15-213 Recitation: Attack Lab


10 June 2020

Agenda

- **Reminders**
- **Buffer Overflow Attacks**
- Attack Lab Activities

Reminders

- Attack lab out Monday, due Monday, June 15
 - You can use 1 grace day
 - No penalties for solving targets incorrectly (a la bomb lab detonations)



once again I am being attacked for presenting new ideas

4:57 PM - 1 May 2018

Attack Lab

- We're letting you hijack programs by running buffer overflow attacks on them...
- To understand stack discipline and stack frames
- To defeat relatively secure programs with return oriented programming

Stack Smashing Attack

callq pushes the return address onto the stack

retq pops this return address and jumps to it

\$rsp →

Next return address

Buffer Overflows

Local string variables are stored on the stack

Some C functions do not check sizes of strings

Next return address

Space allocated for string

\$rsp ─

Buffer Overflows

- You can write a string that overwrites the return address
- Activity 1 steps through an example of overwriting the return address on the stack



Next return address

Space allocated for string

\$rsp —

Executing Commands on the Stack

- What if instead of jumping to a predefined function, we jumped to code on the stack?
- Activity 2 steps through an example of executing code on the stack

Assembly instructions on the stack

Return address points to assembly above

\$rsp ---

OS Countermeasures

- Executable code is not allowed on the stack (unless we specifically allow it e.g. through *mprotect* like we do for activity 2)
- Thus, we must use executable code that already exists in the program to do what we want
- But code often doesn't already contain our exploit function so what can we do instead?

Return-Oriented Programming

- Goal: execute a small section of code, return, call another small section of code. Repeat until you execute your exploit
- Activity 3 steps you through an example of a return-oriented programming exploit

Attack Lab Activities

- **■** Three activities
 - Each relies on a specially crafted assembly sequence to purposefully overwrite the stack
- Activity 1 overwrite the return addresses (Buffer Overflow)
- Activity 2 write assembly instructions onto the stack
- Activity 3 use byte sequences in libc as the instructions (Return-Oriented Programming)

Attack Lab Activities

- Work in pairs: one student needs a laptop
- Login to a shark machine

```
$ wget http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213/activities/attack-lab-rec.tar
$ tar xf attack-lab-rec.tar
$ cd attack-lab-rec
$ make (only do this if the executables aren't present)
$ qdb act1
```

Activity 1

```
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x $rsp
(gdb) backtrace
```

- Q. Does the value at the top of the stack match any frame?
- A. 0x400c63 is the address to return to in main

Activity 1 Continued


Q. Has the return address changed?

A. 0x401040 was the first number pointed to by \$rdi

```
(gdb) finish // Should exit and print out "Hi!"
```

Activity 1 Post

- Clobber overwrites part of the stack with memory at \$rdi, including the all-important return address
- In act1, it writes two new return addresses:
 - 0x401040: address of printHi()
 - 0x400560: address in main



Activity 2

```
$ gdb act2
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x $rsp
```

- Q. What is the address of the stack and the return address?
- A. 0x7ffffffdd38 -> 0x400f5a

```
(gdb) x /4gx $rdi
```

- Q. What will the new return address be?
- A. 0x7ffffffdd40 (First address stored using \$rdi)

Activitity 2 Continued

```
(gdb) \times /5i \Rightarrowrdi + 8// Display as instructions
```

- Q. Why \$rdi + 8?
- A. Want to ignore the 8-byte return address
- Q. What are the three addresses?
- A. 0x49b259, 0x402eb0, 0x401fe0

```
(gdb) break puts
(gdb) break exit
```

- Q. Do these addresses look familiar?
- A. puts 0x402eb0, exit 0x401fe0

Activity 2 Post

- Normally programs cannot execute instructions on the stack
 - Main used *mprotect* to disable the memory protection for this activity
- Clobber wrote an address that's on the stack as a return address
 - Followed by a sequence of instructions
 - Three addresses show up in the exploit:
 - $0x49b259 \rightarrow$ "Hi\n" string
 - 0x402eb0 → puts() function
 - 0x401fe0 → exit() function

Activity 3

```
$ gdb act3
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x /5gx $rdi
```

- Q. Which value will be first on the stack? Why is this important?
- A. 0x401a6e, this is the address to return to from clobber

Activity 3 Continued

```
(qdb) x /2i <return address>
```

- Q. What does this sequence do?
- A. Pops next stack value into \$rdi, then returns
- Q. Check the other addresses. Note that some are return addresses and some are for data. When you continue, what will the code now do?
- A. Print "Hi\n"

Activity 3 Post

- It's harder to stop programs from running existing pieces of code in the executable.
- Clobber wrote multiple return addresses (aka gadgets) that each performed a small task, along with data that will get popped off the stack while running the gadgets.
 - ■0x401a6e: pop %rdi; retq
 - ■0x4941f0: Pointer to the string "Hi\n"
 - ■0x475f6a: pop %rax; retq
 - ■0x401060: Address of a printing function
 - ■0x47664b: callq *%rax

Activity 3 Post

Note that some of the return addresses actually cut off bytes from existing instructions

```
457cfa: 48 83 c4 28
                               add
                                      $0x28,%rsp
457cfe: 5b
                                      %rbx
                              pop
457cff: 4a 8d 44 3d 00
                                     0x0(%rbp,%r15,1),%rax
                               lea
457d04: 5d
                                      %rbp
                              pop
457d05: 41 5c
                                      %r12
                              pop
457d07: 41 5d
                                     %r13
                              pop
                                     %r14
457d09: 41 5e
457d0b 41 5f
                                      %r15
                              pop
457d0d: c3
457d0e: 48 83 7c 24 10 00
                                      $0x0,0x10(%rsp)
                               cmpq
457d14: 74 8a
                                      457ca0 < IO getline info+0xd0>
                               ie
```

0x457d0b0c	0d
pop %r15	retq
41 5f	c3
pop %rdi	retq
5f	c3

Operation	Register R							
	%rax	%rcx	%rdx	%rbx	%rsp	%rbp	%rsi	%rdi
popq R	58	59	5a	5b	5c	5d	5e	(5f)

If you get stuck...

- Please read the writeup!
- CS:APP Chapter 3
- View lecture notes and course FAQ at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213
- Office hours Sundays Fridays 6-10PM EDT on Z00m
 - Also Mondays 11AM-1PM, as a treat!
- Post a private question on Piazza
- man gdb gdb's help command

Attack Lab Tools

- gcc -c test.s; objdump -d test.o > test.asm
 Compiles the assembly code in test.s and shows the actual bytes for the instructions
- ./hex2raw < exploit.txt > converted.txt
 Convert hex codes in exploit.txt into raw ASCII strings to pass to targets
 See the writeup for more details on how to use this
- (gdb) display /12gx \$rsp (gdb) display /2i \$rip
 Displays 12 elements on the stack and the next 2 instructions to run

GDB is also useful for tracing to see if an exploit is working