On evolution of cooperation and conflict

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Evolution of cooperation and conflict in networked multiagent systems

• L. Luo, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara, `` An evolutionary game-theoretic model for ethno-religious conflicts between two groups '', Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory , Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 379-401, November 2011.

• L-M. Hofmann, N. Chakraborty and K. Sycara, `` The Evolution of Cooperation in Self-interested Agent Societies: A Critical Study '', Proceedings of 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), Taipei, Taiwan, May 2011.

• L. Luo, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara, `` Prisoner's Dilemma in Graphs with Heterogeneous Agents '', Second IEEE International Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom2010) , Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 2010.

• L. Luo, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara, ``Modeling effect of leaders in ethno-religious conflicts '', 2010 International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral Modeling, and Prediction (SBP10) , Washington D.C., USA, March 2010.

• L. Luo, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara, `` Modeling Ethno-religious Conflicts as Prisoner's Dilemma Game in Graphs '', 2009 IEEE International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering , vol. 4, pp. 442-449, VanCouver, Canada, August 2009.

• L. Luo, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara, ``Prisoner's Dilemma on Graphs with Heterogeneous Agents''. Proceedings of GECCO '09, 11th Annual Conference Companion on Genetic and Evolutionary Com- putation Conference: Late Breaking Papers, Montreal, Canada, July 2009.




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Dynamic Equilibrium Computation for Repeated Games in Graphs

In this paper, we present algorithms to compute all possible dynamic equilibrium (DE) of repeated games in graphs (RGG). Repeated games in graphs are used to model emerging social phenomenon like spread of an innovation in a network and emergence of cooperation in a society of self-interested agents. A RGG is a multiple round game played by agents organized in graphs, where during each round, an agent gains payoff by playing a game with her neighbors, and updates her action for the next round based on the actions and/or payoffs of all her neighbors in the current round. Thus, a RGG corresponds to a dynamical system and the evolved phenomenon corresponds to the equilibrium state of this dynamical system. We present a dynamic programming based two-pass algorithms to compute all possible DE of RGGs. We show that if the graph is a tree, then the complexity of the algorithm is linear in the number of nodes.

• L. Luo, N. Chakraborty, and K. Sycara, `` Dynamic Equilibrium Computation for Repeated Games in Graphs '', Under Submission.




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Multiplayer conflicts over resources

This paper considers the problem of $n$-player conflict modeling, arising due to competition over resources. Each player represents a distinct group of people and has some resource and power. A player may either attack other players (i.e., groups) to obtain their resources or do nothing. We present a game-theoretical model for interaction between the players, and show that key questions of interest to policy makers can be answered efficiently, i.e., in polynomial time in the number of players. They are: (1) Given the resources and the power of each group, is no-war a stable situation? and (2) Assuming there are some conflicts already in the society, is there a danger of other groups not involved in the conflict joining the conflict and further degrading the current situation? We show that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is not an appropriate solution concept for our problem and introduce a refinement of the Nash equilibrium called the asymmetric equilibrium. We also provide an algorithm (that is exponential in the number of players) to compute all the asymmetric equilibria and propose heuristics to improve the performance of the algorithm.
• N. Hazon, N. Chakraborty and K. Sycara, ``Game Theoretic Modeling and Computational Analysis of N-Player Conicts over Resources '', Third IEEE International Conference on Social Computing (SocialCom2011), Boston, Massachusetts, October 2011.

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