

# Lecture Notes on Convergence

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Lecture 10

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## 1 Introduction

We began the lecture with a consideration of induction over explicitly defined inductive types, notably unary natural numbers defined by zero and a successor function. We tacked this material on the end of the notes for [Lecture 9](#).

So far in our study of dynamic logic we have focused on  $[\alpha]P$ , meaning that  $P$  is true after every possible run of  $\alpha$ . In the world of deterministic programs we call this *partial correctness*: the final state satisfies  $P$ , but only if  $\alpha$  terminates. We also sometimes talk about a *safety property*: no matter what happens, if we terminate at least  $P$  will be true.

The other modality is  $\langle\alpha\rangle P$  which means that there is a run of  $\alpha$  such that  $P$  is true. For deterministic programs (that is, programs that have at most one final state), we call this *total correctness*:  $\alpha$  will reach a final state, and it satisfies  $P$ . We also sometimes talk about a *liveness property*: something good (that is a final state that satisfied  $P$ ) will eventually happen.

In this lecture we recall the semantics of  $\langle\alpha\rangle P$  more formally and then examine how to break down programs for this particular modal operator by using axioms. This will be straightforward until we encounter  $\alpha^*$ , which requires an axiom of *convergence* as a counterpart to the axiom of *induction*.

**Learning goals.** After this lecture, you should be able to:

- Express liveness properties in dynamic logic
- Reason with the axiom of convergence
- Reason with interacting  $[-]$  and  $\langle-\rangle$  modalities.

## 2 Box vs. Diamond

Recall that we defined

$$\begin{aligned}\omega \models [\alpha]Q & \text{ iff for every } \nu, \omega \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \nu \text{ implies } \nu \models P \\ \omega \models \langle \alpha \rangle Q & \text{ iff there exists a } \nu \text{ such that } \omega \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \nu \text{ and } \nu \models P\end{aligned}$$

Both of these are with respect to the same semantics  $\omega \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \nu$ . In the first case, if  $\nu$  is reachable then  $P$  must be true; in the second case some such  $\nu$  must be reachable.

Recall the definitions

$$\begin{aligned}\text{skip} & \triangleq ?\text{true} \\ \text{abort} & \triangleq ?\text{false}\end{aligned}$$

From this definition we can deduce the following properties. You should make sure you understand each line.

$$\begin{aligned}[\text{skip}]P & \text{ iff } P \\ \langle \text{skip} \rangle P & \text{ iff } P \\ [\text{abort}]P & \text{ always} \\ \langle \text{abort} \rangle P & \text{ never} \\ [\alpha^*]\text{true} & \text{ always} \\ \langle \alpha^* \rangle \text{true} & \text{ always} \\ [\alpha^*]\text{false} & \text{ never} \\ \langle \alpha^* \rangle \text{false} & \text{ never}\end{aligned}$$

## 3 One Axiom for Diamonds

It turns out that in dynamic logic we can give a single axiom characterizing  $\langle \alpha \rangle Q$ :

$$\langle \alpha \rangle Q \leftrightarrow \neg[\alpha]\neg Q$$

Let's reason this through, starting on the right-hand side:

$$\begin{aligned}\omega \models \neg[\alpha]\neg Q & \text{ iff } \neg(\forall \nu. \omega \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \nu \rightarrow \nu \models \neg Q) \\ & \text{ iff } \exists \nu. \neg(\omega \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \nu \rightarrow \nu \models \neg Q) \\ & \text{ iff } \exists \nu. \omega \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \nu \wedge \neg(\nu \models \neg Q) \\ & \text{ iff } \exists \nu. \omega \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket \nu \wedge \nu \models Q \\ & \text{ iff } \omega \models \langle \alpha \rangle Q\end{aligned}$$

Here we have used some fundamental laws of (classical) reasoning in our language of mathematical discourse, such as  $\neg(P \rightarrow Q) \leftrightarrow (P \wedge \neg Q)$  and  $\neg(\exists x. Q) \leftrightarrow \forall x. \neg Q$ .

This observation will carry us quite far, but it will not help us when we come to induction.

## 4 Other Axioms for Diamonds

We would like to break down the programs in  $\langle \alpha \rangle Q$  in order to generate a verification condition in pure arithmetic. In some cases this works just as for  $[\alpha]Q$ , in other cases it is very different.

We start with assignment. This will always terminate in one step, so a property of all runs is the same as a property of one run.

$$\langle x \leftarrow e \rangle Q(x) \leftrightarrow \forall x'. x' = e \rightarrow Q(x') \quad (x' \text{ not in } e, Q(x))$$

Sequential composition also does not change matters in any essential way. Just for a change of style, let's use the axiom from the previous section to derivation what should hold.

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha ; \beta \rangle Q & \text{ iff } \neg[\alpha ; \beta] \neg Q \\ & \text{ iff } \neg[\alpha][\beta] \neg Q \\ & \text{ iff } \langle \alpha \rangle \neg[\beta] \neg Q \\ & \text{ iff } \langle \alpha \rangle \langle \beta \rangle \neg \neg Q \\ & \text{ iff } \langle \alpha \rangle \langle \beta \rangle Q \end{aligned}$$

Informally, we can argue as follows: there is a run of  $\alpha ; \beta$  if there is a run of  $\alpha$  to some intermediate state, and a run of  $\beta$  from there after which  $Q$  is true. And that's the same as running  $\alpha$  to a state from which  $\beta$  can reach a state in which  $Q$  is true.

For nondeterministic choice  $\alpha \cup \beta$ , we can reach a final state either by choosing  $\alpha$  or choosing  $\beta$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha \cup \beta \rangle Q & \text{ iff } \neg[\alpha \cup \beta] \neg Q \\ & \text{ iff } \neg([\alpha] \neg Q \wedge [\beta] \neg Q) \\ & \text{ iff } (\neg[\alpha] \neg Q) \vee (\neg[\beta] \neg Q) \\ & \text{ iff } \langle \alpha \rangle Q \vee \langle \beta \rangle Q \end{aligned}$$

We see that through the negations this dualizes the axiom for  $[\alpha \cup \beta]$ , used in the second step above.

Finally, for guards they are opposites in a different say.

$$\begin{aligned} \langle ?P \rangle Q & \text{ iff } \neg[?P] \neg Q \\ & \text{ iff } \neg(P \rightarrow \neg Q) \\ & \text{ iff } P \wedge Q \end{aligned}$$

Finally, we come to repetition. There is a simple analogue of the axiom to unroll a loop, for the same reason as nondeterministic choice. We won't go through steps, just show the final equivalence.

$$\langle \alpha^* \rangle Q \leftrightarrow Q \vee \langle \alpha \rangle \langle \alpha^* \rangle Q$$

As before, this finite unrolling is of limited utility.

## 5 Convergence

In practice, unrolling a loop a finite number of times is insufficient to prove most programs. Instead, we work with the induction axiom and then invariants when proving  $[\alpha^*]Q$ . Recall:

$$\begin{aligned} [\alpha^*]Q &\leftrightarrow Q \wedge [\alpha^*](Q \rightarrow [\alpha]Q) && \text{(induction)} \\ &\leftarrow J \wedge \Box(J \rightarrow [\alpha]J) \wedge \Box(J \rightarrow Q) \end{aligned}$$

What is the analogue for induction for  $\langle \alpha^* \rangle Q$ ? We can work through it and see what the mechanical approach yields.

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha^* \rangle Q &\text{ iff } \neg[\alpha^*]\neg Q \\ &\text{ iff } \neg(\neg Q \wedge [\alpha^*](\neg Q \rightarrow [\alpha]\neg Q)) \\ &\text{ iff } Q \vee \neg[\alpha^*](\neg Q \rightarrow [\alpha]\neg Q) \\ &\text{ iff } Q \vee \langle \alpha^* \rangle(\neg(\neg Q \rightarrow [\alpha]\neg Q)) \\ &\text{ iff } Q \vee \langle \alpha^* \rangle(\neg Q \wedge \langle \alpha \rangle Q) \end{aligned}$$

Unfortunately, the resulting axiom (while true) is not very useful.

$$\langle \alpha^* \rangle Q \leftrightarrow Q \vee \langle \alpha^* \rangle(\neg Q \wedge \langle \alpha \rangle Q)$$

It states that there is a way to reach a poststate where  $Q$  is true either if it already happens to be true in the current state (and we go around the loop zero times), or there is a way to go around the loop some number of times in such a way that, after that,  $Q$  is false but we can restore it with one more iteration.

Instead, we have to somehow capture, in a slightly more abstract way, the reasoning behind the variant contracts in Why3 that guarantee termination.

To capture this logically we assume that a predicate  $V$  is parameterized by an integer variable  $n$ , written as  $V(n)$ . We prohibit the variable  $n$  from appearing in programs; instead we use  $V$  to relate  $n$  to expressions occurring in the program. The axiom of convergence then says

It is possible to reach a poststate with  $V(0)$  after a finite number of iterations of  $\alpha$  if (1) initially  $V(n)$  for some  $n \geq 0$ ,  
and (2) at each iteration, assuming  $V(n)$  for  $n > 0$   
implies we can reach a poststate with  $V(n - 1)$ .

Translating this an axiom gives us

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha^* \rangle V(0) &\leftarrow (\exists n. n \geq 0 \wedge V(n)) \\ &\quad \wedge [\alpha^*](\forall n. n > 0 \wedge V(n) \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle V(n - 1)) \\ &\quad (n \text{ not in } \alpha) \end{aligned}$$

It is interesting that this axiom incorporates  $[\alpha^*]P$  because we need to make sure that no matter how many iterations we need until we reach 0 the decrease of  $n$  will always take place.

To make this effective we take one more step: we think of  $V(n)$  as the *predicate variant* of the iteration and use it to prove an arbitrary postcondition  $Q$ . As before, this replaces  $[\alpha^*]P$  by  $\Box P$ , and makes sure the variant predicate implies the postcondition. This is slightly different than the *variant expression* we use in Why3, which we address in the next section.

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha^* \rangle Q \leftarrow & (\exists n. n \geq 0 \wedge V(n)) \\ & \wedge \Box (\forall n. n > 0 \wedge V(n) \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle V(n-1)) \\ & \wedge \Box (V(0) \rightarrow Q) \\ & (n \text{ not in } \alpha \text{ or } Q) \end{aligned}$$

As an example, let's prove

$$x \geq 0 \rightarrow \langle (x \leftarrow x - 1)^* \rangle x = 0$$

In order to apply convergence we have to define the variant formula  $V(n)$ . In this case, it is easy and we choose

$$V(n) = (x = n)$$

that is,  $n$  just tracks the value of  $x$ . We proceed:

To prove (init):  $x \geq 0 \rightarrow \exists n. n \geq 0 \wedge x = n$  True (pick  $n = x$ )

To prove (step):  $x \geq 0 \rightarrow \Box (\forall n. n > 0 \wedge x = n \rightarrow \langle x \leftarrow x - 1 \rangle x = n - 1)$

True if  $\forall n. n > 0 \wedge x = n \rightarrow \forall x'. x' = x - 1 \rightarrow x' = n - 1$

True if  $\forall n. n > 0 \wedge x = n \rightarrow x - 1 = n - 1$  By arithmetic

To prove (post):  $x \geq 0 \rightarrow \Box (x = 0 \rightarrow x = 0)$

True if  $x = 0 \rightarrow x = 0$

To illustrate how we have to think about picking  $V(n)$ , consider the slightly more complicated example

$$x \geq 0 \rightarrow \langle (x \leftarrow x - 2)^* \rangle (x = 0 \vee x = 1)$$

Consider what variant formula  $V(n)$  might allow us to do this proof.

We pick  $V(n) = (x = 2n \vee x = 2n + 1)$ . Then  $V(0) = (x = 0 \vee x = 1)$  and  $V(n - 1) = (x = 2n - 2 \vee x = 2n - 1)$ . We reason:

To prove (init):  $x \geq 0 \rightarrow \exists n. n \geq 0 \wedge (x = 2n \vee x = 2n + 1)$   
 True (every number is either even or odd)

To prove (step):  $x \geq 0 \rightarrow \square(\forall n. n > 0 \wedge (x = 2n \vee x = 2n + 1) \rightarrow \langle x \leftarrow x - 2 \rangle (x = 2n - 2 \vee x = 2n - 1))$

True if  $\forall n. n > 0 \wedge (x = 2n \vee x = 2n + 1 \rightarrow x - 2 = 2n - 2 \vee x - 2 = 2n - 1)$   
 By arithmetic

To prove (post):  $x \geq 0 \rightarrow \square(x = 0 \vee x = 1 \rightarrow x = 0 \vee x = 1)$

True if  $x = 0 \vee x = 1 \rightarrow x = 0 \vee x = 1$  Valid

## 6 Interactions Between Box and Diamond

Already, the axiom of convergence mixes  $[\alpha]P$  and  $\langle \alpha \rangle P$ . This interaction is a bit tricky, so we consider a few simpler cases on how these modalities interact.

$$[\alpha](P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow ([\alpha]P \rightarrow [\alpha]Q) \quad \text{Valid}$$

If  $P$  implies  $Q$  in every poststate of  $\alpha$ , then if  $P$  is also true in every poststate, so must  $Q$  be.

$$\langle \alpha \rangle(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\langle \alpha \rangle P \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle Q) \quad \text{Not valid}$$

There is a poststate in which  $P$  implies  $Q$  and also a poststate in which  $P$  is true. Since these two poststate may be different, we cannot be certain that there will be a poststate in which  $Q$  is true.

$$[\alpha](P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\langle \alpha \rangle P \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle Q) \quad \text{Valid}$$

If  $P$  implies  $Q$  in every poststate of  $\alpha$ , then this will also be true in the poststate in which  $P$  is true. Therefore,  $Q$  will be true in that poststate.

In the next two we explore the consequence of an invariant  $J$

$$[\alpha]J \rightarrow (\langle \alpha \rangle(J \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle Q) \quad \text{Valid}$$

If  $J$  is true in every poststate of  $\alpha$ , and there is a poststate where  $J$  implies  $Q$ , then  $Q$  must be true in that poststate.

$$[\alpha]J \rightarrow (\langle \alpha \rangle Q \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle(J \wedge Q)) \quad \text{Valid}$$

If  $J$  is true in every poststate of  $J$ , and there is a poststate where  $Q$  is true, then both  $J$  and  $Q$  must be true in that poststate.

## 7 From Variant Formulas to Variant Expressions

We generalize the axiom of convergence with *variant predicates* to one with *variant expressions* allowing “big steps” where the expressions may decrease by more than 1. In this formulation we explicitly highlight an invariant  $J$  together with the variant expression  $e$ . Both of these may mention program variables but not the new variable  $n$  which tracks the value of the variant in the axiom. This closely approximates what the verification condition generator for Why3 does for while-loops.

One of the key ideas here is that the invariant may help us to establish the variant. In lecture we stated:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha^* \rangle Q \leftarrow & J \\ & \wedge \Box(J \rightarrow e \geq 0) \\ & \wedge \Box(\forall n. J \wedge e = n \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle (J \wedge e < n)) \\ & \wedge \Box(J \rightarrow Q) \\ & (n \text{ not in } J, e, \text{ or } Q) \end{aligned}$$

While this is true, this is not very useful:<sup>1</sup> if we know  $J$  and  $\Box(J \rightarrow Q)$  then we can conclude  $\langle \alpha^* \rangle Q$  immediately with zero iterations.

So we skip to the version for while loops, recalling that

$$\text{while } P \alpha \triangleq (?P ; \alpha)^* ; ?\neg P$$

We can then justify the following axiom (which don't formally prove sound):

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \text{while } P \alpha \rangle Q \leftarrow & J \\ & \wedge \Box(J \wedge P \rightarrow e \geq 0) \\ & \wedge \Box(\forall n. J \wedge P \wedge e = n \rightarrow \langle \alpha \rangle (J \wedge e < n)) \\ & \wedge \Box(J \wedge \neg P \rightarrow Q) \\ & (n \text{ not in } \alpha, J, P, e, \text{ or } Q) \end{aligned}$$

As an example you may consider the following correctness statement for computing Fibonacci numbers, using simultaneous assignment as a shorthand.

$$x \geq 0 \rightarrow \langle a \leftarrow 0 ; b \leftarrow 1 ; i \leftarrow 0 ; \text{while } (i < x) (a, b \leftarrow b, a + b ; i \leftarrow i + 1) \rangle a = \text{fib } x$$

To conduct this proof we pick

$$\begin{array}{ll} e & = (x - i) & \text{variant expression} \\ J & = (0 \leq i \leq x \wedge a = \text{fib}(i) \wedge b = \text{fib}(i + 1)) & \text{invariant} \end{array}$$

It is then a mechanical exercise to verify the conditions of the axioms for while with invariants and variant expressions.

<sup>1</sup>as was pointed out by a student after lecture

## 8 Extending Our Why3 Formalization of Dynamic Logic

We can extend our formalization of dynamic logic by adding  $\langle \alpha \rangle Q$  as a new kind of formula and prove the new axioms. We did not do this in lecture, and we have not completed the development at the time of writing these lecture notes.