Program

Jump directly to Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday.

Registration: starting Monday 8:30am
Banquet: Tuesday 6:30pm
Welcome: Monday 8:50am-9:00am

Each invited talk is 60 minutes long. Contributed talks have been allocated 20 minutes each, including questions and change-over to the next speaker. Here is a rough schedule of the program (see the full program below for the exact time slots):

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday
8:50 Welcome
9:00 Budish (Invited)	9:00 Felten (Invited)	9:00 Laslier (Invited)
10:00 Coffee Break	10:00 Coffee Break	10:00 Coffee Break
10:30 Session 1	10:30 Session 6	10:30 Poster Session
11:30 Short Break	11:30 Short Break	11:30 Short Break
11:40 Session 2	11:40 Session 7	11:40 Session 10
12:40 Lunch	12:40 Lunch	12:40 Lunch
2:00 Session 3	2:00 Session 8	2:00 Session 11
3:00 Afternoon Snack	3:20 Afternoon Snack	3:20 Short Break
3:30 Session 4	3:50 Session 9	3:30 Session 12
4:30 Break	4:50 Short Break	4:10 Farewell cake
4:50 Session 5	5:00 Panel
5:50 Business Meeting
	6:30 Banquet

Monday, 23 June 2014

8:50-9:00  Welcome   (Registration: from 8:30 onwards)

9:00-10:00  Invited Talk   Efficient and Fair Course Allocation: Theory, Data, Experiments, and Practical Implementation Eric Budish

10:00-10:30  Coffee Break

10:30-11:30  Session 1: Voting and the Web (chair: Joerg Rothe) Finding a Collective Set of Items: From Proportional Multirepresentation to Group Recommendation Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Jerome Lang. Large-Scale Decision-Making via Small Group Interactions: The Importance of Triads Ashish Goel and David Lee. Approval Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls James Zou, Reshef Meir and David Parkes.

11:30-11:40  Short Break

11:40-12:40  Session 2: Scoring Rules (chair: Piotr Faliszewski) Universal and Symmetric Scoring Rules for Binary Relations William Zwicker. Voting with Rank Dependent Scoring Rules Judy Goldsmith, Jerome Lang, Nicholas Mattei and Patrice Perny. Axiomatic and Computational Aspects of Scoring Allocation Rules for Indivisible Goods Dorothea Baumeister, Sylvain Bouveret, Jerome Lang, Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Trung Thanh Nguyen, Joerg Rothe and Abdallah Saffidine.

12:40-2:00  Lunch

2:00-3:00  Session 3: Voting — Probabilistic Approaches (chair: Jeffrey Rosenschein) The Maximum Likelihood Approach to Voting on Social Networks Vincent Conitzer. Statistical Properties of Social Choice Mechanisms Lirong Xia. A Non-Parametric Test of Stochastic Preferences Bart Smeulders, Michel Regenwetter and Frits Spieksma.

3:00-3:30  Afternoon Snack

3:30-4:30  Session 4: Fair Division (chair: Ulle Endriss) Mechanism Design for Fair Division Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Gagan Goel. Manipulating Picking Sequences Sylvain Bouveret and Jerome Lang. Maximizing Nash Product Social Welfare in Allocating Indivisible Goods Andreas Darmann and Joachim Schauer.

4:30-4:50  Break

4:50-5:50  Session 5: Voting — Axiomatic Approaches (chair: William Zwicker) Agendas with Priority Sean Horan. On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Vincent Conitzer. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference for Collective Households Bart Smeulders, Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock, Frits Spieksma and Fabrice Talla Nobibon.

5:50-6:30  Business meeting

Tuesday, 24 June 2014

9:00-10:00  Invited Talk   From Choice to Consensus Edward Felten

10:00-10:30  Coffee Break

10:30-11:30  Session 6: Voting — Equilibria (chair: Brent Venable) A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria Reshef Meir, Omer Lev and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Analysis of Equilibria in Iterative Voting Schemes Zinovi Rabinovich, Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis and Jeffrey Rosenschein. On the Convergence of Iterative Voting: How Restrictive Should Restricted Dynamics Be? Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich and Nick Jennings.

11:30-11:40  Short Break

11:40-12:40  Session 7: Judgement Aggregation (chair: Umberto Grandi) Parameterized Complexity Results for Agenda Safety in Judgment Aggregation Ulle Endriss, Ronald de Haan and Stefan Szeider. Complexity of Manipulative Attacks in Judgment Aggregation for Premise-Based Quota Rules Dorothea Baumeister, Gabor Erdelyi, Olivia J. Erdelyi and Joerg Rothe. Interval Methods for Judgment Aggregation in Argumentation Richard Booth, Edmond Awad and Iyad Rahwan.

12:40-2:00  Lunch

2:00-3:20  Session 8: Cooperative Games (chair: Evangelos Markakis) Weighted Simple Games as Access Structures of Ideal Secret Sharing Schemes Ali Hameed and Arkadii Slinko. The Shapley Value in Budgeted Games Smriti Bhagat, Anthony Kim, S. Muthukrishnan and Udi Weinsberg. On the Effects of Priors in Weighted Voting Games Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Yair Zick and Yoram Bachrach. Non Myopic Collaborators (nearly) Get Their Way Yair Zick, Yoram Bachrach, Ian Kash and Peter Key.

3:20-3:50  Afternoon Snack

3:50-4:50  Session 9: Voting — Control and Manipulation (chair: Francesca Rossi) A Control Dichotomy for Pure Scoring Rules Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra and Henning Schnoor. Control in the Presence of Manipulators: Cooperative and Competitive Cases Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra. Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy Markus Brill and Vincent Conitzer.

4:50-5:00  Short Break

5:00-6:00  Panel Discussion: The Future of Computational Social Choice (moderator: Ariel Procaccia) Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang, Brent Venable.

6:30  Banquet at the Carnegie Museum of Natural History (5 min walk from campus)

Wednesday, 25 June 2014

9:00-10:00  Invited Talk   Representation Jean-Francois Laslier

10:00-10:30  Coffee Break

10:30-11:30  Poster Session

11:30-11:40  Break

11:40-12:40  Session 10: Stable Matching (chair: Mark Wilson) Soft Constraints in Stable Matching Problems Pietro De Caro, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi and Kristen Brent Venable. Preference Elicitation and Interview Minimization in Stable Matchings Joanna Drummond and Craig Boutilier. Stable Invitations Hooyeon Lee and Yoav Shoham.

12:40-2:00  Lunch

2:00-3:20  Session 11: Voting — Game-Theoretic Approaches (chair: Jerome Lang) Games Gibbard-Satterthwaite Manipulators Play Edith Elkind, Umberto Grandi, Francesca Rossi and Arkadii Slinko. Iterated Regret Minimization in Voting Games Miranda Emery and Mark Wilson. Pre-Vote Negotiations and Binary Voting with Constraints Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi and Paolo Turrini. Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving Felix Brandt and Christian Geist.

3:20-3:30  Short Break

3:30-4:10  Session 12: Voting — New Representations (chair: Reshef Meir) DEMOCRATIX: A Declarative Approach to Winner Determination Gunther Charwat and Andreas Pfandler. Voting with CP-nets Using a Probabilistic Preference Structure Cristina Cornelio, Umberto Grandi, Judy Goldsmith, Nicholas Mattei, Francesca Rossi and K. Brent Venable.

4:10-4:40  Farewell Cake