

Lecture 19: Online Learning (Part 1)

Learning/prediction in "Mistake-Bounded Model"

[[A bit different from the "competitive ratio" model...]]
still an "online" kind of problem, but...

Versus C.R.: - look at cost difference (versus ratio)
- don't compare to best poss. decisions
but to best fixed policy "in hindsight."

[[Not so clear yet, but will be. Kind of like situation where you have several possible algs you could use, want to not regret just picking one & sticking with it at end of day.]]

- Game: • Each day $t=1, 2, \dots, T$, you must predict 0 or 1.
 $a^t :=$ your action [prediction] eg. \uparrow "Bitcoin down" "Bitcoin up" (and you buy/sell accordingly)
- ~~Later~~ Later each day, an outcome σ^t occurs.
 - "Mistake" if $a^t \neq \sigma^t$. (Your goal, of course, is to make few mistakes over the course of time.)

[[Well, so far there's absolutely nothing for you to go on, so we need to have more...]]

- There are N quote-unquote "experts".
[[Don't assume anything about how much they "know". They're just people with predictions.]]

At start of each day (before you predict), experts make predictions $e_1^t, e_2^t, \dots, e_N^t \in \{0, 1\}$

[[As I said, these may or may not have anything to do with outcomes. They have to do with your ...]] Regret: After T days, how are you vs. Best Expert?

e.g. $N=4$:

	e_1	e_2	e_3	e_4	a	σ
$t=1$	1	1	1	0	1	1
2	1	0	1	1	1	0
3	0	1	1	0	1	1
4	1	1	1	0	1	0

x = mistake

Best expert: [retrospectively] 1 mistake
 You: 2 mistakes

• Dream (?) # Mistakes ≤ 1.01 (# Best expert's Mistakes)

• OK: # Mistakes $\leq 3 (\text{---}) + O(\log N)$

"additive term" (unavoidable)

[To see why additive term is unavoidable, suppose....]

Say I promise some mystery expert will make O mistakes.

[What should you do? Well, if anyone ever makes a mistake, henceforth ignore them. Among the rest.... go with majority?]

"Majority Alg":
 • Dump any expert making a mistake
 • O/w predict via majority.

Analysis: Each time you make a mistake, so did $\geq \frac{1}{2}$ of (remaining) experts
 \Rightarrow you dump $\geq \frac{1}{2}$ of remaining experts

\therefore you make $\leq \log_2 N + 1$ mistakes (Total, indep of T).

(vs. O of Best Expert). [This is optimal, and shows necessity of additive $O(\log N)$.]

Say Best Expert will make 5 (eg.) mistakes

Could still do "Majority" Alg... "resetting" if all experts get dumped

What's the worst scenario now?

You make up to $\log_2 N+1$ mistakes till Best Expert's 1st,

- + "more" " " " " 2nd,
- + " " " " " " 3rd
- + " " " " " " 4th
- + up to $\log_2 N+1$ more. 5th

o.o Your Mistakes $\leq (\log_2 N+1) (\# \text{ Best Expert mistakes}) + \log_2 N+1$

OK \nearrow sad is.

Better alg: Don't completely discount an expert after they make a mistake, just trust them less

"Weighted Majority" Alg: You store a "weight" ("trust amount") w_i^t for each expert i @ time t .

- Initially, $w_1^1 = w_2^1 = w_3^1 = \dots = w_N^1 = 1$,

- On day t , predict according to weighted majority, with w_i^t weights.
- After seeing outcome, halve the weight of each mistaken expert:

$$w_i^{t+1} = \begin{cases} w_i^t & \text{if } e_i^t = \sigma_t \\ w_i^t/2 & \text{if } e_i^t \neq \sigma_t \end{cases}$$

Analysis idea: Let $\Phi^t = w_1^t + w_2^t + \dots + w_N^t$ [total "trust" @ time t]

- ① If you make a lot of mistakes, Φ^t becomes small.
- ② If some expert i^* makes few mistakes, $\Phi^t \gg w_{i^*}^t \gg \text{large}$.

In more detail:

① Suppose you make a mistake one day.

At least half the total weight Φ^t gets halved.
↑ that contributing to wrong majority vote
↑ we chose halving factor.

$$\hookrightarrow \Phi^{t+1} \leq \frac{3}{4} \Phi^t$$

$$\therefore \Phi^{(T+1)} \leq \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^{\# \text{ your mistakes (YM)}} \cdot \Phi^{(1)}_N$$

② If i^* makes only BM ("Best Mistakes") mistakes, $w_{i^*}^{(T+1)} \geq \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{\# \text{ BM}}$

$$\therefore \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{\# \text{ BM}} \leq \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^{\# \text{ YM}} \cdot N$$

(reciprocal) $2^{\# \text{ BM}} \cdot N \geq \left(\frac{4}{3}\right)^{\# \text{ YM}} \Rightarrow \left(\log_2 \frac{4}{3}\right) \cdot (\# \text{ YM}) \leq \# \text{ BM} + \log_2 N$

$$\Rightarrow \text{Your Mistakes} \leq \frac{1}{\log_2 4/3} \cdot \left[(\# \text{ Best Mistakes}) + \log_2 N \right]$$

$$\approx 2.41$$

😊 Pretty good. (Better on multipliers, worse on additive term.)

Why be so harsh? Say we multiply wrong expert's weight by 0.98

Now: ① \geq half of Φ^t gets .98-timed.

$$\Rightarrow \Phi^{t+1} \leq \frac{1}{2} \Phi^t + \frac{1}{2} \cdot .98 \Phi^t = .99 \Phi^t$$

$$\textcircled{2} w_{i^*}^{(T+1)} \geq (.98)^{\# \text{ BM}}$$

$$\Rightarrow (.98)^{\# \text{ BM}} \leq (.99)^{\# \text{ YM}} \cdot N$$

(?)

(take logs) $(\#BM) \ln(.98) \leq (\#YM) \ln(.99) + \ln N$. (*) (5)

What's $\ln(.99)$? [Recall one of the greatest facts ever!!]

$$e^x \approx 1+x \quad \text{for small } x$$

$$\Rightarrow x \approx \ln(1+x) \quad (\text{took } \ln)$$

Subs $x = -.01 \rightarrow -.01 \approx \ln(.99)$

$$\therefore (*) \approx (-.02)(\#BM) \leq (-.01)(\#YM) + \ln N$$

$$(.01)(\#YM) \leq (.02)(\#BM) + \ln N$$

$$\#YM \leq 2(\#BM) + 100 \ln N$$

$$\uparrow \infty \quad \uparrow O(\log N) \dots$$

More precisely, using $\ln(1-\epsilon) \approx -\epsilon - \frac{1}{2}\epsilon^2 - \dots$

\leadsto If you penalize weight by factor $1-\epsilon$,

get $\#YM \leq 2(1+\epsilon)(\#BM) + \frac{\ln N}{\epsilon}$. \smile

Fact: No deterministic alg. can beat multiplicative factor 2.

Proof: Say just 2 experts:

e_1	e_2	a	σ
0	1	a^1	
1	0	a^2	
0	1	a^3	
1	0	a^4	
0	1	\vdots	
1	0	\vdots	
0	1	\vdots	

Det. alg. $\Rightarrow a^1, a^2, a^3, \dots$
 is fixed. An "adversary"
 designing outputs can always
 have $\sigma^t \neq a^t$.

\therefore Your Mistakes = T . But -

at least one expert
 must make $\leq T/2$
 mistakes!

Next time:

Beating factor-2
 with a randomized
 alg!