi_*^2) &\geq v^2(\pi_*^1, \pi^2), \forall \pi^2 \in \Omega^{M^2}. \end{aligned}$$

Here,  $v^k(\pi^1, \pi^2)$  is the value vector of the game for player  $k$  when both players play their stationary strategies  $\pi^1$  and  $\pi^2$ , respectively, and  $\geq$  is used to mean the left-hand-side vector is componentwise greater than or equal to the right-hand-side vector. At this equilibrium, there is no mutual incentive for either one of the players to deviate from their equilibrium strategies  $\pi_*^1$  and  $\pi_*^2$ . A deviation will mean that one or both of them will have lower expected returns, i.e.,  $v^1(\pi^1, \pi^2)$  and/or  $v^2(\pi^1, \pi^2)$ . A pair of Nash equilibrium strategies is also known as best responses, i.e., if player 1 plays  $\pi_*^1$ , player 2’s best response is  $\pi_*^2$  and vice versa.

For infinite-horizon stochastic games, we use a nonlinear program by Filar and Vrieze [7], which we call NLP-1, to find the stationary equilibrium strategies for both players. For finite-horizon games, a dynamic programming procedure found in the book by Fudenberg and Tirole [8] can be used. For a thorough treatment on stochastic games, the reader is referred to the work by Filar and Vrieze [7].

The following nonlinear program is used to find a Nash equilibrium for a general-sum stochastic game:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{u^1, u^2, \sigma^1, \sigma^2} \quad & \mathbf{1}^T [u^k - R^k(\sigma^1, \sigma^2) - \beta P(\sigma^1, \sigma^2) u^k], \\ & k = 1, 2 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{NLP-1})$$

<sup>2</sup> These numbers were given by our network manager.

subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} R^1(\xi_i)\sigma^2(\xi_i) + \beta T(\xi_i, u^1)\sigma^2(\xi_i) &\leq u^1(\xi_i)\mathbf{1}, \\ &i = 1, \dots, N \\ \sigma^1(\xi_i)^T R^2(\xi_i) + \beta \sigma^1(\xi_i)^T T(\xi_i, u^2) &\leq u^2(\xi_i)\mathbf{1}^T, \\ &i = 1, \dots, N, \end{aligned}$$

where  $u^k \in \mathfrak{R}^N$  are variables for value vectors,  $\sigma^k \in \Omega^{M^k}$  are variables for strategies, and  $\mathbf{1}$  is a unit vector of appropriate dimensions.

$R^k(\sigma^1, \sigma^2)$  is the vector  $[\sigma^1(\xi_1)^T R^k(\xi_1)\sigma^2(\xi_1) \dots \sigma^1(\xi_N)^T R^k(\xi_N)\sigma^2(\xi_N)]^T$ . It contains the rewards for each state when the players play  $\sigma^1$  and  $\sigma^2$ .

$P(\sigma^1, \sigma^2)$  is a state transition probability matrix  $[\sigma^1(s)^T [p(s' | s, a^1, a^2)]_{a^1 \in A^1, a^2 \in A^2} \sigma^2(s)]_{s, s' \in S}$ . It is the stochastic matrix for a Markov chain induced by the strategy pair  $(\sigma^1, \sigma^2)$ . When a player fixes his strategy, a Markov Decision Problem (MDP) is induced for the other player.

$T(s, u)$  is the matrix  $[ [p(\xi_1 | s, a^1, a^2) \dots p(\xi_N | s, a^1, a^2)]^T u^T ]_{a^1 \in A^1, a^2 \in A^2}$ , where  $u$  is an arbitrary value vector.  $T(s, u)$  represents future rewards from the next state onwards in a game matrix form.

The two sets of constraints ( $2 \times N$  inequalities) represent the optimality conditions required for the players and the global minimum to this nonlinear program. A solution  $(u_*^1, u_*^2, \sigma_*^1, \sigma_*^2)$  to NLP-1 that minimizes its objective function to 0 is a Nash solution  $(v_*^1, v_*^2, \pi_*^1, \pi_*^2)$  of the game.

In our network example,  $\pi^1$  and  $\pi^2$  corresponds to the attacker's and administrator's strategies, respectively.  $v^1(\pi^1, \pi^2)$  corresponds to the expected return for the attacker, and  $v^2(\pi^1, \pi^2)$  corresponds to the expected return for the administrator when they use strategies  $\pi^1$  and  $\pi^2$ . In a Nash equilibrium, when the attacker and administrator use their best-response strategies,  $\pi_*^1$  and  $\pi_*^2$ , respectively, neither will gain a higher expected return if the other continues using his Nash strategy.

Every general-sum discounted stochastic game has at least one (not necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies (see [7]), and finding these equilibria is nontrivial. In our network example, finding multiple Nash equilibria means finding multiple pairs of Nash strategies. In each pair, a strategy for one player is a best response to the strategy for the other player and vice versa. We shall use NLP-1 to find Nash equilibria for our network example later in Sect. 5.

## 4 Attack and response scenarios

In this section, we describe three different attack and response scenarios. We show in Fig. 3 how the attacker sees the state of the network change as a result of his actions. Figure 4 depicts the administrator's viewpoint. These figures represent the MDPs faced by the players, i.e., Fig. 3

assumes the administrator has fixed an arbitrary strategy and Fig. 4 assumes the attacker has fixed an arbitrary strategy. In both figures, we represent a state as a box containing the symbolic name and the values of the state variables for that state. We label each transition with an action, the probability of the transition, and the gain or cost in minutes of restorative effort incurred by the administrator (detailed state transition probabilities and costs/rewards are in the appendix). In Fig. 3 we use bold, dotted, and dashed arrows to denote the three different scenarios. For better readability, we do not draw all state transitions for every action. From one state to the next, state variable changes are highlighted using boldface.

### 4.1 Scenario 1: Deface Web site (bold)

A common target for use as a launching base in an attack is the public Web server. The Web server typically runs *httpd* and *ftpd*, and a common technique for the attacker to gain a root shell is *buffer overflow*. Once the attacker gets a root shell, he can deface the Web site and leave. We illustrate this scenario with state transitions drawn as bold arrows in Fig. 3.

From state **Normal\_operation**, the attacker takes action *Attack\_httpd*. With a probability of 1.0 and a reward of 10, he moves the system to state **Httpd\_attacked**. This state indicates increased traffic between the external computer and the Web server as a result of his attack action. Taking action *Continue\_attacking*, he has a 0.5 probability of success of gaining a user or root access through bringing down *httpd*, and the system moves to state **Httpd\_hacked**. Once he has root access in the Web server, he can deface the Web site, restart *httpd*, and leave, moving the network to state **Website\_defaced**.

### 4.2 Scenario 2: DOS (dotted)

The other thing that the attacker can do after he has hacked into the Web server is to launch a denial-of-service (DOS) attack from inside the network. We illustrate this scenario with state transitions drawn as dotted arrows in Fig. 3.

From state **Webserver\_sniffer** (where the attacker has planted a sniffer and backdoor program), the attacker may decide to launch a *DOS* attack and take action *Run\_DOS\_virus*. With probability 1 and a reward of 30, the network moves into state **Webserver\_DOS\_1**. In this state, the traffic load on all internal links has increased from  $\frac{1}{3}$  to  $\frac{2}{3}$ . From this state, the network degrades to state **Webserver\_DOS\_2** with probability 0.8, even when the attacker does nothing. The traffic load is now at full capacity of 1 in all the links. We assume that there is a 0.2 probability that the administrator will notice this degradation and take action to recover the system. In the very last state, the network grinds to a halt and nothing productive can take place.



#### 4.3 Scenario 3: Stealing confidential data (dashed)

Once the attacker has hacked into the Web server, he can install a sniffer and a backdoor program. The sniffer will sniff out passwords from the users in the workstation when they access the file server or Web server. Using the backdoor program, the attacker then comes back to collect his password list from the sniffer program, cracks the root password, logs on to the workstation, and searches the local hard disk. We illustrate this scenario with state transitions drawn by dashed arrows in Fig. 3.

From state **Normal\_operation**, the attacker takes action *Attack\_ftpd*. With a probability of 1.0 and a reward of 10, he uses the buffer overflow or a similar attack technique and moves the system to state **Ftpd\_attacked**. There is increased traffic between the external computer and the Web server as well as between the Web server and the file server in this state, both loads going from  $\frac{1}{3}$  to  $\frac{2}{3}$ . If he continues to attack *ftpd*, he has a 0.5 probability of success of gaining a user or root access through bringing down *ftpd*, and the system moves to state **Ftpd\_hacked**. From here he can install a sniffer program and, with probability 0.5 and a reward of 10, move the system to state **Webserver\_sniffer**. In this state, he has also restarted *ftpd* to avoid causing suspicion from normal users and the administrator. The attacker then collects the password list and cracks the root password on the workstation. We assume he has a 0.9 chance of success, and when he succeeds, he gains a reward of 50 and moves the network to state **Workstation\_hacked**. To cause more damage to the network, he can even shut it down using the privileges of root user on this workstation.

#### 4.4 Recovery

We now turn our attention to the administrator's view (Fig. 4). The administrator in our example does mainly restorative work with actions such as restarting *ftpd* or removing a virus. He also takes preventive measures with actions such as installing a sniffer detector, reconfiguring a firewall, or deactivating a user account.

In the first attack scenario in which the attacker defaces the Web site, the administrator can only take the action *Restore\_website\_remove\_compromised\_account* to bring the network from state **Website\_defaced** to **Normal\_operation**. In the second attack scenario, the states **Webserver\_DOS\_1** and **Webserver\_DOS\_2** (indicated by double boxes) show the network suffering from the effects of the internal DOS attack. All the administrator can do is take the action *Remove\_virus\_and\_compromised\_account* to bring the network back to **Normal\_operation**. In the third attack scenario, there is nothing he can do to restore the network back to its original operating state. Important data have been stolen, and no action allows him to undo this situation. The attacker has brought the sys-

tem to state **Workstation\_data\_stolen\_1** (Fig. 3), and the network can only move from this state to **Workstation\_data\_stolen\_2** (indicated by the dotted box on the bottom right in Fig. 4).

The state **Ftpd\_attacked** (dashed box) is interesting because here the attacker and administrator can engage in real-time game play. In this state, when the administrator notices an unusual increase in traffic between the external network and the Web server and also between the Web server and the file server, he may suspect an attack is going on and take action *Install\_sniffer\_detector*. Taking this action, however, incurs a cost of 10. If the attacker is still attacking, the system moves into state **Ftpd\_attacked\_detector**. If he has already hacked into the Web server, then the system moves to state **Webserver\_sniffer\_detector**. Detecting the sniffer program, the administrator can now remove the affected user account and the sniffer program to prevent the attacker from taking further damaging actions.

## 5 Nash equilibria results

We implemented NLP-1 (the nonlinear program mentioned in Sect. 3) in *MATLAB*, a mathematical computation software package by The MathWorks, Inc. (Natick, MA, USA). To run NLP-1, we require a complete model of the game defined in Sect. 2. The appendix contains the action sets for the attacker (Table 2) and administrator (Table 3), the state transition probabilities (Table 4), and the cost/reward function (Table 5). We now explain the experimental setup for our example.

In the formal game model, the state of the game evolves only at discrete time instants. In our example, we imagine that the players take actions only at discrete time instants. The game model also requires actions to be taken simultaneously by both players. There are some states in which a player has only one or two nontrivial actions, and for consistency and easier computation using NLP-1, we add the *inaction*  $\phi$  to the action set for such a state so that the action sets are all of the same cardinality. Overall, our game model has 18 states and 3 actions per state.

We ran NLP-1 on a computer equipped with a 600-MHz Pentium III and 128 MB of RAM. The result of one run of NLP-1 is a Nash equilibrium. It consists of a pair of strategies ( $\pi_*^{Attacker}$  and  $\pi_*^{Administrator}$ ) and a pair of value vectors ( $v_*^{Attacker}$  and  $v_*^{Administrator}$ ) for the attacker and administrator. The strategy for a player consists of a probability distribution over the action set for each state, and the value vector consists of a state value for each state.

We ran NLP-1 on 12 different sets of initial conditions, finding three different Nash equilibria shown in Tables 6–8 (all tables are in the appendix). We cannot know exactly how many unique equilibria there are in this example since running NLP-1 with more sets of initial



conditions could possibly find us more. Depending on how close the initial conditions are to the solution, NLP-1 can take from 30 to 45 min to find a solution. Of the three equilibria we found, we shall discuss in detail the first one (Table 6) and briefly the other two (Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix).

Table 6 shows the first Nash equilibrium. The first column lists the row numbers and the second column gives the names of the states. For example, row 1 corresponds to state **Normal\_operation**. The third and fourth columns contain the Nash strategies  $\pi_*^{Attacker}$  and  $\pi_*^{Administrator}$  for the attacker and administrator, respectively. A vector in each of these columns is the probability distribution over the action set for the state in the corresponding row. For example, in the first row (state **Normal\_operation**) and third column (attacker's strategy), the vector [1.00 0.00 0.00] says that in the state **Normal\_operation**, the attacker should take the first action *Attack\_httpd* with probability 1.00, the second action *Attack\_ftpd* with probability 0.00, and the third action  $\phi$  (inactions are always placed last) with probability 0.0. (Actions are ordered in which they are listed in Tables 2 and 3.) The last two columns contain the value vectors  $v_*^{Attacker}$  and  $v_*^{Administrator}$  for the attacker and administrator, respectively. In the first row and sixth column, the value  $-206.8$  means that the administrator will incur a cost of 206.8 min of recovery time when starting the game in the state **Normal\_operation** and when both attacker and administrator play their Nash strategies.

We explain the strategies for some of the more interesting states here. For example, in the state **Httpd\_hacked** (row 5 in Table 6), the attacker has action set  $\{ Deface\_website\_leave, Install\_sniffer, \phi \}$ . His strategy for this state says that he should use *Deface\_website\_leave* with probability 0.33 and *Install\_sniffer* with probability 0.10. Ignoring the third action  $\phi$ , and after normalizing, these probabilities become 0.77 and 0.23, respectively, for *Deface\_website\_leave* and *Install\_sniffer*. Even though installing a sniffer may allow him to crack a root password and eventually capture the data he wants, there is also the possibility that the system administrator will detect his presence and take preventive measures. He is thus able to do more damage (probabilistically speaking) if he simply defaces the Web site and leaves. In this same state, the administrator can take either action *Remove\_compromised\_account\_restart\_httpd* or action *Install\_sniffer\_detector*. His strategy says that he should take the former with probability 0.67 and the latter with probability 0.19. Ignoring the third action  $\phi$  and after normalizing, these probabilities become 0.78 and 0.22, respectively. This tells him that he should immediately remove the compromised account and restart *httpd* rather than continue to “play” with the attacker. It is not shown here in our model, but installing the sniffer detector could be a step towards apprehending the attacker, which means greater reward for the administrator. In the state **Webserver\_sniffer** (row 8 in Table 6), the attacker

should take actions *Crack\_file\_server\_root\_password* and *Crack\_workstation\_root\_password* with equal probability (0.5) because either action will let him do the same amount of damage eventually. He should not take action *Run\_DOS\_virus* (probability 0.0) in this state. Finally, in the state **Webserver\_DOS\_1** (row 10 in Table 6), the system administrator should remove the DOS virus and compromised account, this being his only action in this state (the other two being  $\phi$ ).

In Table 6, we note that the value vector for the administrator is not exactly the negative of that for the attacker. That is, in our example, not all state transitions have costs whose corresponding rewards are of the same magnitude. In a zero-sum game, the value vector for one player is the negative of the other's. In this table, the negative state values for the administrator correspond to his expected costs or expected amount of recovery time (in minutes) required to bring the network back to normal operation. Positive state values for the attacker correspond to his expected reward or the expected amount of damage he causes the administrator (again, in minutes of recovery time). Both the attacker and administrator would want to maximize the state values for all the states.

In state **Fileserver\_hacked** (row 13 in Table 6), the attacker has gained access into the file server and has full control over the data in it. In state **Workstation\_hacked** (row 15 in Table 6), the attacker has gained root access to the workstation. These two states have the same value of 1065.5, the highest among all states, because these are the two states that will lead him to the greatest damage to the network. When at these states, the attacker is just one state away from capturing the desired data from either the file server or the workstation. For the administrator, these two states have the most negative values ( $-1049.2$ ), meaning most damage can be done to his network when it is in either of these states.

In state **Webserver\_sniffer** (row 8 in Table 6), the attacker has a state value of 716.3, which is relatively high compared to those for other states. This is the state in which he has gained access to the public Web server and installed a sniffer, i.e., a state that will potentially lead him to stealing the data that he wants. At this state, the value is  $-715.1$  for the administrator. This is the second least desirable state for him.

Table 7 shows the strategies and value vectors for the second equilibrium we found. In this equilibrium, the attacker should still prefer to attack *httpd* (probability of 0.13 compared to 0.00) in the state **Normal\_operation** (row 1). Compared to the first equilibrium, the attacker places a higher probability on  $\phi$  (probability 0.87) here. Once the attacker has hacked into the Web server, (state **Httpd\_hacked**, row 5), he should just deface the Web site and leave (probability of 0.91, compared to 0.06 and 0.04 for *Install\_sniffer* and  $\phi$ , respectively). However, if for some reason he chooses to plant a sniffer program into the Web server (state **Webserver\_sniffer**, row 8) and manages to collect the passwords to the fileserver and

workstation, he should prefer very slightly (probability of 0.53) to use the password to hack into the fileserver instead of the workstation (probability of 0.47). The rest of the attack strategy is similar to the one in the first equilibrium.

The strategy for the administrator is similar to that in the first equilibrium except that, once he has removed the DOS virus and compromised account from the Web server (state **Webserver\_DOS\_1**, row 10), he does not need to do anything more in state **Webserver\_DOS\_2** (row 11), which, presumably, can be avoided since the system will be brought back to the state **Normal\_operation**. In this equilibrium, the administrator also has lower costs in most of the states compared to the first equilibrium. In the first state **Normal\_operation**, the administrator has a cost of only  $-79.6$ , compared to  $-206.8$  in the first equilibrium. We attribute this to the fact that the attacker places only a probability of 0.13 (compared to 1.00 in the first equilibrium) on the attack action *Attack\_httpd* in this state.

Table 8 shows yet another equilibrium. This equilibrium is largely similar to the second except for a slight twist. In state **Http\_hacked** (row 5), instead of choosing to remove the compromised user account and restarting *httpd* (as in the first equilibrium), the administrator chooses to install a sniffer detector (probability of 0.89). This action leads the system to the state **Webserver\_sniffer\_detector** (row 9) where the administrator can further observe what the attacker is going to do before eventually removing the sniffer program and compromised account (Fig. 4). In this equilibrium, the administrator has lower values in his value vector. For example, in **Normal\_operation**, the administrator's state value is  $-28.6$ . This is a much lower value than that in the first equilibrium ( $-206.8$ ). Again, this is due to the attacker placing a smaller probability (0.04, compared to 1.00 in the first equilibrium) on the attack action *Attack\_httpd* in this state.

## 6 Discussion

In our game theory model we assume that the attacker and administrator both know what the other can do. Such common knowledge affects their decisions on what action to take in each state and thus justifies a game formulation of the problem. Any formal modeling technique will have advantages and disadvantages when applied to a particular domain. We elaborate on the strengths and limitations of our approach below.

### 6.1 Strengths of our approach

We could have modeled the interaction between the attacker and the administrator as a purely competitive (zero-sum) stochastic game, in which case we would always find only a single unique Nash equilibrium. Modeling it as a general-sum stochastic game, however, allows

us to find, potentially, multiple Nash equilibria. A Nash equilibrium gives the administrator an idea of the attacker's strategy and a plan for what to do in each state in the event of an attack. Finding more Nash equilibria thus allows him to know more about the attacker's best attack strategies.

By using a stochastic game model, we are able to capture the probabilistic nature of the state transitions of a network in real life. Admittedly, solutions for stochastic models are hard to compute, and assigning probabilities can be difficult (Sect. 6.2).

In our example, the second and third Nash equilibria are quite similar to the first. This similarity is due to the simplicity of the model we constructed, but there is nothing preventing us from constructing a richer, more realistic model. A model where the administrator has more actions to take per state would allow us to find more interesting equilibria. For example, in our model the administrator only needs to act when he suspects the network is under attack. A more aggressive administrator might have a larger action set for attack prevention and attack detection; he might take the action to set up a "honeypot" network to lure attackers and learn their capabilities.

One might wonder why the administrator would not put in place all possible security measures. In practice, tradeoffs have to be made between security and usability, between security and performance, and between security and cost. Moreover, a network may have to remain in operation despite known vulnerabilities (e.g., [6]). Because a network system is not perfectly secure, our game theoretic formulation of the security problem allows the administrator to discover the potential attack strategies of an attacker as well as best defense strategies against them.

### 6.2 Limitations to our approach

Though a disadvantage of our model is that the full state space can be extremely large, we are interested in only a small subset of states that are in attack scenarios. One way of generating these states is the attack-scenario-generation method developed by Sheyner et al. [13]. This method uses an enhancement to the standard model-checking algorithm to generate multiple counterexamples; an attack graph is simply a succinct and complete representation of the set of violations (counterexamples) of a given desired property (e.g., an attack can never gain root access to a workstation). To apply our game-theoretic analysis, we would further augment the set of scenario states with state transition probabilities and costs/rewards as functions of both players' actions. We discuss this idea further in Sect. 8.

Another difficulty in our approach is in building the game model in the first place. There are two challenges: assigning numbers and modeling the players.

In practice, it may be difficult to assign the costs/rewards for the actions and the transition probabilities. We

share this difficulty with other qualitative and quantitative approaches to security where similar estimates are required. *Qualitative* approaches avoid the need to give precise numbers but still require judgment. For example, in the National Institute of Standards and Technology risk management guide [14], system administrators are expected to assign *high*, *medium*, and *low* values for estimating the likelihood of an attack and to assign similar qualitative assessments for estimating impact of attack, cost of asset protected, and cost of risk mitigation strategy. In Meadows’s work on cost-based analysis of DOS attacks, costs are assigned to an attacker’s actions using categories such as *cheap*, *medium*, *expensive*, and *very expensive* [12]. Such estimates could be adapted for a game-theoretic model, though the coarseness of the symbolic measures could lead to an overly conservative model.

The limitation of obtaining good *quantitative* estimates is discussed thoroughly in Butler’s dissertation on the Security Attribute and Evaluation Method [4, 5]. Butler’s own quantitative cost-benefit method gives network administrators a practical way of calculating tradeoffs between security vulnerabilities and security measures. Instead of requiring *absolute* estimates on costs and probabilities, she requires only *relative* estimates, e.g., a relative ranking of a list of threats with respect to each other, and similarly for a list of security measures. Her work is based on the multiattribute analysis technique from decision sciences. Whereas her estimation technique is formal, her system model is informal. The combination of her quantitative cost-benefit method and our game-theoretic system model would be an interesting research direction to pursue.

The second difficulty is in modeling the actions of the players, in particular the attacker. The results of our analysis are only as good as the inputs to our model. If we omit an attacker action, then we will not be able to represent any scenario involving that action. In practice, attackers will devise new actions, new ways in which to attack a system, and hence they will be missing from our model. This limitation is shared by other formal modeling techniques, which represent a system’s environment implicitly (e.g., a set of assumptions) or explicitly (e.g., a simulator). For security, however, this limitation may be more pronounced than, say, for fault-tolerance or real-time control, where environmental actions are also unknown or unpredictable. Thus, we are limited in our analysis to modeling known attacks, and at best a catchall “unknown attack” with a guess at its probability and cost. Our formal framework at least gives system administrators a formal basis for making decisions relative to the accuracy of the input model.

## 7 Related work

The use of game theory in modeling attackers and defenders appears in other areas of research. For example, in

military and information warfare, the enemy is modeled as an attacker and has actions and strategies to disrupt the defense networks. Browne describes how to use static games to analyze attacks involving complicated and heterogeneous military networks [2]. In his example, a defense team has to defend a network of three hosts against an attacking team’s *worms*. A defending team member can choose either to run a worm detector or not. Depending on the combined attack and defense actions, each outcome has different costs. This problem is similar to ours if we view the actions of each team member as separate actions of a single player. The interactions between the two teams, however, are dynamic and can be better represented using a stochastic model as we did here. In his master’s thesis, Burke studies the use of repeated games with incomplete information to model attackers and defenders in information warfare [3]. As in our work, the objective is to predict enemy strategies and find defenses against them using a game model. Using static game models, however, requires the problem to be abstracted to a very high level, and only simple analyses are possible. Our use of a stochastic model in this paper allows us to capture the probabilistic nature of state transitions in real life.

In the study of network reliability, Bell considers a zero-sum game in which the router has to find a least-cost path and a network tester seeks to maximize this cost by failing a link [1]. The problem is similar to ours in that two players are in some form of control over the network and they have opposite objectives. Finding the least-cost path in their problem is analogous to finding a best defense strategy in ours. Hespanha and Bohacek discuss routing games in which an adversary tries to intersect data packets in a computer network [9]. The designer of the network has to find routing policies that avoid links that are under the attacker’s surveillance. Finding their optimal routing policy is similar to finding the least-cost path in Bell’s work [1] and the best defense strategy in our problem in that at every state, each player has to make a decision on what action to take. Again, their game model is a zero-sum game. In comparison, our work uses a more general (general-sum) game model that allows us to find more Nash equilibria.

McInerney et al. use a simple one-player game in their *FRIARS* cyber-defense decision system capable of reacting autonomously to automated system attacks [11]. Their problem is similar to ours in having cyberspace attackers and defenders. Instead of finding complete strategies, their single-player game model is used to predict the opponent’s next move one at a time. Their model is closer to being just a Markov decision problem because it is a single-player game. Ours, in contrast, exploits fully what a (two-player) game model can allow us to find, namely, equilibrium strategies for both players.

Finally, Syverson mentions the idea of “good” nodes fighting “evil” nodes in a network and suggests using

stochastic games for reasoning and analysis [15]. In this paper, we have precisely formalized this idea and given a concrete example in detail.

Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show a formal application of a game-theoretic model in the context of network security. Our formulation and example are different from previous work in that we employ a general-sum stochastic game model. This model allows us to perform a richer analysis for more complicated problems and also allows us to find multiple Nash equilibria (sets of best responses) instead of a single equilibrium. Finally, our illustration of our formal model on a concrete example gives rise to realistic attack-and-recover scenarios.

## 8 Conclusions and future work

We have shown how the network security problem can be modeled as a general-sum stochastic game between the attacker and the administrator. Using the nonlinear program NLP-1, we computed multiple Nash equilibria, each denoting best strategies (best responses) for both players. For the first Nash equilibrium, we explained why these strategies make sense and are useful for the administrator. We showed in the second and third equilibria that there are more strategies that the attacker could use. Discussions with one of our university's network managers revealed that these results are indeed useful and provided him with additional insight. Our analysis allows him to discover strategies that an attacker could use and helps him in planning future software and hardware upgrades that will strengthen weak points in the network. With proper modeling, the game-theoretic analysis we presented here can also be applied to other general heterogeneous networks.

In the future, we wish to develop a systematic method for decomposing large models into smaller manageable components such that strategies can be found individually for them using conventional Markov Decision Process (MDP) and game-theoretic solution methods such as dynamic programming, policy iteration, and value iteration. For example, we can regard nearly isolated clusters of states as subgames, and we can regard states in which only one player has meaningful actions as an MDP. We can then compose the overall best response for each player from the strategies for the components. We expect that we can significantly reduce the computation time by using such a decomposition method.

We have recently used the method by Sheyner et al. [13] for automatically generating attack graphs to replicate our example, which we generated manually in this paper. In further work [10], they show how to augment state transitions with probabilities to represent the likelihood of a given atomic action, and they formally draw a correspondence between probabilistic attack graphs

and MDPs. Thus, by starting with their model-checking-based algorithm for generating attack graphs, we hope to experiment with network examples that are larger and more complicated than the one given here.

We view our work as a first step in the application of game theory to security. While others have informally suggested this formalism for modeling security, due to the adversarial nature of attackers, we worked out how a very general game-theoretic formalism might actually be applied in this context. In so doing, we note in Sect. 6.2 the limitations of our approach; some limitations are common to other formal modeling techniques, but others suggest further research work.

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**Table 3.** Administrator’s action names and numbers

State no. \ Action no.	Administrator’s action numbers and names		
	1	2	3
1	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
2	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
3	<i>Install_sniffer_detector</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
4	<i>Remove_sniffer_detector</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
5	<i>Remove_compromised_account_restart_httpd</i>	<i>Install_sniffer_detector</i>	$\phi$
6	<i>Remove_compromised_account_restart_ftpd</i>	<i>Install_sniffer_detector</i>	$\phi$
7	<i>Restore_website_remove_compromised_account</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
8	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
9	<i>Remove_sniffer_and_compromised_account</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
10	<i>Remove_virus_and_compromised_account</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
11	<i>Remove_virus_and_compromised_account</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
12	<i>Remove_virus_and_compromised_account</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
13	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
14	<i>Remove_sniffer_and_compromised_account</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
15	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
16	<i>Remove_sniffer_and_compromised_account</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
17	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
18	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$

**Appendix: Tables for network example**

**Table 1.** State names and numbers: we provide this and the next two summary tables for reading the remaining tables in this appendix

State number	State name
1	<b>Normal_operation</b>
2	<b>Httpd_attacked</b>
3	<b>Ftpd_attacked</b>
4	<b>Ftpd_attacked_detector</b>
5	<b>Httpd_hacked</b>
6	<b>Ftpd_hacked</b>
7	<b>Website_defaced</b>
8	<b>Webserver_sniffer</b>
9	<b>Webserver_sniffer_detector</b>
10	<b>Webserver_DOS_1</b>
11	<b>Webserver_DOS_2</b>
12	<b>Network_shutdown</b>
13	<b>Fileserver_hacked</b>
14	<b>Fileserver_data_stolen_1</b>
15	<b>Workstation_hacked</b>
16	<b>Workstation_data_stolen_1</b>
17	<b>Fileserver_data_stolen_2</b>
18	<b>Workstation_data_stolen_2</b>

**Table 2.** Attacker’s action names and numbers

State no. \ Action no.	Attacker’s action numbers and names		
	1	2	3
1	<i>Attack_httpd</i>	<i>Attack_ftpd</i>	$\phi$
2	<i>Continue_attacking</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
3	<i>Continue_attacking</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
4	<i>Continue_attacking</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
5	<i>Deface_website</i>	<i>Install_sniffer</i>	$\phi$
6	<i>Install_sniffer</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
7	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
8	<i>Run_DOS_virus</i>	<i>Crack_file_server_root_password</i>	<i>Crack_workstation_root_password</i>
9	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
10	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
11	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
12	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
13	<i>Capture_data</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
14	<i>Shutdown_network</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
15	<i>Capture_data</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
16	<i>Shutdown_network</i>	$\phi$	$\phi$
17	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$
18	$\phi$	$\phi$	$\phi$

**Table 4.** State transition probabilities (remaining probabilities are either set to 0 or assigned to transitions to a “catchall” state)

State 1	State 2	State 3
$P(2   1,1,\cdot) = 1/3$	$P(2   2,1,\cdot)=0.5/3$	$P(3   3,1,2)= 0.5$
$P(3   1,2,\cdot) = 1/3$	$P(5   2,1,\cdot)=0.5/3$	$P(3   3,1,3)= 0.5$
$P(1   1,3,\cdot) = 1$	$P(1   2,2,\cdot)=1$	$P(6   3,1,2)= 0.5$
	$P(1   2,3,\cdot)=1$	$P(6   3,1,3)= 0.5$
		$P(4   3,1,1)= 1$
State 4	State 5	State 6
$P(1   4,2,1)= 1$	$P(7   5,1,3)=0.8$	$P(8   6,1,3)=0.8$
$P(1   4,3,1)= 1$	$P(8   5,2,3)=0.8$	$P(9   6,1,2)=0.8$
$P(3   4,1,1)= 1$	$P(9   5,2,2)=0.8$	$P(1   6,2,1)=1$
$P(4   4,1,2)= 1$	$P(1   5,3,1)=1$	$P(1   6,3,1)=1$
$P(4   4,1,3)= 1$	$P(1   5,3,1)=1$	$P(6   6,2,3)=1$
		$P(6   6,3,3)=1$
State 7	State 8	State 9
$P(1   7,\cdot, 1)=1$	$P(10   8,1,\cdot) = 1/3$	$P(1   9, \cdot,1)=1$
$P(7   7, \cdot, 2)=0.9$	$P(13   8,2,\cdot) = 0.9/3$	
$P(7   7, \cdot, 3)=0.9$	$P(15   8,3,\cdot) = 0.9/3$	
State 10	State 11	State 12
$P(1   10,\cdot,1) = 1$	$P(1   11,\cdot,1) = 1$	$P(1   12, \cdot,1)=1$
$P(11   10,\cdot,2) = 0.8$	$P(12   11,\cdot,2) = 0.8$	$P(12   12, \cdot,2)=0.9$
$P(11   10,\cdot,3) = 0.8$	$P(12   11,\cdot,3) = 0.8$	$P(12   12, \cdot,3)=0.9$
State 13	State 14	State 15
$P(14   13,1,\cdot)=1$	$P(12   14,1,2)=1$	$P(16   15,1, \cdot)=1$
	$P(12   14,1,3)=1$	
	$P(17   14,2,1)=1$	
	$P(17   14,3,1)=1$	
	$P(12   14,1,1)=0.5$	
	$P(17   14,1,1)=0.5$	
State 16	State 17	State 18
$P(12   16,1,2)=1$	$P(17   17,\cdot,\cdot)=0.9$	$P(18   18,\cdot,\cdot)=0.9$
$P(12   16,1,3)=1$		
$P(18   16,2,1)=1$		
$P(18   16,3,1)=1$		
$P(12   16,1,1)=0.5$		
$P(18   16,1,1)=0.5$		

**Table 5.** Reward and cost matrices

$R^1(1) = \begin{bmatrix} 10 & 10 & 10 \\ 10 & 10 & 10 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(1) = -R^1(1)$
$R^1(2) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(2) = R^1(2)$
$R^1(3) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(3) = \begin{bmatrix} -10 & -10 & -20 \\ -10 & -10 & 0 \\ -10 & -10 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(4) = \begin{bmatrix} 20 & 10 & 10 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(4) = \begin{bmatrix} -20 & -10 & -10 \\ -10 & 0 & 0 \\ -10 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(5) = \begin{bmatrix} 99 & 50 & 99 \\ 10 & 0 & 10 \\ 0 & -10 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(5) = \begin{bmatrix} -99 & -99 & -99 \\ 10 & 10 & -10 \\ -10 & -10 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(6) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 10 \\ -10 & 0 & 0 \\ -10 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(6) = -R^1(6)$
$R^1(7) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(7) = \begin{bmatrix} -99 & 0 & 0 \\ -99 & 0 & 0 \\ -99 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(8) = \begin{bmatrix} 30 & 30 & 30 \\ 50 & 50 & 50 \\ 50 & 50 & 50 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(8) = -R^1(8)$
$R^1(9) = \begin{bmatrix} -20 & 0 & 0 \\ -20 & 0 & 0 \\ -20 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(9) = R^1(9)$
$R^1(10) = \begin{bmatrix} 30 & 0 & 0 \\ 30 & 0 & 0 \\ 30 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(10) = \begin{bmatrix} -30 & 0 & 0 \\ -30 & 0 & 0 \\ -30 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(11) = \begin{bmatrix} 30 & 0 & 0 \\ 30 & 0 & 0 \\ 30 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(11) = \begin{bmatrix} -60 & 0 & 0 \\ -60 & 0 & 0 \\ -60 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(12) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(12) = \begin{bmatrix} -90 & 0 & 0 \\ -90 & 0 & 0 \\ -90 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(13) = \begin{bmatrix} 999 & 999 & 999 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(13) = -R^1(13)$
$R^1(14) = \begin{bmatrix} 30 & 60 & 60 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(14) = \begin{bmatrix} -10 & -60 & -60 \\ -20 & 0 & 0 \\ -20 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(15) = \begin{bmatrix} 999 & 999 & 999 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(15) = -R^1(15)$
$R^1(16) = \begin{bmatrix} 30 & 60 & 60 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(16) = \begin{bmatrix} -10 & -60 & -60 \\ -20 & 0 & 0 \\ -20 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
$R^1(17) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(17) = R^1(17)$
$R^1(18) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$	$R^2(18) = R^1(18)$

**Table 6.** Nash equilibrium 1: Strategies and state values for attacker and administrator

	State	Strategies		State Values	
		Attacker	Administrator	Attacker	Administrator
1	Normal_operation	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	210.2	-206.8
2	Httpd_attacked	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	202.2	-191.1
3	Ftpd_attacked	[ 0.65 0.00 0.35 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	176.9	-189.3
4	Ftpd_attacked_detector	[ 0.40 0.12 0.48 ]	[ 0.93 0.07 0.00 ]	165.8	-173.8
5	Httpd_hacked	[ 0.33 0.10 0.57 ]	[ 0.67 0.19 0.14 ]	197.4	-206.4
6	Ftpd_hacked	[ 0.12 0.00 0.88 ]	[ 0.96 0.00 0.04 ]	204.8	-203.5
7	Website_defaced	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	80.4	-80.0
8	Webserver_sniffer	[ 0.00 0.50 0.50 ]	[ 0.33 0.33 0.34 ]	716.3	-715.1
9	Webserver_sniffer_detector	[ 0.34 0.33 0.33 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	148.2	-185.4
10	Webserver_DOS_1	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	106.7	-106.1
11	Webserver_DOS_2	[ 0.34 0.33 0.33 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	96.5	-96.0
12	Network_shutdown	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	80.4	-80.0
13	Fileserver_hacked	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.35 0.34 0.31 ]	1065.5	-1049.2
14	Fileserver_data_stolen_1	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	94.4	-74.0
15	Workstation_hacked	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.31 0.32 0.37 ]	1065.5	-1049.2
16	Workstation_data_stolen_1	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	94.4	-74.0
17	Fileserver_data_stolen_2	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	80.4	-80.0
18	Workstation_data_stolen_2	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	[ 0.33 0.33 0.33 ]	80.4	-80.0

**Table 7.** Nash equilibrium 2: Strategies and state values for attacker and administrator

	State	Strategies		State Values	
		Attacker	Administrator	Attacker	Administrator
1	Normal_operation	[ 0.13 0.00 0.87 ]	[ 0.26 0.22 0.52 ]	212.7	-79.6
2	Httpd_attacked	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.27 0.30 0.43 ]	204.6	-166.9
3	Ftpd_attacked	[ 0.12 0.32 0.56 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	179.1	-141.0
4	Ftpd_attacked_detector	[ 0.12 0.00 0.88 ]	[ 0.93 0.07 0.00 ]	167.7	-80.8
5	Httpd_hacked	[ 0.91 0.06 0.04 ]	[ 0.66 0.20 0.13 ]	199.2	-177.4
6	Ftpd_hacked	[ 0.10 0.00 0.90 ]	[ 0.70 0.23 0.08 ]	207.9	-175.0
7	Website_defaced	[ 0.39 0.26 0.34 ]	[ 0.23 0.35 0.41 ]	81.4	-70.7
8	Webserver_sniffer	[ 0.00 0.53 0.47 ]	[ 0.34 0.42 0.24 ]	719.0	-690.0
9	Webserver_sniffer_detector	[ 0.34 0.34 0.33 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	150.2	-83.7
10	Webserver_DOS_1	[ 0.24 0.40 0.35 ]	[ 0.52 0.29 0.19 ]	140.5	-93.7
11	Webserver_DOS_2	[ 0.33 0.39 0.28 ]	[ 0.00 0.59 0.41 ]	97.7	-84.8
12	Network_shutdown	[ 0.34 0.32 0.34 ]	[ 0.29 0.26 0.45 ]	81.4	-70.7
13	Fileserver_hacked	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.11 0.41 0.48 ]	1066.1	-1043.2
14	Fileserver_data_stolen_1	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	95.1	-66.5
15	Workstation_hacked	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.33 0.24 0.43 ]	1066.1	-1043.2
16	Workstation_data_stolen_1	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	95.1	-66.5
17	Fileserver_data_stolen_2	[ 0.39 0.25 0.36 ]	[ 0.31 0.42 0.26 ]	81.4	-70.7
18	Workstation_data_stolen_2	[ 0.23 0.50 0.27 ]	[ 0.25 0.42 0.33 ]	81.4	-70.7



**Table 8.** Nash equilibrium 3: Strategies and state values for attacker and administrator

	State	Strategies		State Values	
		Attacker	Administrator	Attacker	Administrator
1	<b>Normal_operation</b>	[ 0.04 0.00 0.96 ]	[ 0.33 0.36 0.31 ]	224.2	-28.6
2	<b>Httpd_attacked</b>	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.35 0.32 0.34 ]	218.1	-161.0
3	<b>Ftpd_attacked</b>	[ 0.20 0.11 0.69 ]	[ 0.77 0.23 0.00 ]	199.2	-163.0
4	<b>Ftpd_attacked_detector</b>	[ 0.96 0.01 0.04 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	179.3	-145.3
5	<b>Httpd_hacked</b>	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.00 0.89 0.11 ]	232.3	-155.8
6	<b>Ftpd_hacked</b>	[ 0.10 0.00 0.90 ]	[ 0.96 0.00 0.04 ]	218.9	-169.2
7	<b>Website_defaced</b>	[ 0.42 0.37 0.21 ]	[ 0.27 0.30 0.43 ]	85.8	-69.1
8	<b>Webserver_sniffer</b>	[ 0.00 0.49 0.51 ]	[ 0.33 0.35 0.32 ]	730.7	-685.7
9	<b>Webserver_sniffer_detector</b>	[ 0.31 0.32 0.38 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	159.3	-42.9
10	<b>Webserver_DOS_1</b>	[ 0.27 0.29 0.44 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	179.3	-52.9
11	<b>Webserver_DOS_2</b>	[ 0.38 0.29 0.34 ]	[ 0.90 0.05 0.06 ]	171.5	-82.9
12	<b>Network_shutdown</b>	[ 0.36 0.21 0.43 ]	[ 0.18 0.40 0.42 ]	85.8	-69.1
13	<b>Fileserver_hacked</b>	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.29 0.28 0.43 ]	1068.9	-1042.2
14	<b>Fileserver_data_stolen_1</b>	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	98.6	-65.3
15	<b>Workstation_hacked</b>	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 0.39 0.24 0.36 ]	1068.9	-1042.2
16	<b>Workstation_data_stolen_1</b>	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	[ 1.00 0.00 0.00 ]	98.6	-65.3
17	<b>Fileserver_data_stolen_2</b>	[ 0.31 0.48 0.21 ]	[ 0.31 0.37 0.32 ]	85.8	-69.1
18	<b>Workstation_data_stolen_2</b>	[ 0.39 0.36 0.25 ]	[ 0.38 0.37 0.25 ]	85.8	-69.1